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Introduction

In his opinion for the Court in United States v. Lopez,1 Chief Justice
Rehnquist warned that under the government's expansive theory of the
Commerce Clause, "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement.., where States historically
have been sovereign."'2 Concerned that Congress might assume a "general
police power,"'3 the Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act 4 was
beyond Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.5 Scholars and
commentators question how far Lopez extends, 6 and it remains to be seen
whether Lopez has any real power to restrain Congress's creation of a broad,
7
duplicative criminal code.
1 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2 Id. at 564.
3 Id. at 567.
4 Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844 (1990) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)).
5 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
6

Lopez has occasioned an enormous amount of legal commentary. Two good symposia

include Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MiCH. L. Rv. 533 (1995) and
Symposium, The New FederalismAfter United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RaS. L. REV. 635
(1996).
7 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 33 (Supp. I 1995) (car bombs and bombs in parking structures); id.
§ 36 (1994) (drive-by shootings); id. § 43 ("animal enterprise terrorism" against, inter alia, a zoo,
aquarium, circus, or rodeo); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208,

§ 645(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-709 (1996) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 116) (female genital
mutilation); 18 U.S.C. § 228 (failure to pay child support); Church Arson Prevention Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat. 1392 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 247); 18 U.S.C. § 248
(freedom of access to abortion clinics); id. § 521 ("criminal street gangs"); id. § 844(i) (arson); id.
§ 1028 (fraud in connection with identification documents); id. § 1030 (fraud in connection with
computers); id. § 1992 (Supp. I 1995) (wrecking trains); id. § 2119 (1994) (carjacking); id. § 2261
(interstate domestic violence); see also Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the ProperLimits for FederalCriminal Jurisdiction,46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 979-81
& nn.2-9 (1995) (describing the rapid expansion of federal criminal law in the 1980s and 1990s);
Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 801, 812-17 (1996) [hereinafter Brickey, Life After Lopez] (suggesting a number of
ways Congress can correct the Gun-Free School Zones Act to survive constitutional challenge);
HeinOnline -- 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 2 1997-1998
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Lopez promises, at best, to be a limited restraint on Congress's power to
federalize crime because it applies only to Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause. Although this clause traditionally has been the most effective basis for Congress's creation of criminal laws, it is not the sole basis
on which Congress can rely. 8 Moreover, the Tenth Amendment offers little
hope of explaining why matters such as criminal law that, as the Court said,
have been "historically" within the states' sovereignty, 9 are constitutionally
within their sovereignty. The Tenth Amendment reassures us that whatever

has not been delegated to the United States has been reserved to the states
or the people, but (of itself) it cannot tell us what has been delegated or
reserved. 10 Clear constitutional confirmation of the historic sovereignty of
the states in the area of criminal law enforcement can come only from an
express reservation of state authority over crime or (what is functionally the
same) an express disabling of the United States.
Lost in the discussions of the federalization of crime is the one clause in
the Constitution that actually links Congress, the states, and the problem of
local crime: the Domestic Violence Clause. This clause represents precisely
Kathleen F. Brickey, CriminalMischief. The Federalizationof American Criminal Law, 46 HAsL.J. 1135, 1166-69 (1995) (counseling congressional restraint with respect to new federal
criminal legislation); Adam H. Kurland, FirstPrinciplesof American Federalism and the Nature
of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction,45 EMORY L.J. 1, 2-7 (1996) (noting that it is unclear what
impact Lopez will have on federal criminal law and the Commerce Clause); Gregory W.
O'Reilly & Robert Drizin, United States v. Lopez: Reinvigoratingthe FederalBalance by Maintaining the States' Role as the "Immediate and Visible Guardians"of Security, 22 J. LEGIS. 1, 8-12
(1996) (discussing the effects of "federal encroachment" on federalism, federal court caseloads,
and potential defendants); Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a PrincipledBasis
for Federal Criminal Legislation, 543 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 15, 22-26 (1996)
(proposing a framework of principles for federal intervention into criminal law).
Some commentators do not believe that federal criminal jurisdiction has extended too far.
See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised Constitutional
Theory or New Congressional Statutes, But the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutive Discretion,
46 HAsrIos LJ. 1175, 1216 (1995) (arguing that "[a]bstract questions of legal theory or governmental organizations have little to do with what our people want from our systems of criminal
justice"); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 247, 249-50 (1997) (stating that "[tihe image of a runaway national government increasingly taking away the enforcement of the criminal law from the States is essentially false").
8 Congress might, for example, rely on its power over bankruptcies, see U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cI. 4; 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (defining crimes in connection with bankruptcy); coining, weights
and measures, and counterfeiting, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 5-6; 18 U.S.C. §§ 331, 471-509
(defining crimes of counterfeiting of U.S. and foreign coins, securities, obligations, and official
papers); post roads, see U.S. CONsw. art. I, § 8, cl. 7; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342, 1691-1738 (defining
crimes in connection with the mails); naturalization, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1421-1429 (defining crimes in connection with immigration and naturalization); slavery, see
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIII, § 2; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1588 (defining crimes in connection with slave
trade); piracy, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1661 (defining crimes in connection with piracy); and U.S. territories and property, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; 18
U.S.C. §§ 1851-1864 (defining crimes in connection with public lands). See also Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39, 61 (1968) (upholding a revenue provision regulating intrastate illegal
gambling under Congress's taxing power); United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 401 (10th
Cir. 1990) ("Congress may, in any case, regulate or prohibit wagering activities pursuant to its
enumerated powers; to do so by means of a tax would not violate the Constitution.").
9 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
10 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
TINGS
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the Constitution's express commitment of general criminal law enforcement
to the states. Article IV, Section 4 provides:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."
Long ignored by courts, the Domestic Violence Clause recognizes the
primacy of the states in addressing domestic violence within their borders. It
imposes on the federal government a duty to protect states against domestic
violence, but only when states request assistance. The Domestic Violence
Clause plays the role of a Tenth Amendment for crime. It is a reaffirmation
of the enumerated powers doctrine 12 and a promise of federal noninterference that prohibits not only the uninvited use of federal forces to combat
crime, but also forbids federal legislation that displaces the states' obligation
to protect their citizens by suppressing domestic violence. As St. George
Tucker opined in one of the earliest commentaries on the Constitution:
[E]very pretext for intermeddling with the domestic concerns of any
state, under colour of protecting it against domestic violence is
taken away, by that part of the provision which renders an application from the legislative, or executive authority of the state endangered, necessary to be made to the federal government, before it's
13
[sic] interference can be at all proper.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lopez demonstrates how far our thinking about the power of the federal government to address domestic violence
has traveled from the thinking of St. George Tucker.' 4 This Article documents an important, but overlooked portion of that journey. Part I begins
with a discussion of the structure of state powers under the Constitution and
discusses the Supreme Court's current view of the powers of the United
States to define and punish crime. Part II then considers Lopez in greater
detail and explains why the Tenth Amendment does not offer a satisfactory
justification for exclusive state control over crime.
11 Id. art. IV, § 4.
12 The enumerated powers doctrine provides that Congress's power is limited to those
powers expressly conferred by the Constitution. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
358, 395 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[U]nder a constitution conferring specific powers, the power
contended for must be granted, or it cannot be exercised."); William Van Alstyne, Federalism,

Congress,the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769,

770-71.
13

1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE,

TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOvERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES;

OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. at 367 (photo. reprint 1996) (1803).
14 Compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long
steps down [the] road" towards recognizing a general police power under the Commerce
Clause), with 1 TUCKER, supra note 13, app. at 367 (stating that the Domestic Violence Clause
AND

takes away all power from Congress to intermeddle in a state's domestic affairs in the name of
protecting the state from domestic violence).
HeinOnline -- 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 4 1997-1998
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Part III reviews the adoption of the Domestic Violence Clause and the
Framers' diverse views regarding the power of the United States. This part
considers the early interpretation of federal power through congressional
criminal legislation, judicial enforcement, and executive intervention to suppress domestic violence in the states. Part IV examines the role of the Domestic Violence Clause in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment and
its enforcement and, in particular, the Civil Rights Act of 1871. These debates, as significant to the Fourteenth Amendment as the earlier debates and
legislation were to the original Constitution, demonstrated nearly polar views
of Congress's power to define national crimes. The Domestic Violence
Clause figured prominently in these debates.
Part V concludes with a discussion of the role of the Domestic Violence
Clause in delegating authority between the federal government and the
states. In particular, this part considers the clause's implications on Lopez
and future cases dealing with the scope of federal criminal authority.
This Article concludes that the Domestic Violence Clause has two functions: one procedural and the other substantive. First, it provides a mechanism by which a state can request federal assistance to suppress domestic
violence. This function represents the literal meaning of the clause. But the
Domestic Violence Clause has long had a more subtle meaning. It also
serves as a reassurance that the states have the primary duty to provide domestic tranquility, while the United States retains the obligation to insure it.
The clause thus provides a guarantee to the states that the federal government will not interfere with a state's administration over crime; a promise of
noninterference that extends not only to the use of federal troops, but also to
federal legislation that threatens to displace or co-opt the states' responsibility against domestic violence. 15
The Domestic Violence Clause has important implications for the federalization of crime. Although the clause does not supply a rule forbidding
federal criminal legislation and thus demarcating a line between federal and
state criminal jurisdiction, it creates a presumption demanding that Congress
justify an overlap of federal and state action against crime. At the least, the
Domestic Violence Clause provides independent reinforcement for the step
the Court took in Lopez to rein in congressional attempts to federalize crime
and may even justify closer scrutiny of such legislation.
II.
A.

The Problem of Exclusive State Powers

Defining Congress's Powers/DiscoveringState Powers: The Enigma of
the Half-Empty Glass

The "more perfect union" created by the Constitution did not assign or
divide power between the states and the national government in the same
way that it divided power among the three great departments of the national
15 See, e.g., Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994) (requiring
local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on handgun purchasers). The
Court recently held the "Brady Act" unconstitutional because it compelled state officers to exe-

cute federal law, in violation of the "dual sovereignty" principle. See Printz v. United States, 117
S. CL 2365, 2384 (1997).
HeinOnline -- 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 5 1997-1998
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government. In drafting the Constitution, the Framers confronted two separate problems of divided government: First, a horizontal division of power
among three branches collectively exercising the singular power of the
United States; and, second, a vertical demarcation of authority between dis-

tinct sovereigns exercising different powers.
Separation of powers described three entities exercising a single power;

federalism described two sets of sovereigns exercising two separate powers.
These differences required distinct approaches. In the first three articles of
the Constitution, the Framers took pains to set out the powers (the horizontal division) that would belong to each of the three departments of the new
national government. Each of these articles begins with an affirmative allo-

cation of power. 16 Separation of powers questions begin from the premise

that the national government, as a whole, possesses the power at issue; the

question is to which department the power has been granted. Federalism
questions begin from the quite different premise that states have the general

power of a sovereign, and the national government is of limited powers; the
question is whether there is any power in the national government at all and,
if so, whether that power is exclusive or concurrent.

The Framers began with the proposition that the people already had
granted all authority inherent in government to an existing set of sovereigns-the states-and that the states exercised that authority consistent with
the charters agreed upon between the people and the several states. 17 In the

Constitution, the states ceded a portion of their authority ("[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted") 18 to a new national sovereign. The Constitution
granted power to the national government and reserved power to the states,

but it did not grant power to the states. 19 The task for the Framers, accordingly, was to describe those powers actually granted to the national government, powers that might be exercised either exclusively, or concurrently with
the states.

In FederalistNo. 32, Alexander Hamilton described the mechanisms employed in the Constitution for distinguishing exclusive and concurrent pow16 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States."); id. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."); id. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."). There are, of course, significant differences between the
vesting clauses. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were To Govern": The
Need for PragmaticFormalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 479-80 (1991).
See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The StructuralConstitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1153 (1992) (discussing the structural relationships
between the branches of the federal government).
17 See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast. Democracy, Federalismand the Sirens' Song of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 500, 501-04 (1997) (discussing the roles of the people and the states in the formation of the Constitution).
18 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) ("[E]xcept as restrained and limited by [the Constitution, the states] possess and exercise the authority of independent States.").
19 See Thomas B. McAffee, The FederalSystem as Bill of Rights: Original Understandings,
Modern Misreadings,42 VILL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 6, on file with author).
HeinOnline -- 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 6 1997-1998
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ers.20 He offered two principal means for identifying exclusive powers in the
United States: First, where the Constitution expressly granted exclusive
power to the United States; second, where it granted power to the United
States and then prohibited the exercise of such power by the states. 2' He
illustrated the first case with the District of Columbia Clause: Congress may
"exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District." 22
The second was easily illustrated by the coinage clauses. 23 Article I, Section
8, granted Congress power to "coin Money,"2 4 a power that, in the absence of
any other provision, could be exercised concurrently by the states as well.
But Article I, Section 10, provided that "[n]o State shall ... coin Money," 25
making Congress's power to coin money exclusive;
the decision to coin or not
26
to coin money belonged to Congress alone.
Although it did not grant powers to the states, the Constitution ensured
exclusive powers in the states. This process was more complicated than
granting Congress exclusive powers. Unlike Congress, the states did not
need to plead the source of their powers affirmatively; they were assumed to
exercise general police powers.2 7 When state powers were concerned, the
inquiries were whether the exercise of power was consistent with the state's
constitution and within the general police power of any sovereign (ordinarily
not an inquiry for the Court), and whether the matter was granted exclusively
to Congress or otherwise prohibited to the states.28 Ordinarily, the absence
of an expressly defined power in the United States would leave the states
with the ability to exercise that power if it was consistent with a state's
29
constitution.
20

THE

21

See id.

FEDERALIST

No. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added); see Shoemaker v. United States, 147
U.S. 282, 298-300 (1893); THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton).

23

See THE

24

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.

FEDERALIST

No. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton).

25 Id. § 10, cl. 1.
26 Hamilton also argued that the United States has exclusive power when "a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant." THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton). He pointed to Congress's power to establish a
"uniform Rule of Naturalization," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 4, as one which must be exclusive
"because if each State had power to prescribe a DISTINCr RULE there could be no uNIFORm

RULE." THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton).
27 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 304, 325 (1816).
28 See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton).
29 The Tenth Amendment affirms this relationship. Whatever powers are "not delegated

to the United States by th[e] Constitution," and not "prohibited by [the Constitution] to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The
last phrase, reserving power to the States and the people, is a recognition of the relationship
between the states and their own citizens as codified in pre-existing state constitutions. The

Tenth Amendment does not calcify the relationship between a state and its citizens, but simply
recognizes that whatever power is not granted to Congress has been reserved to the states and
the people, and the states and the people may reallocate that power between them as they see
fit. See DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTrrUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUrSHELL 8-9 (2d ed. 1987);

see also McAffee, supra note 19 (manuscript at 28) (explaining that the Tenth Amendment, as
adopted, underscores "that it is the people who grant and reserve powers, to both federal and

state governments").
HeinOnline -- 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 7 1997-1998
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The states have exclusive power in three cases: (1) When the Constitution expressly recognizes power in the states; (2) when the power is expressly
forbidden to Congress (and not forbidden to the states); and (3) when the
power is not granted to Congress (and not forbidden to the states). The first
case is the least likely because the states are sovereigns with general powers.
One area in which the Constitution may actually have granted an express
power to the states is in the regulation of "intoxicating liquors. '30 "The
Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over
whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the
liquor distribution system."' 31 The second case is illustrated by the First
Amendment, which prohibits Congress from establishing religion, interfering
with religious free exercise, and abridging freedom of speech, press, and petition. 32 The First Amendment-at least prior to the Fourteenth Amendment-disabled Congress alone, thus guaranteeing exclusive state control
over speech, press, and religion, and protecting state religious
33
establishments.
Determining the third case-exclusive power in the states through the
absence of power in Congress-is a far more vexing task. In the first two
cases our task was to find either a constitutional provision conferring power
on the states or a clause denying power to Congress, but our task in the third
case is to prove a negative: that, with respect to a particular subject, the Constitution does not confer any such power on Congress, nor deny it to the
states. Because of the structure of our Constitution, we must approach the
question of exclusive state powers with some caution. The Court's experi-.
30 "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
31 California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110
(1980); see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S.

335, 356 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Twenty-first Amendment was intended to

return absolute control of the liquor trade to the States, and... the Federal Government could
not use its Commerce Clause powers to interfere in any manner with the States' exercise of the
power conferred by the Amendment."); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 712
(1984) ("[Section] 2 reserves to the States power to impose burdens on interstate commerce in
intoxicating liquor that, absent the [Twenty-first] Amendment, would clearly be invalid under
the Commerce Clause."). But cf. Laurence Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really
Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibitionto the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST.
COMMENTARY 217, 218-20 (1995) (arguing that the Twenty-first Amendment was intended to
empower the states, but in fact prohibits directly the conduct that it meant to authorize states to
prohibit).
32 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
33 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 397-98 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting); see
also Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845) ("The Constitution makes
no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is
left to the state constitutions and laws ....
); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1272-75 (1992) (explaining the federalism-based
theory of the First Amendment; noting that the theory has not been accepted by federal courts);
Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the FirstAmendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1555-66, 1571-76 (1995) (discussing the text
and history of the First Amendment and explaining why it applied only to Congress).
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ence with this problem has not been a pleasant one.34 In New York v. United
States,35 the Court observed that the division of authority between the federal
government and the states could be determined in two ways: by asking
whether the Constitution delegated such power to Congress, or by asking

36
whether the matter was reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.
The Court then stated:

[Tihe two inquiries are mirror images of each other. If a power is
delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment
expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a
power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not con37

ferred on Congress.

Because the enumerated powers doctrine applies only to the federal
government, the Court's "mirror images" analogy does not work. It is not
true that if a power is delegated to Congress, the states "disclaim[ ] any reservation of that power. 38s The statement is true only if the power one is concerned with is an exclusive power; the Constitution is replete with powers
granted to Congress that are exercised concurrently with the states. Similarly, reserved powers also may be concurrent powers, so that a power might
be reserved to the states through the Tenth Amendment and still have been
conferred upon Congress. 39 Only if a power has been reserved exclusively to
the states can one say that the Constitution does not confer such power on
Congress.
Determining the powers exclusively reserved to the states is not as facile
as the Court makes it sound. In New York, the Court compounded its "mirror images" theme:
[J]ust as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference
whether one views the question at issue ...as one of ascertaining
the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under
34 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (stating
that, with rare exception, "the Constitution does not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace"); National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) ("[T]here are attributes of sovereignty attaching to
every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack
an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution
prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner."), overruled by Garcia,469 U.S. at 557.
35 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
36 See id. at 155-56; see, e.g., Garcia, 469U.S. at 547-48.
37 New York; 505 U.S. at 156.
38 Id.
39 Taxing and spending is an easy one. As Hamilton explained: "There is plainly no expression in the granting clause which makes [the taxing] power exclusive in the Union. There is
no independent clause or sentence which prohibits the States from exercising it." THE FEDERALis-r No. 32, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). He concluded that the
taxing power (other than on imports and exports) was "manifestly a concurrent and coequal
authority in the United States and in individual States." Id.; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824) ("The power of taxation is indispensible to [the states'] existence, and is
a power which ... is capable of residing in, and being exercised by, different authorities at the
same time.").
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the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning
the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth
40
Amendment.
Again, the Court employed a flawed analogy. The Court admitted that
"the Tenth Amendment 'states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered,"'41 but did not believe it. Knowing that the top half of a
cup is empty tells us nothing about the contents of the bottom half of the cup
(just as knowing that the bottom half of a cup contains milk tells us nothing
about the top half of the cup). Knowing that Congress has power over a
particular matter tells us nothing about the power of the states over that matter unless we know whether Congress's power is exclusive. Conversely,
knowing that the states have power over a matter does not mean that Congress may not concurrently exercise such a power. The Constitution simply
does not treat the question of congressional and state powers symmetrically.
One employs different mechanisms for locating the boundaries of congressional or state authority, respectively.
This discussion is altogether relevant to an important question for those
who remain concerned with constitutional federalism: Are there any matters
which yet belong uniquely to the states? If there are, one cannot prove them
by virtue of the Tenth Amendment, 42 but only by showing that the Constitution confers no such power on Congress, that the Constitution expressly con505 U.S. at 159.
Id. at 156 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)). The enumerated
powers doctrine generally has failed. See Van Alstyne, supra note 12, 773 n.15.
The doctrine of enumerated powers, standing alone, is ideologically indifferent to
federalism interests; the tenth amendment is not ....
The tenth amendment is a
significant counter referent against which the fairness of interpreting enumerated
powers may be measured. Its dismissal as a "truism" . . . [in Darby] was more
hubris than insight, a reflection of judicial values in the age of the national state.
Id.
42 The Tenth Amendment has no substantive content. See Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d
452,455 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[Ihe Tenth Amendment does not independently provide a substantive
limitation on the powers of the United States."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2507 (1997). Rather, the
Amendment is best viewed as a rule of construction, to prevent the inference that Congress had
power over all matters not specifically excepted in the new Bill of Rights. See David N. Mayer,
Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court's Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP.
U. L. REv. 339, 352 (1996). Professor Mayer wrote:
[T]he Tenth Amendment was prompted, first, by Antifederalist fears about the imperfect enumeration of powers in the Constitution-particularly the vagueness of
the "necessary and proper" clause-and, second, by the Federalist argument that
the addition of a bill of rights to the Constitution would be "dangerous" because it
would jeopardize the enumerated powers scheme of Article I. The Amendment
was intended to provide a rule of construction against additional federal powers
being inferred from the absence of limitations, or rights provisions ....
Id.
Professor Merritt has argued that the Republican Guarantee Clause offers stronger support
for federalism than the Tenth Amendment. Deborah Jones Merritt, The GuaranteeClause and
State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 2 & n.8 (1988). In her
view, states cannot enjoy republican governments when expansive congressional legislation interferes severely with state autonomy. See id. This Article demonstrates that the Domestic Violence Clause provides even greater textual support for state autonomy to govern a particular
area-criminal law enforcement.
40
41
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fers the power on the states, or that the Constitution disables Congress. The
question is not purely academic, but instead is of current concern to a Court
determined to retrench or at least hold the line against expansion of federal
powers.

43

The Court's concern is manifest in its recent decision in United States v.
Lopez,44 in which the Court struck down a provision of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 that prohibited "any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that [he] knows.., is a school zone. ' 45 The Court found
that Congress may regulate three classes of activity under the Commerce
Clause: the use of the channels of interstate commerce; instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, such as vehicles or railroads used to facilitate interstate
commerce, as well as persons and things in interstate commerce; and those
46
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
The United States did not argue that firearm possession was a channel or
an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Rather, the government claimed
that Congress properly regulated gun possession within a school zone as an
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce because firearm possession may result in violent crime in schools, which affects the national economy in a number of ways. 47 Violent crime in schools imposes insurance costs,
reduces our willingness to travel to certain areas of the country, and threatens the educational process.48 Reflecting on the government's argument, the
Court observed that
under the Government's ...reasoning, Congress could regulate any

activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of
individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and
child custody), for example. Under the theories that the Government presents ....
it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
49
where States historically have been sovereign.
The Court's syllogism-if we accept the Solicitor General's position,
then Congress can regulate family law, criminal law enforcement, and education-takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum argument. An unstated, but
necessary, premise in the Court's reasoning is that family law, criminal law
enforcement, and education are not within Congress's powers. Therefore, if
one accepts the Solicitor General's position, two contradictory premises are
43 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995); see also U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 841 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Federal Govern-

ment must be held within the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to the States."). But see Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MicH. L. REv. 674, 72829, 733-35 (suggesting that, after Lopez, "the Court does not intend further dramatic cuts in
Congress's Commerce Clause power").
44
45

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994) (originally codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp.

V 1993)). This provision was subsequently amended to add congressional findings. See Lopez,

514 U.S. at 563 n.4.
46 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
47 See id. at 563.
48 See id.
at 563-64.
49 Id. at 564.
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created: Congress can regulate family law (by virtue of the Commerce
Clause), and Congress cannot regulate family law (because of "
). But
how does the Court fill in the blank to explain why Congress cannot regulate
family law?
The New York Court might have answered with a "mirror image" argument: To paraphrase the Court, one might say that family law, criminal law
enforcement, and education are not within Congress's powers, or one could

say that family law, criminal law enforcement, and education are within the

states' sovereignty.50 But how can we prove that the latter is true? Simply
because the states "historically" have governed a particular subject matter

does not necessarily mean that the states "exclusively" govern that subject
matter. The Court has offered us an empty concern, a specter that the Court
itself has no tools for capturing.
B.

Congress and "Historical"State Subject Matter

The Lopez court identified three areas of the law traditionally dominated by state law: family law, education, and criminal law enforcement.
One should also add real property to these categories. How exclusive are the
states' historical powers in these four areas? As one might have guessed, not

very exclusive.
1.

Domestic Relations

The area of domestic relations "has long been regarded as a virtually
exclusive province of the States."'51 "The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States
and not to the laws of the United States." 2 Even "[o]n the rare occasion
when state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute," the
Court has limited preemption to those cases in which Congress "'positively
''53
required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-empted.
Until recently, there were few occasions for federal interference with

state domestic relations law. Beginning in 1884, amendments to the Constitution were proposed to give Congress the formal power to enact uniform

domestic relations laws. 54 All were ultimately rejected.5 5 More recently-

50 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
51 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
52 Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593-94 (1890)); see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 697-701 (1992) (reaffirming a "domestic relations" exception to the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction; holding that the exception exists by virtue of statute, not Article III); Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379,
384 (1930) ("[D]omestic relations of husband and wife ... [are] matters reserved to the States.");
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 32 (1903) ("[Tlhe Constitution of the United States confers
no power whatever upon the government of the United States to regulate marriage in the States
or its dissolution.").
53 Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581 (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)).
54 See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 364 n.13 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); HERMAN AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DUR-

ITS HISTORY, H.R. Doc. No. 54-353, pt. 2, at 190 (1896). See
generally H.R. REP. No. 52-1290 (1892).
55 See Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 364 n.13.
ING THE FIRST CENTURY OF
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and despite Justice Holmes's warning that "[c]ommerce depends upon population, but Congress could not, on that ground, undertake to regulate marriage and divorce" 56 -federal legislation in the domestic relations area has
expanded greatly.5 7 The Court's rhetoric has been loud, but when Congress
has acted in an area traditionally-and some thought, exclusively-belonging
to the states, the enumerated powers doctrine has done little to restrain Congress's activity.58
2. Property and Inheritance

Understanding the relationship between the states and the federal government with respect to the transfer and use of real property has become
increasingly complicated. Property law, which regulates the ownership and
transfer of real and personal property, has remained, quite naturally, under
the control of the states. In general, the Supreme Court has thought that the
"devolution of property.., is an area normally left to the States," 59 as a "part
of the residue of sovereignty retained by the states, a residue insured by the
Tenth Amendment. '60 Indeed, as early as Swift v. Tyson, 61 the Court's example of "state laws strictly local" were "rights and titles to things having a
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 402 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A; Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z to 300z-10 (1994); Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, id.
§§ 620-628, 670-679a; Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, id. §§ 5101-5107, 5116a-5116i, 5118-5118e; Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, id.
§§ 5111-5115; Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, id. §§ 10401-10418; Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990, id. §§ 13001-13055; see also
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 715 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting "the expansion in recent years of federal law in the domestic relations area").
58 See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 114, 119 (1946) (upholding the conviction
of polygamists under a statute prohibiting the transportation of women across state lines for
"immoral purposes," and stating that "[t]he fact that the regulation of marriage is a state matter
does not, of course, make the Mann Act an unconstitutional interference by Congress with the
police powers of the states").
More recently, federal courts have upheld the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18
U.S.C. § 228, although several district courts initially held the Act unconstitutional under Lopez.
See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1233 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'g 902 F. Supp. 727
(W.D.Tex. 1996); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'g 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v.
Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1040 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1004
(10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 753 (1997); United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 791
(9th Cir. 1996), rev'g 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (D. Ariz. 1995), cert denied, 117 S.Ct. 1567 (1997);
United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 784 (1997).
59 United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961) (upholding the escheatment of estate
of a veteran without heirs, who died in a veterans hospital); see John Marshall, A Friendof the
Constitution, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 173 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) ("Congress certainly may not, under the pretext.., of guaranteeing to
each state a republican form of government, alter the law of descents ....).
60 United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1950); see also Oregon, 366 U.S. at 654
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]here is nothing more deeply imbedded in the Tenth
Amendment, as I read history, than the disposition of the estates of deceased people").
61 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), overruled on other grounds, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
56
57
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permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character. ' 62
On the other hand, Congress possesses some direct power over property.
For example, Congress has express control over property in the District of
Columbia and U.S. territories. 63 The United States also owns property
outside the District of Columbia and the territories, and exercises control as
an owner. 64 Additionally, a federal claim to property may trigger an obligation to pay compensation under the Takings Clause. 65 Less directly, the
United States successfully has asserted control of land use under the Treaty
Power,66 enacted rent controls and survivorship rules for military life insurance under its war powers, 67 and prohibited discrimination in housing
through the Thirteenth Amendment. 68 Through its commerce power, Congress has regulated land use through numerous environmental statutes 69 and,
more recently, required that buildings accommodate the disabled. 70
62 Id. at 18.
63 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see also Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.

135, 158 (1921) (involving rent control in the District of Columbia); Gibbons v. District of Co-

lumbia, 116 U.S. 404, 407 (1886) (involving property taxes in the District of Columbia); United
States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840) (explaining that "territory" in the Property

Clause means "land"); Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 337 (1810) (holding that Congress
has the power to govern and legislate for the Orleans territory, acquired through the Louisiana
Purchase).
64 See 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (1994) (authorizing quiet title actions against the United States
when the United States claims a lien).
65 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-67 (1946) (hold-

ing that the use of airspace may render the property below uninhabitable and thus compensable
under the Fifth Amendment).
Congress may also have the power to "to create a separate 'Federal law' as to what constitutes real property for Federal condemnation." United States v. Certain Property Located in the
Borough of Manhattan, 306 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1962) (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)); see, e.g., Private Property Rights Restoration Act, S. 145, 104th
Cong. (1995) (requiring compensation to landowners whose property value is significantly reduced by federal government action).
66 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty Act against a Tenth Amendment challenge).
67 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S.
655, 658, 661 (1950) (upholding the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940); Woods v.

Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 142, 144 (1948) (upholding the Housing and Rent Act of 1947
under Congress's war power, but recognizing that a broad interpretation of war power might
"not only swallow up all other powers of Congress but largely obliterate the Ninth and the Tenth
Amendments as well").
68 See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIII, § 2; United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 573 (6th
Cir. 1981); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hunter,
459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir. 1972).
69 See, e.g., Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464; Wood Resi-

due Utilization Act of 1980, id. §§ 1681-1687; Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 ("CERCLA"). Compare United States v. NL Indus.,
936 F. Supp. 545, 563 (S.D. Ill. 1996) (upholding CERCLA under the Commerce Clause), with

United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1503 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that, on the facts
of the case, CERCLA violated the Commerce Clause), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.
1997).
70 See Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Congress reHeinOnline -- 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 14 1997-1998
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One area of property regulation that has remained largely with the states
71
is the transfer of property through inter vivos or testamentary disposition.
The Court has long observed that "regulating the manner and term upon
which property real or personal within its dominion may be transmitted by
last will and testament, or by inheritance" is "nothing more than an exercise
of the power which every state and sovereignty possesses ....

."7

Yet even

here, the Court has affirmed Congress's control over the property of veterans
who died intestate in a Veterans' Administration Hospital, by virtue of Con73
gress's power to raise armies and maintain navies and conduct war.
Although states still have substantial control over zoning regulations,
property transfers, and testamentary dispositions, there seems to be little
question that all of these matters affect commerce and might be brought
within Congress's Commerce Clause powers. Property and inheritance, as an
area of state dominion, seems to rest on congressional sufferance rather than
any particular constitutional doctrine.
3. Education
In Brown v. Board of Education,74 the Court observed that "education is

perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. ' 75 This
statement echoes earlier recognition of the intimate relationship among the
state, families, and schools. 76 To say that states have historically taken the
lead in the field of education is not equivalent, however, to stating that they
possess exclusive power over education. If Congress and the President's recent efforts in this area are any indication, there is much evidence to the
contrary.77

cited both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the sources of
power by which it could legislate the Act. See id. § 12101(b)(4).
71

See United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1950); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503,

517 (1947); Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942).
72
73

Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490, 493 (1850).
See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643,648-49 (1961); see also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8,

cls. 11-16.
74

347 U.S. 483 (1954)

75

Id. at 493.

76

See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) ("There is no doubt as to the

power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of basic education."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
77 See, e.g., Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 128 (1994)
(codified, in part, as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-6084 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)); Remarks at the
Presidential Scholars Awards Presentation Ceremony, in PUa. PAPERS 912, 914-15 (June 21,
1995) (discussing education legislation); Joint Statement by the President and the Governors on
a Process for Measuring and Reporting on Progress Toward the National Education Goals, in
Pun. PAPERS 1078 (July 31, 1990) (establishing a National Education Goals Panel); see also
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 631-36 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing congressional
hearings and materials related to education).
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C. Dual Remedies, Dual Sovereignties, and Federal Criminal Law
Even though the Lopez Court identified "criminal law enforcement" as
a matter historically belonging to the states,78 Part II.B did not discuss crimes
or law enforcement because criminal law presents a problem quite distinct
from other historical state subject matter. The Court's inclusion of criminal
law with family law and education was a mistake in categorization. Crime is
improperly added to the preceding list, not because it does not belong to the
states, but because "crimes" are not a subject matter in the same way that
"property," "inheritance," and "domestic relations" are said to be subjects
within the law. Rather, criminal sanctions have long been recognized as a
particular kind of remedy within the law.79 Just as we contrast criminal procedure with civil procedure, we ordinarily contrast criminal sanctions with
civil sanctions.80 Crimes are sanctioned, even in the absence of any actual
damage, because they are viewed as wrongs against the public interest. Civil
sanctions, on the other hand, typically are applied when some actual harm to
an individual has occurred. In other words, criminal law provides a public
remedy, while torts provide a private remedy. 81 Furthermore, the remedies
for harm to property often differ from the remedies for harm to the family.
For years, the remedy for beating one's spouse was divorce, not jail.82 Only3
recently has spouse abuse come to have both a public and a private remedy.
These differences reveal that it is difficult to say that the defining and
punishing of crimes is a matter historically belonging to the states. If it is so,
it is because the underlying subject matter to which we have applied public
sanction was a matter belonging to the states. This hypothesis, however, does
not address the issue of federal power over crimes any more than stating that
domestic relations, property, and education belong to the states.
Does Congress have a general power over crime? 84 Or, stated differently, does Congress have the power to make criminal sanctions a remedy for
the violation of federal law? The answer appears obvious in light of the innumerable federal criminal laws that Congress has enacted. 85 The answer may
be obvious, but the rationale is not. In the ordinary case, a sovereign has the
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
See Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EmORY L.J. (forthcoming Jan. 1998) (manuscript at 9-10, on file with author); David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in
the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REv. 59, 83 (1996) ("What is remarkable about the actions
that formed our categories of crime and tort is that they were choices. Crime and tort were
different ways for a victim to pursue justice for the same wrongful act."); cf.Kenneth Mann,
Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J.
1795, 1803-13 (1992) (describing the elements of the law of sanctions, that is crimes and torts, as
including the definition of the wrong, a purpose, a procedure, and a remedy).
80 See Mann, supra note 79, at 1803-04.
81 See id. at 1806-07.
82 See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2130-34 (1996).
83 See id. at 2170-71.
84 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
Constitution does not contain an explicit delegation to the Federal Government of the power to
define and administer the general criminal law.").
85 See examples cited supra note 7.
78
79
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right to punish violations of its own laws. But the United States, as a federal
system, is not the ordinary case because when we are physically present in
the United States, we are subject simultaneously to the jurisdiction of two
sovereigns. "Where a person owes a duty to two sovereigns, he is'86amenable
to both for its performance; and either may call him to account.
Even in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative to punish, the enumerated powers constrain Congress. The Constitution expressly grants to Congress the power to punish in three cases: counterfeiting securities and coin of
the United States, piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and treason. 87 Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,8 8 one reasonably might argue that, by granting Congress the power to punish these
matters, the Framers intended to establish the whole of Congress's power to
define crimes. As Chief Justice Marshall asked in McCulloch v. Maryland:
"[W]hence arises the power to punish, in cases not prescribed by the constitution?" 89 He answered: "[T]he power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as
incidental to his constitutional powers." 90 From early on, however, Congress
not only punished the three crimes enumerated in the Constitution, but also
crimes related to its other substantive powers as a remedy "necessary and
proper" to the exercise of these powers. 91 For example, it exercised the
power to punish crimes physically committed in locations where it had plenary authority: the military, 92 the District of Columbia, 93 and U.S. property
and territories. 94 Congress exercised this authority in these jurisdictions even
when the subject matter of the crime was one that fell within an area historically regulated by the states, such as marriage. 95
Does Congress possess the power to punish crimes that are not defined
in the Constitution and are not physically committed in locations subject to
exclusive federal control? Congress, in fact, has defined and punished crimes
in other areas over which it has power, 96 notably, commerce among the
86 Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,389 (1879); see also Moore v. Illinois, 55 (14 How.) 13,20
(1852) ("Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be
said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns.[sic] and liable to punishment for an infraction of the
laws of either.")
87 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.6 (counterfeiting); id. art. I, § 8, cl.10 (piracies); id. art.
III, § 3, cl.
2 (treason).
88 "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
89 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416 (1819).
90 Id. at 418.
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18.
92 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1994) (providing generally for a court-martial to punish,
among other things, all "crimes and offenses not capital" by members of the military).
93 See, e.g., An Act to Create a Metropolitan Police District of the District of Columbia,
and to Establish a Police Therefor, ch. 62, 12 Stat. 320 (1861); An Act for the Punishment of
Crimes in the District of Columbia, ch. 37, 4 Stat. 448 (1831).
94 See, e.g., An Act to Authorize Protection to be Given to Citizens of the United States
Who May Discover Deposites of Guano, ch. 164, § 6, 11 Stat. 119, 120 (1856); An Act for the
Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790).
95 See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1561 (prohibiting bigamy and polygamy in the Virgin Islands); see
also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878) (affirming a conviction in the Utah Territory under the federal bigamy statute).
96

See FRANcis

WHARTON,
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states. 97 Thus, even though Congress has no express power to address ques-

tions of morality, such as lotteries, prostitution, or even sodomy, the Court
has acquiesced to the exercise of such power when it was nominally attached
to something dealing with interstate commerce. 98 Congress's ability to enact

criminal laws involving interstate commerce has resulted in a substantial
overlap between state and federal criminal laws. 99
The steady expansion of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause

has given rise to the question whether there is any area that Congress cannot
reach through federal criminal laws? Commentators have long assumed that
"there is no serious restriction on what Congress may or may not choose to
criminalize, aside from such considerations of self-restraint as Congress itself
may be inclined, politically, to observe."' 100 In Lopez, the Court indicated
that there were still some limits on the scope of federal power over com-

merce.' 0 ' But even if the Court ultimately fails to establish real limits on

Congress's Commerce Clause power, one would be remiss to conclude that

Congress has plenary power to punish crime. One must not only ask if there
is a basis for congressional action, but also whether the Constitution disables

Congress. Although Congress can properly make it a crime to steal mail, it
cannot make it a crime to steal mail from Presbyterians, or even make it a
crime to steal mail from everyone except Presbyterians. In doing so, Congress would violate the First Amendment (and likely the Equal Protection
80-85 (Philadelphia, James Kay, Kun. and Brother 1852) (describing federal criminal laws).
Brief histories of the federalization of crime may be found in John S. Baker, Jr., Nationalizing
CriminalLaw: Does Organized Crime Make It Necessary or Proper?, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 495, 499531 (1985); Sara Sun Beale, Reporter's Draftfor the Working Group on Principlesto Use When
Consideringthe Federalizationof CriminalLaw, 46 HASTrNGS L.J. 1277, 1278-82 (1995); Andrew
Weis, Note, Commerce Clause in the Cross-Hairs:The Use of Lopez-Based Motions to Challenge
the Constitutionalityof FederalCriminal Statutes, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1436-38 (1996).
97 See Baker, supra note 96, at 518-31. But see Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96-97, 99
(1879) (striking a trademark counterfeiting provision on the grounds that the State impermissibly embraced all commerce, not just intrastate commerce); United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 41, 44-45 (1869) (striking a federal criminal statute prohibiting the sale of certain oils on
grounds that Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause).
98 Essentially, many of the crimes enacted under the Commerce Clause fall within Congress's reach simply when persons engaging in otherwise intrastate conduct cross a state line.
See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150-57 (1971) (loansharking); United States v. Five
Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953) (upholding a statute providing for the seizure and forfeiture of gambling devices, but affirming the dismissal of indictments that failed to allege that the
devices in question had travelled in or affected interstate commerce); Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917) (upholding the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910, which prohibited the
transportation of women for immoral purposes); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903)
(The Lottery Case) (prohibiting the transportation of lottery tickets across state lines); see also
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946) (upholding the Mann Act, which outlaws the
transportation across state lines of "any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose").

99 See Paul D. Carrington, Federal Use of State Institutions in the Administration of Crimi-

nal Justice, 49 SMU L. REv. 557, 558 (1996) ("[M]ost federal criminal law is now redundant to
State systems of criminal justice.").
100 William Van Alstyne, Dual Sovereignty, Federalism, and National Criminal Law: Modernist ConstitutionalDoctrineand the Nonrole of the Supreme Court, 26 AM. CRIM.L. REv. 1740,

1750 (1989); see Baker, supra note 96, at 501.
to' See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995).
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Clause). These provisions are external constraints on otherwise legitimate
exercises of congressional power.
There are two methods that might disable Congress from exercising general criminal power. 02 First, Congress might be implicitly disabled because
the states have been empowered expressly to deal with the subject matter.
Second, the Constitution might expressly disable Congress. The remainder
of this Article is devoted to the question whether the Domestic Violence
Clause is a disability on Congress, prohibiting it from interfering-either directly through the use of U.S. law enforcement officials, or indirectly through
the establishment of federal criminal laws-in the domestic affairs of the
states.
Ii.

The Domestic Violence Clause and the Scope of Federal Power
Over Crime

In 1786, British traders refused credit to or payment in goods from cashstrapped Boston merchants, who in turn demanded that Western Massachusetts subsistence farmers pay their debts in hard currency. 10 3 Unable to meet
these demands or to obtain legislative relief, the cash-poor farmers faced
debtors' courts and prison.10 4 Outraged citizens convened at town meetings
to protest the debtor proceedings and to demand the abolition of the state
senate and courts. 105 The meetings turned into armed mobs that were led by
Revolutionary War veterans, including Daniel Shays, who vented their frustrations by closing the courts. 10 6 Massachusetts Governor James Bowdoin
dispatched the state militia to protect the courts, but the militia's numbers
proved inadequate. 1°7 Congress, justifiably worried that rebellion might
erupt in other states, 08 called for additional federal troops from surrounding
states. 10 9 Its request largely went ignored. 110 In the meantime, rumors
abounded that the protesters had sought assistance from the British in Can102 See text accompanying supra notes 30-33.
103 See David Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion in Springfield, in SHAYs' REBELLION: SELECTED
ESSAYS 1, 3-7 (Martin Kaufman ed., 1987) [hereinafter Szatmary, Rebellion in Springfield]; see
also ROBERT J. TAYLOR, WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE REVOLUTION 128-36 (1954). Shays'

Rebellion was both a class and a rural/urban struggle. The urban merchant classes were better
suited to paying taxes in cash than their poor, landed compatriots. See TAYLOR, supra, at 133;
Szatmary, Rebellion in Springfield,supra, at 5-6. On the class nature of the rebellion, see Millard
Hansen, The Significance of Shays' Rebellion, 39 S. ATLAr~ic. Q. 305, 306-08 (1940).
104

See Szatmary, Rebellion in Springfield, supra note 103, at 5-6.

105 See TAYLOR, supra note 103, at 136-41.

See id. at 143-49, 154, 156-57; Szatmary, Rebellion in Springfield, supranote 103, at 7-10.
See TAYLOR, supra note 103, at 150, 158; see also MARION L. STARKEY, A LrrrLE REBELLION 91 (1955).
106
107

108 See DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION

123-26 (1980) (referring to violent or near violent protests in Maryland, New Jersey,

Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia).
109 See ROBERT A. FEER, 268-85 (Frank Freidel & Ernest May eds., 1988); SZATMARY,
supra note 108, at 82.
110 See FEER, supra note 109, at 274, 278, 280; SZATMARY, supra note 108, at 84-85.
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ada and that Great Britain hoped to use this opportunity to reinstate the

monarchy in the states."1
By February 1787, however, Massachusetts had reestablished order, the
rebels had dispersed, and Shays' Rebellion was over.112 But concerns about
how the confederation would survive while one or more of its states were
weakened by insurrection lingered.1 3 Three months later, the Constitutional

Convention opened in Philadelphia.
Shays' Rebellion supplied both a reason and an excuse for creating new
powers in the union. 114 For James Madison, Shays' Rebellion was "'distressing beyond measure to the zealous friends of the Revolution"' and it sup-

plied "'new proofs of the necessity of such a vigor in the general government
as will be able to restore health to any diseased part of the Federal body.' ,11s

From the opening gavel of the Constitutional Convention in May 1787, concerns raised by Shays' Rebellion were not far from the delegates' minds. Virginia's Governor, Edmund Randolph, opened the Convention with a
discussion of the elements of a proper government, the defects of the Confederation, and the Virginia Plan. 1 6 Governor Randolph listed some of the
attributes of a federal government: "The character of such a government

ought to secure, first, against foreign invasion; secondly against dissensions
between members of the Union, or seditions in particular states ....-117 He
then discussed the defects of the present arrangement: "First, that the Con-

federation produced no security against foreign invasion; ...Secondly, that
the federal government could not check the quarrel between states, nor a

rebellion in any, not having constitutional power, nor means, to interpose
according to the exigency. 11 8 Governor Randolph was not alone in his concerns. Shays' Rebellion was cited repeatedly at the Constitutional Conven-

tion 1 9 and the state ratifying conventions, 120 as well as in The Federalist
111 See SZATMARY, supra note 108, at 74-75, 108-09, 118;

TAYLOR, supra note

103, at 149-

50.
112 See TAYLOR, supra note 103, at 162-63.
113
114

See SZATMARY, supra note 108, at 127-30; TAYLOR, supra note 103, at 168.
See SZATMARY, supra note 108, at 120-123; GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE

AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 412 (1969).

[T]he late rebellion in Massachusets [sic] has given more alarm than I think it
should have done. [sic] calculate that one rebellion in 13 states in the course of 11
years, is but one for each state in a century & a half. [sic]
no country should be so
long without one. [sic] nor will any degree of power in the hands of government
prevent insurrections.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HIS-

TORY OF THE RATFCATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 249, 252 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1988).
115 SZATMARY, supra note 108, at 128 (quoting letter from James Madison to George Mater
(Jan. 7, 1787), in 9 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 231 (Robert Rutland ed.,

1962)); see also Hansen, supra note 103, at 311-13.
116

See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 126 (photo. reprint 1941) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (statement of Edmund Randolph).

117 4 id. (statement of Edmund Randolph).
118 4 id. at 127 (statement of Edmund Randolph).

119 See Andrew R. Willing, Protection By Law Enforcement: The Emerging Constitutional
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Papers121 and other contemporaneous discussions. 122 The Framers reasoned
that Massachusetts had been unable to deal with the incident, that the rebellion threatened peaceful government, and that the situation demanded the
assistance of a general militia to aid state governments as necessary. 123
These concerns found expression in two provisions: the Preamble, which
provides that the Constitution was established, in part, to "insure domestic
Tranquility," 124 and in Article IV, Section 4.125 The latter appeared to fulfill
the Preamble's promise and the Framers' concerns that Shays' Rebellion not
be reenacted. Article IV, Section 4 consists of three clauses: the Republican
Guarantee Clause, the Invasion Clause, and the Domestic Violence Clause.
Article IV, Section 4 provides:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against do26
mestic Violence.
From its inception, the language of the Domestic Violence Clause and
the familiar history surrounding its adoption created confusion as to whether
the clause granted authority to the new national government or whether it
constituted a guarantee to the states of federal noninterference in domestic
matters. For many in that era, the concern was not that the United States
would physically intervene to suppress domestic violence without state permission, but that Congress would simply adopt its own criminal code, thereby
authorizing the United States to intervene at will in support of its own
laws. 27 This Part explores the various views of the Framers on this controversial issue.
A.

The Preamble and The Articles of Confederation

Essential to any claim of legitimate sovereignty is the sovereign's ability
to protect its people. If the king cannot insure the safety of his people, there
is no reason that they should recognize him as king; if he cannot protect
them, his reign is not likely to last. People obeyed their king because he
offered them security against their enemies and promised to maintain the
Right, 35 RurGERS L. REv. 1, 42 & n.245 (1982) (listing 21 references to Shays' Rebellion in the

records of the federal convention).
120 See Robert Feer, Shays's Rebellion and the Constitution:A Study in Causation, 42 NEw
ENG. Q. 388, 404 n.32 (1969) (listing six references in state conventions).
121 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6, at 31, 21, at 131, 25, at 162, 28, at 177, 74, at 502 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 43, at 293 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
122 See Willing, supra note 119, at 40-42.
123 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 21, at 131, 25, at 162 (Alexander Hamilton).
124 U.S. CONST. preamble.
125 See Willing, supra note 119, at 44-45 & n. 251; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
126 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
127 See infra Part III.B.
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public peace. 128 "One of the first duties of government," the Court said in
Marbury v. Madison, is to "afford ... protection."'129

From the outset, the Framers recognized the reciprocity in the union
they were proposing. The Confederation had only nominally promised mutual aid, and the newly independent Americans discovered, through Shays'
Rebellion, that the Confederation only nominally provided it. Consequently,
the Confederation failed to earn the respect of the people, as demonstrated
by the continuation of the Massachusetts uprising after the Confederation
government took action. 130 In the Constitution, the Framers thought that a

real promise of securing the borders would command real fealty from the
people. At the same time, the Framers, with the unpleasantness of Shays'

Rebellion fresh in their minds, saw an opportunity to strengthen the national
government to deal with internal disorders as well. 13 1 Protection of citizens
within the states was more complicated, however, than the offer of protection
against foreign enemies. Although foreign enemies could be repelled by a

single sovereign, a new national government could only hope to supplement,
but not displace, state governments in their dealings with civil disorders.
These broad purposes are reflected, quite subtly, in the Preamble and

are illustrated by contrasting the phrases "provide for the common defence,"
"promote the general welfare," and "insure domestic tranquility."'1 32 The
duty of the United States with respect to the common defense was quite
clear. Under the Constitution, the United States expressly acquired the war
powers, 133 and the states expressly relinquished the right to "engage in War,
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay."'1 34 The United States would, by assuming the war powers of the
states, take on the responsibility of providing for the common defense, as
promised by the Preamble.
128 See Steven J. Heyman, The FirstDuty of Government: Protection,Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 513-20, 536-37 (1991); Willing, supra note 119, at 22-38.
129 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550-51
(1875); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 76 (1872). The fundamental privileges
belonging to citizens of the United States, that are to be ensured by the sovereign, begin with
"protection by the Government," according to Justice Washington. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas.
546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230); see John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1435-36 (1992).
130 See SZATMARY, supra note 108, at 84-85. The Shaysites were able to continue closing
courts following the passage of anti-Shaysite legislation and a call for federal troops, because the
Confederation lacked the monetary resources to raise sufficient troops and thereby enforce the
new laws. See id.
131 See id. at 120 ("The crisis atmosphere ... strengthened the resolve of the nationalists
and shocked some reluctant localists into an acceptance of a stronger national government
.....

"); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTrTUTION 33 (1972)

("Since independence, ... the interests of the government and the people were identical, so
there could be no valid reason for extralegal violence."); WOOD, supra note 114, at 412 ("[M]any
social conservatives [saw Shays'] rebellion as encouraging the move for constitutional reform. It
was both a confirmation of their worst fears... and a vindication of their desires for stronger
government ....
).
132 U.S. CONST. preamble (emphasis added).
133 See id. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
134 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
HeinOnline -- 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 22 1997-1998

1997]

InsuringDomestic Tranquility

The national government's responsibility for the "general welfare" was
also enumerated, but not as easily described as its power over defense. The
Constitution granted Congress a series of different powers, guardianship of
which would assist in the promotion of the general welfare. For example,
a35
Congress was granted the power to tax and spend for the general welfare,

a power peculiarly well suited for promoting the general welfare, though
stopping short of providing for it. This distinction reveals that, in the Framers' minds, providing for the general welfare was neither the province nor
within the capacity of any government. To the extent that a government
might promote it, the United States would share that power with the states.
On the other hand, the Constitution did not grant Congress an exclusive
power (as it had over war) or general enumerated powers (as it had for
spending for the general welfare) to provide for domestic tranquility. The
United States assumed the duty of "protect[ing] [the states] against Invasion"' 3 6 and obligated itself to protect the states against domestic violence
"on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened)."' 37 Congress did not assume primary responsibility for
quelling domestic violence. Rather its responsibility was secondary: The
United States was to insure domestic tranquility when the states, in their own
judgment, proved incapable. 138 The Framers did not intend to unify all the
sovereign powers of the states. They moved from a confederacy to a dual
system of government, a system they thought would create "a more perfect
union,"'1 9 not a "perfect union."'140 Although the Framers gave Congress
enumerated powers for the common defense and general welfare,'14 1 they
granted it only limited power to insure domestic tranquility. 142

By contrast, the Articles of Confederation (the "Articles") had made no
provision for federal control or assistance in such situations. The Articles
created the "firm league of friendship" that pledged "common defence, the
security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare; binding
themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made
upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any
other pretence whatever."' 143 But despite this general pledge, the Articles
had neither provisions for punishing crime nor a mechanism for actually aid135 See id.§ 8, cl. 1.
136 Id. art. IV, § 4.
137 Id.
138 See Heyman, supra note 128, at 525 ("The states... were to retain their role as 'the
immediate and visible guardian[s] of life and property'...." (quoting THm FEDERALIST No. 17,
at 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961))); see also DAVID HUrCHISON, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 13 (1975) (suggesting that the Framers drafted the phrase
"insure domestic tranquility" in response to an incident in Philadelphia in 1783 and to Shays'
Rebellion).
139 U.S. CONST. preamble.
140 See Martin Diamond, The Federaliston Federalism: "Neither a National Nor a Federal
Constitution, But a Composition of Both," 86 YALE L.J. 1273, 1280 (1977); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 257 (James Madison); Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 773.
141 See U.S. CONsr.art. I,§ 8, cl.
1.
142 See 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 501-02 (1953).
143 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION

art. Ill.
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ing states whose security was threatened from within.1 44 Incident to its war
powers under the Articles, Congress had the power to "establish[ ] rules for
deciding, in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in
what manner prizes, taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United
States, shall be divided or appropriated[,]"'' 45 but it had no authority to define crimes or marshall troops to the aid of the states. 146 As with our Constitution, the Articles forbid the states to engage in war without the consent of
Congress, except in case of actual invasion, invasion by Indians, or "infest[ation] by pirates."'147 The Articles gave Congress the power to appoint
'148
courts for the "trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,
and provided for extradition between states of persons charged with or guilty
49
of "treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State.'
To address internal commotions, such as Shays' Rebellion, the Framers
laced together three related powers: the power to define crimes, creation of a
central military authority, and the use of federal authority to suppress domestic violence. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 resulted in the clear authority of the United States to create an army and navy and to assemble a
militia, the power to use the forces of the United States to suppress domestic
violence, when requested by appropriate state authorities, and the somewhat
50
blurred authority to define crimes.
B.

Three Views at the Founding of Federal CriminalAuthority
1.

Express Authority and Enumerated Crimes

As previously noted, the Constitution expressly grants to Congress the
power to punish in three cases: 151 counterfeiting securities and coin of the
144 See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 116, at 127 (discussing the defects of the Articles,
including "that the federal government could not check the quarrel between states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power, nor means, to interpose according to the exigency");
HtrrcHISON, supra note 138, at 12-13; supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.

art. IX, cl. 1.
Hamilton noted that the Confederation had a "total want of a SANCTION to its laws."
THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 129 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
147 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. VI, cl. 5.
148 Id. art. IX, cl. 1.
149 Id. art. IV, cl.
2.
150 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 10 (conferring power to punish counterfeiting, piracy, and
145

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION

146

felonies on the high seas); id. cls. 12-16 (conferring power over army and navy and authorizing

use of militia); id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (conferring power to punish treason); id. art. IV, § 4 (Domestic Violence Clause).
151 Ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment may have given Congress power to punish
those who engage in slavery. Section 1 declares that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction," while Section 2 gives Congress "power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id. amend. XIII; see CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 85 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (suggesting that the
United States had the power to punish individuals who enslaved others).
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United States, 152 piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, 153 and
treason. 5 4 The United States has a powerful interest in each of these areas.
The Counterfeiting Clause added significant power to the United States
government. Under the Articles, Congress had "the sole and exclusive right
and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective States[,]'1 55 but it possessed no power to
punish counterfeiting. The omission was evident because the Congress, operating under the Articles, requested that the states address the counterfeiting
problem. 56 This request, however, failed to produce consistent and uniform
enforcement. 57 The Framers addressed this deficiency through three different clauses in the Constitution. As with the Articles, Congress was given
authority to "coin Money.[and] regulate the Value thereof.' 158 In contrast to
the Articles, the states were expressly forbidden to "coin Money."'1 59 Finally,
as noted above, Congress was given authority to "provide for the Punishment
160
of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States.'
This combination of power and disability gave Congress exclusive authority
161
over coinage and counterfeiting.
The debates on the Counterfeiting Clause are short, but indicate that the
power granted to Congress still had limits. Gouverneur Morris, a delegate to
the convention from Pennsylvania, thought the counterfeiting authority
should be extended "so as to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting in
general. Bills of exchange for example might be forged in one State and
carried into another[.]"' 162 Another delegate suggested that it "might be politic to provide by national authority for the punishment" of counterfeit foreign securities. 63 The delegates did not adopt either of these suggestions.'64
The Piracies Clause provides an interesting contrast to the coin and
counterfeiting provisions. Whereas the Counterfeiting Clause gave Congress
152 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o provide for the
Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;").
153 See id. cl. 10 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;").

154 See id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason .... ). Although the Treason Clause is found in Article III, rather than Article I, it uses
language identical to that used to enumerate the powers of Congress in Section 8 of Article I
("The Congress shall have Power.. ."). Two other crimes-bribery and slavery-are specifically
mentioned in the Constitution. See id. art. II, § 4 (defining bribery as an impeachable offense);

id. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery).
155

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. IX,

cl. 4.

156 See Kurland, supra note 7, at 24, 39 n.125.
157 See id. at 24.

158 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
159 Id. § 10, cl. 1.
160 Id. § 8, cl. 6.
161 See Tim FEDERALIST No. 42, at 285 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
162 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 315 (Max Farrand ed., rev.

ed. 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND].
163 Id. (failing to identify the source of the proposition).
164 St. George Tucker concluded that the Counterfeiting Clause gave Congress no power

over forgery, nor "the power of punishing offences of this nature, generally, but such only as are
enumerated. all others not enumerated being reserved to the jurisdiction of the states, respectively." 1 TUCKER, supra note 13, app. at 414-15.
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the power to "provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting," the Piracies
Clause granted Congress the authority to "define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations."'1 65 The terms "define and punish" in the latter clause suggest that

Congress had greater responsibility to define precisely what constituted
piracy and offences against the law of nations, a duty perhaps not as pressing
with respect to counterfeiting coins and securities. 166 Congress did not, however, acquire an exclusive complementary power over admiralty, as it had
with respect to coinage. Congress acquired power to "provide and maintain

a Navy" and to "[r]egulat[e] ... naval Forces,"'167 and the Constitution prohibited the states from maintaining "[s]hips of War in time of Peace.' 168 This
combination of power in Congress and disability in the states gave Congress
exclusive control of the navy, but not necessarily exclusive control over
admiralty.

169

The more controversial question for the Framers was whether these
clauses gave Congress exclusive power over piracies. During the debates

over the Piracies Clause, Colonel George Mason, a delegate from Virginia,
"doubted... the propriety of taking the power in all these cases wholly from
the States.' 170 James Madison argued that the clause should give exclusive
power to Congress.

If the laws of the States were to prevail on this subject, the citizens
of different States would be subject to different punishments for the

same offence at sea-There would be neither uniformity nor stability in the law-The proper remedy for all these difficulties was to

vest the power proposed by the term "define" in the Natl.
legislature.

171

§ 8, cl. 10.
166 In an early commentary, Thomas Sergeant observed:
Piracy is well defined by the law of nations as robbery on the sea. The term, felonies, however, in relation to offences on the high seas, is necessarily somewhat indeterminate, since the term is not used in the criminal jurisdiction of the admiralty,
in the technical sense of the common law. Offences against the law of nations cannot, with any accuracy, be said to be completely ascertained and defined in any
public code, recognised by the common consent of nations. In respect to these,
there is a peculiar fitness in giving the power to define, as well as to punish.
THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 333 (Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 2d ed.
165 U.S. CONST. art. I,

1830).
167

U.S.

168

Id. § 10, cl. 3.

CONST.

art. I,

§ 8,

cls. 13-14.

169 By statute, federal district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction of "[a]ny civil case
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1994); see U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2
("The judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."); see
also United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 389 (1818) (concluding that a murder
committed by a marine on a warship docked in Boston harbor was not on the "high seas" and
thus the federal court lacked jurisdiction).
170 2 FARRAND, supra note 162, at 315.
171 Id. at 316.
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Although the Constitution does not state that Congress's power over
these matters is exclusive, 172 the states generally have respected counterfeiting laws and piracies and felonies on the high seas as the domain of Congress.
The Treason Clause is the only crime defined in the Constitution. 173 By
defining treason, the Constitution would seem to have assumed the exclusive
right to do so. In the Pennsylvania ratification debates, James Wilson, representing the city of Philadelphia, made clear that, in his view, even Congress
could not define treason. In his words, this clause is "the first instance in
which it has not been left to the legislature to extend the crime and punishment of treason so far as they thought proper.... [T]here can be no treason
against the United States, except such as is defined in this Constitution."' 174
Nothing in the Treason Clause, however, forbids the states from prosecuting
someone for treason, and the Extradition Clause contemplated that persons
might be charged "in [a] State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime."'175 The
Extradition Clause does not make clear, however, whether states may punish
treason against the state only, and, if so, whether the state must use the definition found in Article III.
Although a strong case could be made that each of these crimes lay exclusively within the power of the United States, the more difficult question
was whether these crimes constituted the total criminal domain of the United
States. The Framers said little at the convention on this subject; either they
did not question the matter, they considered the answer obvious, or they simply did not wish to resolve the question. In any event, any original understanding at the convention was not made express, as the ratifying debates
demonstrate. The question arose in the Virginia ratification debates, when
delegates Patrick Henry and George Nicholas argued the mechanics of the
proposed Constitution and the government's power over crime. Given to
hyperbole, Patrick Henry warned that
Congress, from their general powers, may fully go into business of
human legislation. They may legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the lowest offence-petty larceny. They may define crimes
and prescribe punishments. In the definition of crimes, I trust they
will be directed by what wise representatives ought to be governed
176
by.
George Nicholas responded that the enumerated powers doctrine barred
Congress from defining crimes not enumerated:
[Mr. Henry] says that, by this Constitution, [Congress has] power to
make laws to define crimes and prescribe punishments; .... Treason
against the United States is defined in the Constitution, and the forfeiture limited to the life of the person attainted. Congress have
172 See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 280-81 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
173 See U.S. CoNrs. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 ("Treason against the United States, shall consist only
in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.").
174 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 116, at 469 (statement of James Wilson); see 2 id. at 487
(statement of James Wilson) ("Congress can neither define nor try the crime [of treason].").
175 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, c. 2.
176 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 116, at 447 (statement of Patrick Henry).
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power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, and offences against the laws of nations; but they cannot
define or prescribethe punishment of any other crime whatever, without violating the Constitution.... [William Grayson] says that the
power of legislation includes every thing. A general power of legislation does. But this is a special power of legislation. Therefore, it
does not contain that plenitude of power which he imagines. They
177
cannot legislate in any case but those particularly enumerated.
Nicholas's argument was straightforward, and it was an argument that would
be repeated during the Alien and Sedition Debates, as well as the Fourteenth
178
Amendment enforcement debates.
The argument that the enumerated crimes were the sum of Congress's
powers in the area of criminal law turned on a characterization of criminal
power as a unique governmental authority, one not necessarily belonging to a
national government. As St. George Tucker commented in 1803, "[Congress
is] not entrusted with a general power over [the subject of crimes and misdemeanors], but a few offences are selected from the great mass of
crimes .... All felonies and offences committed upon land, in all cases not
expressly enumerated, being reserved to the states respectively."' 179 Tucker's
argument would have been absurd if applied to a national government that
was also the sole or principal government. The Framers were cautious, however, over the prospects of a central army and its use in the "internal police"
of the United States. 18 0 Moreover, the Framers had little reason-with the
exception of their brief experience with counterfeiting, concerns over uniform laws of the seas, and Shays' Rebellion-to demand national control
over other crimes.
2.

"Necessary and Proper" Criminal Sanctions

A month after the Constitutional Convention finished its draft, Colonel
George Mason, who refused to sign the Constitution, wrote George Washington to explain his objections to it. In this letter, Mason suggested that the
Necessary and Proper Clause (or Sweeping Clause) might permit Congress to
"constitute new crimes."'' 1 If Mason thought that result to be an avoidable
evil, he had reason to be concerned. A second view of Congress's power
over crime admitted the exclusivity of the three crimes enumerated in the
177
178

Id. at 451 (statement of George Nicholas) (emphasis added).
See infra notes 288-289 and accompanying text; infra notes 385-388 and accompanying

text.
1 TUCKER, supra note 13, app. at 269; see 1 id. app. at 414-415.
180 Cf ObservationsLeading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed
by the Late Convention; And to Several Essentialand Necessary Alterations in It. In a Number of
Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (1788) [hereinafter Letters from the Federal
179

Farmer], reprintedin 2

THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST

233-34 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)

(arguing that Congress cannot "carry all the powers proposed to be lodged in it into effect,
without calling to its aid a military force," which would affect the "internal police" of the states).
181 Letter from George Mason to George Washington (Oct. 7, 1787), in PAMPHLETS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

[hereinafter

331 (photo. reprint 1968) (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888)

PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION].
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Constitution, but denied that these were the sum total of Congress's power to
define crimes.
The two bases for this argument were the various property clauses and
the Sweeping Clause. The District of Columbia Clause, the Territory Clause,
and, perhaps, the Militia Clauses'8s were distinct from Congress's other enumerated powers. In the Commerce, Copyright, and Piracy Clauses, for example, Congress acquired power over particular subject matter. 183 By contrast,
in the District of Columbia Clause, Congress acquired power over the District and "all Places purchased.., for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings."'184 Similarly, the Territory
Clause granted Congress the power to make "all needful Rules and Regulations"'8 5 for U.S. territory and property. These clauses permitted Congress
186
to regulate these areas without resort to the Sweeping Clause.
So far, Congress could be said to have power over the three enumerated
crimes (counterfeiting, piracy, and treason) and power to define crimes
within enumerated areas (the District of Columbia, forts and magazines, and
territories). But what of Congress's other enumerated powers, those not expressly linked to crime? Might Congress punish theft or misuse of the mails
pursuant to its power "to establish post-Offices and post-roads"? 187 Did it
have the power to punish fraud in the payment of taxes and other revenues?
What of Congress's enormous power to "regulate Commerce ... among the

several States"? 8 8 And what of Congress's potentially fearsome power
under the Sweeping Clause "[tio make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers"? 189
Colonel Mason was not the only figure concerned with the scope of Congress's power to enact criminal laws. James Iredell, a prominent North Carolina Federalist and future Supreme Court justice, thought Congress had some
power to define crimes not enumerated:
182 I say "perhaps" with respect to the Militia Clauses because there was some question of
Congress's power to punish offenses by members of the militia. Richard Henry Lee argued that
Congress's power to organize the militia did not include "the infliction of punishments. The
militia will be subject to the common regulations of war when in actual service; but not in time of
peace." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 116, at 407.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cs. 3, 8, 10.
I& cl. 17.
185 Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
183

184

186 See David E. Engdahl, State and FederalPower over FederalProperty, 18 ARIz. L. REv.
283, 288-90 (1976); Gary Lawson, Who Legislates?, 1995 PUB. INTEREsr L. Rnv. 147, 155 (book
review).
187 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819); see also In re Rapier, 143
U.S. 110, 134 (1892) ("It is not necessary that Congress should have the power to deal with crime

or immorality within the States in order to maintain that it possesses the power to forbid the use

of the mails in aid of the perpetration of crime or immorality"; upholding postal restrictions on
lotteries); Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732-37 (1877) (noting that Congress's post-office power
has traditionally been construed to authorize "all measures necessary to secure [the mail's] safe
and speedy transit, and the prompt delivery of its contents"). Note that under the Articles of
Confederation, Congress had the power to "establish[ ] [or] regulat[e] post-offices from one

State to another, throughout all the United States."
PETIJAL UNION art. IX, cl. 4.
188 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
189 Id. cl. 18.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PER-
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These are offences [counterfeiting, piracy, and treason] immediately
affecting the security, the honor or the interest of the United States
at large, and of course must come within the sphere of the Legislative authority which is intrusted [sic] with their protection. Beyond
these authorities, Congress can exercise no other power of this kind,
except in the enactment of penalties to enforce their acts of legislation in the cases where express authority is delegated to them, and if
they could not enforce such acts by the enacting of penalties those
powers would be altogether useless, since a legislative regulation
without some sanction would be an absurd thing indeed. 190
The Anti-Federalist essayist "Brutus" had significant concerns that Congress's power to define crimes was nearly boundless. Discussing the Preamble, he observed that it "has in view every object which is embraced by any
government. The preservation of internal peace-the due administration of
justice-and to provide for the defence of the community, seems to include
all the objects of government."' 191 Referring to the phrase "insure domestic
tranquility," Brutus interpreted it as
comprehend[ing] a provision against all private breaches of the
peace, as well as against all public commotions or general insurrections; and to attain the object of this clause fully, the government
must exercise the power of passing laws on these subjects, as well as
of appointing magistrates with authority to execute them ....
[I]f the
spirit of this system is to be known from its declared end and design
in the preamble, its spirit is to subvert and abolish all the powers of
the state government, and to embrace every object to which any
government extends.
...Any person, who will peruse the 8th section with attention,
in which most of the powers are enumerated, will perceive that they
either expressly or by implication extend to almost every thing
about which any legislative power can be employed. But if this equitable mode of construction is applied to this part of the constitution; nothing can stand before it.
...[The Vesting Clause in Article I will] authorise the Congress
to do any thing which in their judgment will tend to provide for the
general welfare, and this amounts to the same thing as general and
unlimited powers of legislation in all cases. 192
If James Iredell and Brutus agreed that Congress would have some additional authority to define crimes, they disagreed over the wisdom of Congress
doing so. But others believed that the threat of Congress creating additional
190 James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, reprinted in
PAMPHLETS ON THE CoNstrnrrloN, supra note 181, at 333, 359.
191 Essays of Brutus (XII) (Feb. 7, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 180, at 422, 424.
192 Id. at 425; see also SERGEANT, supra note 166, at 351 ("[Tlhe express grant [of power to
punish] does not prevent the exercise of the punishing power in any other cases, where it may be
a necessary and proper sanction to enforce [Congress's] decrees.").
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crimes under the Sweeping Clause was unfounded. "An Impartial Citizen"
of Virginia answered Colonel Mason's argument directly:
It is also objected by Mr. Mason, that under [the Federalists'] own
construction of the general clause, at the end of the enumerated
powers, the Congress may grant monopolies in trade, constitute new
crimes, inflict unusual punishments, and in short, do whatever they
please. Nothing can be more groundless and ridiculous than
this.... [T]he laws which Congress can make, for carrying into execution the conceded powers, must not only be necessary, but
proper-So that if those powers cannot be executed without the aid
of a law, granting commercial monopolies, inflicting unusual punishments, creating new crimes, or commanding any unconstitutional
act; yet, as such a law would be manifestly not proper,it would not
be warranted by this clause,9 without
absolutely departing from the
3
usual acceptation of words.
If one assumes that the Sweeping Clause comprehends the possibility of
criminal sanctions as a means of regulating matters within Congress's enumerated powers, what limitations are there on Congress's power to define
crime? The Sweeping Clause itself suggests a limitation: the crime must be
not only "necessary," but also "proper" to executing the narrow scope of
Congress's enumerated powers. 1 94 Thus, the Sweeping Clause both grants

95
and limits Congress's power:
To carry a law or power into execution in its most basic sense means
to provide enforcement machinery, prescribe penalties, authorize
the hiring of employees, appropriate funds, and so forth to effectuate that law or power. It does not mean to regulate unenumerated

193 An ImpartialCitizen V, On the Federal Constitution(Feb. 28, 1788), reprintedin, 8 THE
supra note 114, at 431.
Pelatiah Webster also addressed Brutus's concerns:
[T]he Constitution does not suffer the federal powers to controul [sic] in the least,
or so much as to interfere in the internal policy, jurisdiction, or municipal rights of
any particular State: except where great and manifest national purposes and interests make that controul [sic] necessary. It appears very evident to me, that the
Constitution gives an establishment, support, and protection to the internal and
separate police of each State, under the superintendency of the federal powers,
which it could not possibly enjoy in an independent state....
There can be no doubt that each State will receive from the union great support
and protection against the invasions and inroads of foreign enemies, as well as
against riots and insurrections of their own citizens; and of consequence, the course
of their internal administration will be secured by this means against any interruption or embarrassment from either of these causes.
Pelatiah Webster, The Weakness of Brutus Exposed (Nov. 4, 1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 181, at 119, 128.
194 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2378-79 (1997); Gary Lawson & Patricia B.
Granger, The "Proper"Scope of FederalPower: A JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping
Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 271-72 (1993). But see McAffee, supra note 19 (manuscript at 33-36,
on file with author) (questioning Lawson and Granger's conclusion that the word "proper" in
the Sweeping Clause places a substantial limit on Congress's power to legislate under this
clause).
195 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 194, at 274-75.
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
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subject areas to make the exercise of enumerated powers more
196
efficient.
This view is consistent with the tenor of the debate between those Federalists and Anti-Federalists who thought the Constitution granted Congress
the power to define crimes in those matters for which Congress was given
some power, even if that power did not expressly include the definition of
crimes. Both sides in the debate should have been assured at least that the
Constitution limited Congress's authority to define crimes. Congress's exclusive power to define crime was limited to the three enumerated crimes; its
plenary power to define crimes was limited; and with respect to the remainder of the government's enumerated powers, it was limited to those acts for
which criminal sanctions were "necessary and proper."'197
3.

The Domestic Violence Clause as a Reservation of State Criminal
Authority

The third view of crime expressed at the convention and during the ratification debates began from a different premise. Rather than focusing on the
powers granted to Congress, this view embraced an idea much like the Tenth
Amendment: the states reserved their authority over the general matter of
crime, except that which was specifically granted to Congress. The concept
of reservation was important because the Framers were about to give the new

national government authority to assist in the suppression of domestic violence. Governor Randolph's Eleventh Resolution proposed "that a Republican Government & the territory of each State,.. . ought to be guaranteed by
the United States to each State," 198 which would "preserve the particular

States against seditions within themselves or combinations against each
196 Id. at 331.
197

See ASA KINNE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REL-

TO CRIMINAL OFFENCES AND THEIR PUNISHMENT 16 (New York, S.W. Benedict 1842)
("Congress ha[s] power to inflict punishment in cases not specified by the constitution, such
power being implied as necessary and proper to the sanction of the laws, and the exercise of the
delegated powers.").
198 1 FARRAND, supra note 162, at 22. At the Virginia ratification convention, Randolph
elaborated on this theme:
When Massachusetts was distressed by the late insurrection, Congress could not
relieve her. Who headed that insurrection? Recollect the facility with which it was
raised, and the very little ability of the ringleader, and you cannot but deplore the
extreme debility of our merely nominal government. We are too despicable to be
regarded by foreign nations. The defects of the Confederation consisted principally
in the want of power: .. .Congress, sir, ought to be fully vested with power to
support the Union, protect the interests of the United States, maintain their commerce, and defend them from external invasions and insult, and internal insurrections; to maintain justice, and promote harmony and public tranquility among the
states. A government not vested with these powers will ever be found unable to
make us happy or respectable.
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 116, at 82 (statement of Governor Edmund Randolph). For a
general history of the drafting of the Domestic Violence Clause, see WIECEK, supra note 131, at
51-63; Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN.L. REv. 513, 516-20 (1962); Clarence C. Ferguson, The Inherent Justiciability of the ConstitutionalGuaranty Against Domestic Violence, 13 RUTGERS L. REv.407
(1959).
ATIVE
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other."'199 Charles Pinckney, a delegate from South Carolina, also offered a
draft plan, which proposed that "[o]n the application of the legislature of a
state, the United States shall protect it against domestic insurrection."'2 0'
As the proposals began working their way through the convention,
James Madison moved to amend Randolph's Eleventh Resolution to "[t]he
republican constitutions and the existing laws of each state, to be guaranteed
by the United States."'20 ' James Wilson offered that the object of the
Madison amendment was "to secure the States agst. dangerous commotions,
insurrections and rebellions," to which Colonel Mason added that "[i]f the
Genl Govt. should have no right to suppress
rebellions agst. particular States,
202
it will be in a bad situation indeed.1
James Madison proposed a substitute provision that emphasized the difference between external and internal threats: "the Constitutional authority
of the States shall be guarantied to them respectively agst. domestic as well as
foreign violence. ' 20 3 Luther Martin of Maryland, stridently Anti-Federalist,
20 4
thought the states should be left to "suppress Rebellions themselves,"
although his colleague Daniel Carrol thought the proposition so essential
that "[e]very State ought to wish for it."205 Harkening back to Congress's
inability to aid Massachusetts during Shays' Rebellion, he added that "[i]t has
been doubted whether it is a casus federis at present. And no room ought to
be left for such a doubt hereafter. ' 20 6 John Rutledge, a delegate from South
Carolina, thought the proposal was unnecessary because "[n]o doubt could
be entertained but that Congs. had the authority if they had the means to cooperate with any State in subduing a rebellion. ' '2°7 James Wilson disagreed
and urged that they guarantee protection against foreign and domestic violence. 208 The Committee of Detail proposed language much closer to the
current form of Article IV, Section 4, guaranteeing to each state a republican
form of government and protecting states against foreign invasion and, upon
20 9
the application of the state legislature, against domestic violence.
The Committee of Detail had included an additional provision to the
Domestic Violence Clause that appeared to be drawn from Pinckney's proposal. 2' 0 It provided that Congress's power to subdue rebellion be conditioned on the application of the state legislature. The delegates divided over
199

1 FARRAND,

supra note 162, at 25.

200 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 116, at 132 (statement of Charles Pinckney).
201 1 FARRAND, supra note 162, at 206.
202 2 id. at 47. There is some evidence that the Framers were also concerned with slave
insurrections. See 3 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 116, at 423 (statement of Patrick Henry); 3
id. at 427 (statement of George Nicholas); 1 TUCKER, supra note 13, app. at 367; Cmvs: To THE
CITIZENS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION,

supra note 114, at 25.
203 2 FARRAND, supra note 162, at 47-48 (statement of James Madison).
204 2 id. at 48 (statement of Luther Martin).
205 2 id. (statement of Daniel Carrol).
206 2 id. (statement of Daniel Carrol).
207 2 id. (statement of John Rutledge).
208 See 2 it at 48-49 (statement of James Wilson).

209 See 2 i.- at 159.
210 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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whether to strike out the condition. Gouverneur Morris objected that the

condition put Congress in a strange position: "We first form a strong man to
protect us, and at the same time wish to tie his hands behind him, The legislature may surely be trusted with such a power to preserve the public tranquil-

lity. '211 Delegates Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut and Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts opposed deleting the condition because, as Gerry pointed out,

the "[s]tates will be the best Judges in such cases" and, referring to Shays'
Rebellion, suggested that "[m]ore blood would have been spilt''212
in Massts in
the late insurrection, if the Genl. authority had intermeddled.
By the end of August of 1787, the delegates completed their edits of the

clause by deleting, as redundant, the word "foreign" from the phrase "foreign
invasion. ' 213 Delaware's John Dickinson, repeating earlier objections, made
one last attempt to delete the requirement that a request come from the leg-

islature. It was, he said, "of essential importance to the tranquillity of the US. that they should in all cases suppress domestic violence. '214 The delegates
refused to drop the condition, but agreed to permit state executives to request assistance when state legislatures could not meet.215 At the last minute,
the delegates refused to substitute the term "insurrections" for "domestic vi-

olence," a proposal that would have coupled the terms "invasion" and "insurrection" in the Domestic Violence Clause just as they are in the Militia
216

Clause.
In the press, the Domestic Violence Clause proved extremely controver-

sial, providing occasion for discussion of a federal role in suppressing domestic violence.2 17 It also evoked distinct views of its function in the
Constitution. The Anti-Federalists strenuously objected to the militia powers
granted to the new government 2 18 and the possibility that the militia would
be used to interfere in the internal affairs of the states:

The powers lodged in the general government, if exercised by it,
must intimately effect [sic] the internal police of the states, as well
as external concerns; and there is no reason to expect the numerous
state governments, and their connections, will be very friendly to
211 2 FARRAND, supra note 162, at 317 (statement of Gouverneur Morris). The notes of the
Committee of Detail demonstrate that the condition put power in the hands of the states: "The
guarantee is 1. to prevent the establishment of any government, not republican[;] 2. against external invasion[; and] 3. to protect each state against internal commotion[.] 4. But this guarantee
shall not operate in the last Case without an application from the legislature of a state." 2 id.
212 2 id. at 317 (statement of Elbridge Gerry).
213 See 2 id. at 466.

2 id. at 466-67 (statement of John Dickinson).
215 See 2 id. at 467.
216 See 2 id.; cf. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
217 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIsT No. 28, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961); Essays of Brutus (VII) (Jan. 3, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE Ai-FEDERALIST,
supra note 180, at 400, 400-01; Essays of Brutus (X) (Jan. 24, 1788), reprinted in, 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 180, at 413, 416-17.
218 See, e.g., Luther Martin, Information to the GeneralAssembly of the State of Maryland,
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 180, at 27, 58-59.
214
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the execution of federal laws in those internal affairs,2which
hitherto
19
have been under their own immediate management.
Brutus, referring to the Militia, Piracy, and Domestic Violence Clauses,
recommended that the general government concern itself with external
problems and those matters when the states were incapable of action on their
own.220 Ordinary police matters, however, including the punishment of
crime, such as murder and theft, belonged to the states:
[T]he protection and defence of the community is not intended to be
entrusted solely into the hands of the general government .... It is
true this system commits to the general government the protection
and defence of the community against foreign force and invasion,
against piracies and felonies on the high seas, and against insurrections among ourselves. They are also authorised to provide for the
administration of justice in certain matters of a general concern, and
in some that I think are not so. But it ought to be left to the state
governments to provide for the protection and defence of the citizen against the hand of private violence, and the wrongs done or
attempted by individuals to each other-Protection and defence
against the murderer, the robber, the thief, the cheat, and the unjust
21
person, is to be derived from the respective state governments.
He further emphasized the division of authority between the federal
government and state governments:
The just way of reasoning therefore on this subject is this, the general government is to provide for the protection and defence of the
community against foreign attacks, &c., they therefore ought to
have authority sufficient to effect this, so far as is consistent with the
providing for our internal protection and defence. The state governments are entrusted with the care of administring [sic] justice
among its citizens, and the management of other internal concerns,
they ought therefore to retain power adequate to the end. The
preservation of internal peace and good order, and the due administration of law and justice, ought to be the first care of every
government. 222
During the ratification debates, Massachusetts delegate Reverend Samuel Stillman, referring to the Republican Guarantee and Domestic Violence Clauses, observed:
Congress solemnly engage themselves to protect [the states] from
every kind of violence, whether of faction at home or enemies
abroad. This is an admirable security of the people at large, as well
as of the several governments of the states; consequently the gen219
220

221
222

Letters from the FederalFarmer,supra note 180, at 233.
See Essays of Brutus (VII), supra note 217, at 400-01.

Id.
Id. at 401.
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eral government cannot swallow up the local governments, as some
2 23
gentlemen have suggested.
Stillman's logic appeared to have misplaced a premise. The concern that
states not be "swallow[ed] up" was not answered by Stillman's reassurance
that Congress would protect the states from "faction at home." Rather, the
concern was fully satisfied by the condition that the states request the assistance of the national government, and that the national government otherwise
had no power.
Much of the discussion at the Virginia ratifying convention concerned
the relationship between the Militia Clause (which authorized Congress to
provide for militia to execute federal law, suppress insurrection, and repel
invasions) and the Domestic Violence Clause (which guaranteed states protection against invasion and, upon request, domestic violence). James
Madison discussed the general purpose for the Militia Clause:
I conceive [it] to be an additional security to our liberty, without
diminishing the power of the states in any considerable degree. It
appears to me so highly expedient that I should imagine it would
have found advocates even in the warmest friends of the present
system. The authority of training the militia, and appointing the officers, is reserved to the states. Congress ought to have the power
to establish a uniform discipline throughout the states, and to provide for the execution of the laws, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions: these are the only cases wherein they can interfere with
the militia; ... without such a power to suppress insurrections, our
liberties might be destroyed by domestic faction, and domestic tyr224
anny be established.
George Nicholas, responding to Patrick Henry's complaint that the government might abuse its general control of the militia,225 noted that
[t]here is a great difference between having the power in three
cases, and in all cases. [Congress] cannot call [the militia] forth for
any other purpose than to execute the laws, suppress insurrections,
and repel invasions. And can any thing be more demonstrably obvious, than that the laws ought to be enforced if resisted, and insur226
rections quelled, and foreign invasions repelled?
The discussion then turned to the national government's possible use of
the militia to quell civil insurrection. Mr. Clay227 worried that the clause
would permit the national government to intervene on the merest pretext of
violence in a state. He considered that "the word insurrectionincluded every
opposition to the laws; and if so, it would be sufficient to call [the militia]
forth to suppress insurrections, without mentioning that they were to execute
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 116, at 168 (statement of Rev. Samuel Stillman).
2 id. at 90 (statement of James Madison).
225 See 3 id. at 384-88 (statement of Patrick Henry).
226 3 id. at 392 (statement of George Nicholas).
227 Elliot refers to the speaker only as Mr. Clay. The Virginia ratifying convention was
attended, however, by two Mr. Clays: Charles Clay and Green Clay. Thus, the speaker remains
unknown.
223

224
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the laws of the Union. '228 James Madison's response may not have satisfied
Clay: "There are cases in which the execution of the laws may require the
operation of militia, which cannot be said to be an invasion or insurrection.
There may be a resistance to the laws which cannot be termed an insurrection. '229 He elaborated: "[A] riot did not come within the legal definition of
an insurrection. There might be riots, to oppose the execution of the laws,
which the civil power might not be sufficient to quell." 23 0
James Madison's reference to riots elicited objections from Patrick
Henry:
Under the order of Congress, they shall suppress insurrections.
Under the order of Congress, they shall be called to execute the
laws .... [James Madison] said that the militia should be called forth
to quell riots ....

It is a long-established principle of the common

law of England, that civil force is sufficient to quell riots. To what
length may it not be carried? ... They may make the militia travel,

and act under a colonel, or perhaps under a constable.23 1
James Madison, seeking to reassure Henry, responded that
[t]here is a great deal of difference between calling forth the militia,
when a combination is formed to prevent the execution of the laws,
and the sheriff or constable carrying with him a body of militia to
execute them in the first instance; which is a construction not war23 2
ranted by the clause.
When Patrick Henry and others read Article IV, Section 4 to give Congress exclusive control of the militia,23 3 James Madison denied such exclusive
use of the militia and explained that states could use the militia to suppress
insurrections and quell riots and then call on the federal government to aid
them if necessary. 23 4 In response to Patrick Henry's insistence that the Militia and Domestic Violence Clauses, together with the clause forbidding the
states from engaging in war, demonstrated Congress's exclusive control of
the militia,23 5 James Madison further explained that the Domestic Violence
Clause was consistent with state control and simply gave states access to a
national military force. Clarifying his earlier explanation, 23 6 he now drew a
distinction between invasion and "domestic insurrections":

230

3 id. at 407 (statement of Mr. Clay).
3 id. at 408 (statement of James Madison).
3 id. at 410 (statement of James Madison).

231

3 id. at 411-12 (statement of Patrick Henry).

228
229

3 id. at 415 (statement of James Madison).
See 3 id. at 416-17, 422 (statement of Patrick Henry); 3 id. at 417-18 (statement of Widliam Grayson).
232
233

234 See 3 id. at 416 (statement of James Madison); see also 3 id. at 417 (statement of Frances
Corbin) (suggesting that states could use their own militia and could call on Congress for the

militia of other states); 3 id. at 419 (statement of John Marshall) (arguing that despite Congress's
grant of power to use and control the militia, the Constitution did not disable the states' power
over the militia).
235

See 3 id. at 423 (statement of Patrick Henry).

236

See supra notes 229-230 and accompanying text.
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The word invasion [in the Domestic Violence Clause], after power
had been given in the [Militia Clause] to repel invasions, may be
thought tautologous, but it has a different meaning from the other.
[The Domestic Violence Clause] speaks of a particular state. It
means that it shall be protected from invasion by other states. A
republican government is to be guarantied [sic] to each state, and
they are to be protected from invasion from other states, as well as
from foreign powers; and, on application by the legislature or executive, as the case may be, the militia of the other states are to be
called to suppress domestic insurrections. Does this bar the states
from calling forth their own militia? No; but it gives them a supple2 37
mentary security to suppress insurrections and domestic violence.
Edmund Pendleton, President of the Virginia ratifying convention, supported James Madison's interpretation by offering his view that the Domestic
Violence Clause vested both a power (in the national government) and an
immunity (in the states):
All the restraint here contained is, that Congress may, at their pleasure, on application of the state legislature, or (in vacation) of the
executive, protect each of the states against domestic violence. This
is a restraint on the general government not to interpose. The state
is in full possession of the power of using its own militia to protect
itself against domestic violence; and the power in the general government cannot be exercised, or interposed, without the application
238
of the state itself.
The earliest commentators on the Constitution also viewed the Domestic Violence Clause as a restricted grant of power to Congress. William
Rawle, a contemporary of the Framers and author of a popular treatise on
the Constitution, thought it the duty of a proper state government to apply to
the federal government for aid when
its own powers are insufficient to suppress the commmotion
[sic] ....At the same time it is properly provided, in order that such

interference may not wantonly or arbitrarily take place, that it shall
only be on the request of the state authorities: otherwise the selfgovernment of the state might be encroached upon at the pleasure
239
of the Union.
Explaining the limitation on Congress, Rawle commented that "there
has been the utmost care to avoid encroachments on the internal powers of
the different states, whenever the general good did not imperiously require
it.,,240

3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 116, at 425 (statement of James Madison).
3 id. at 441 (statement of Edmund Pendleton).
239 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
292 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Len 1825).
240 Id.
237

238
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Although Rawle emphasized the procedural aspects of the clause as a
shield to the states, St. George Tucker was emphatic that the Domestic Violence Clause reserved authority to the states.
[E]very pretext for intermeddling with the domestic concerns of any
state, under colour of protecting it against domestic violence is
taken away, by that part of the provision which renders an application from the legislative, or executive authority of the state endangered, necessary to be made to the federal government, before it's
[sic] interference can be at all proper.241
Both Thomas Cooley and Joseph Story, commenting on the Constitution, expressly followed Tucker's formulation.242
In these early discussions, the Framers and commentators approached
the Domestic Violence Clause somewhat differently. Madison and others
considered "domestic violence" as the internal analog to invasion, and they
equated the term with a direct challenge to a state's authority.243 This interpretation was consistent with the Domestic Violence Clause's location in Article IV, juxtaposed with the Republican Guarantee Clause and the Invasion
Clause.244 Federalists agreed that the Domestic Violence Clause referred to
crime, but was limited to a specific kind of crime: crime against government
qua government. The Domestic Violence Clause secured state governments
against insurrection, which meant violent threats to the state's government as
245
the government.
By contrast, for Anti-Federalists and others (including the early commentators St. George Tucker, William Rawle, Joseph Story, and Thomas
Cooley), "domestic violence" referred not only to insurrection, but also to
other crimes as well.246 Under this broader view the term covered not only
direct threats to the government's authority, but actions that indirectly
threatened the government by challenging its ability to protect its citizens. 247
Although those subscribing to the narrow view of "domestic violence" found
support in the Domestic Violence Clause's proximity to the Republican
Guarantee and Invasion Clauses, the broader view of the Domestic Violence
241 1 TUCKER, supra note 13, app. at 367.
242 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 198 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1880) (citing Tucker); 1 JoSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1825, at 633

(Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 3d ed. 1858) (citing Tucker); see also The Guaranteeof Order and
Republican Government in the States, 2 INT'L REV. 57, 65-68, 82-83, 86 (1875). The author of the
latter, unsigned article was evidently Thomas Cooley. See Note, The Guaranteeof Order and
Republican Government in the States, 2 CENT. L.J. 18 (1875).
243 See, e.g., supra notes 203, 224, 229-230, 237 and accompanying text.
244 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
245

See 1

GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

613 (New
York, Harper & Brothers 1897); G. Edward White, Reading the GuaranteeClause, 65 U. COLO.
FROM THEIR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE CLOSE OF THEIR CIVIL WAR

L. REV. 787, 798 (1994).
246 See, e.g., supra notes 181, 191-192, 219, 221-222, 241 and accompanying text.
247 See Willing, supra note 119, at 23 n.143 (referring to the early origins of "government as
protector of the populace against domestic violence").
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Clause was consistent with the plain text of the clause and the Framers' refusal to substitute the term "insurrections" for "domestic violence." 248
The difference between the two views was of lesser moment, at the time,
than one might expect because everyone agreed that the United States could
intervene only when invited by the state. The difference is significant today,
however, when determining whether there exists a dormant Domestic Violence Clause: an area of either insurrection or ordinary crime into which the
United States may not (as St. George Tucker stated) "intermeddl[e]" without
249
state consent.
C. Post-RatificationHistory of Federal CriminalAuthority and the
Domestic Violence Clause
Once the states ratified the Constitution, the task of interpreting it fell
largely to the earliest Congresses. Their views of their own powers are an
interesting contrast to the views of the Framers and those delegates responsible for ratifying the Constitution. Moreover, congressional interpretations of
the Constitution were substantial precursors to the judgments of the
courts. 250 There is, of course, a danger in trusting Congress to decide the
limits of its own powers. The first Congresses were remarkably aware, however, of the Constitution and conscientiously debated its meaning in a way
that would be quite foreign to modem legislators.
1.

Congress, Crime, and Domestic Violence

a.

The Crime Act of 1790

In April 1790, Congress enacted its first "Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States." 25 1 The Act of April 30, 1790 ("Act of
1790") focused on the three crimes enumerated in the Constitution and defined punishable crimes committed on federal property. The Act of 1790
punished treason, 25 2 piracy and other crimes (such as robbery or murder) on
the high seas or against the law of nations, 253 and counterfeiting. 254 It also
defined crimes-murder, manslaughter, larceny-in places "under the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. '255 If the first Congress had
stopped there, it would strongly have suggested that Congress regarded the
limits of its own power to be circumscribed by the enumerated crimes and its
See supra text accompanying note 216.
See supra text accompanying note 241.
250 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 775-76 (1994) ("Before 1800 nearly all of our constitutional law was made by Congress or the President, and so was much of it thereafter.").
251 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3005, 32813283, 3290, 3432 (1994)) [hereinafter Crime Act of 1790]; see DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801-1829,
at 7-9 (1985).
252 See Crime Act of 1790, §§ 2, 29, 1 Stat. at 112, 118-19.
253 See id. §§ 8-13, 16, 25-28, 1 Stat. at 113-15, 116, 117-18.
254 See id. § 14, 1 Stat. at 115.
255 Id. §§ 3, 7, 16, 1 Stat. at 113, 116.
248
249
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control of U.S. property. 256 The first Congress did not stop there, however,
but further defined the related crimes of misprision of (federal) felonies, mis25 7
prision of treason, and receiving goods stolen in contravention of U.S. law.
These crimes were related to offenses that Congress clearly had the power to
punish, but were not the offenses themselves. Congress also provided for
punishing the theft or falsification of court records, perjury, bribery of judges,
obstruction of process, and receiving persons convicted. 2 58 All of these matters were related-"necessary and proper"-to important functions of the
new government, but not specified in the Constitution. Finally, Congress included procedural rules, including a three-year statute of limitations on most
of the crimes defined and the method of capital punishment. 25 9
The Annals of Congress contains little recorded debate concerning the
Act of 1790. The only debates that were sufficiently controversial to merit
inclusion in the Annals were brief discussions of a venue provision,260 punishment for passing counterfeit securities (as opposed to the actual counterfeiting),261 and a Senate proposal that the bodies of executed murderers "shall
be delivered to a surgeon for dissection." 262 The Annals of Congress provides little discussion, if any, of the members' views of the limits of Congress's power. Rather, it demonstrates only the collective view that Congress
may not only punish the enumerated crimes and provide for the punishment
of crime within U.S. territories and property, but also that Congress may
punish related crimes. At the very least, the sparse debate recorded in the
Annals of Congress, the absence of other recorded debate, and the Act of
1790 itself suggest that Congress did not take seriously the position, held by
263
some Framers, that Congress had limited power to define crime.
b. The Militia Act of 1792
In 1792, Congress enacted the first of two bills for execution of the Militia Clauses and the Domestic Violence Clause.264 Although Article I granted
Congress the power to "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
256
257

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548, 596-97 & n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See Crime Act of 1790, §§ 2, 6, 17, 1 Stat. at 112, 113, 116; Kurland, supra note 7, at 53,

56-57.
258 See Crime Act of 1790, §§ 15, 18-23, 1
259 See id. §§ 31-33, 1 Stat. at 119.
260 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 833-34 (Gales

Stat. at 115, 116-17.
& Senton eds. 1834) (August 30, 1789); see also

Crime Act of 1790, §§ 4-5, 1 Stat. at 113. Because the early debates are found in two different
reports, each with its own pagination, for Volume 1 of the Annals I will indicate the exact date.
261 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1521 (Apr. 7, 1791); see also Crime Act of 1790, § 14, 1 Stat. at
115. During the debates over the establishment of the Bank of the United States, James
Madison, who opposed the bank's creation as exceeding Congress's enumerated powers, pointed
out that although "Congress have power 'to regulate the value of money;' yet it is expressly
added, not left to be implied, that counterfeiters may be punished." 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1899

(1791).
262 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. at 940-41 (Jan. 28, 1790), 1519-20 (Apr. 5, 1790); see also Crime
Act of 1790, § 4, 1 Stat. at 113.
263 See Currie, supra note 250, at 833; Kurland, supra note 7, at 53, 74-75.
264 See An Act to Provide for Calling Forth the Militia to Execute the Laws of the Union,
Suppress Insurrections; and Repel Invasions, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (1792). The Act was repealed in
1795 and reenacted with a provision requiring the President to judge the need for and strength of
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Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions, ' '265 Article IV
authorized the United States to protect the states "against Invasion;

and.., against domestic Violence. '266 The Act of May 2, 1792 (the "Militia
Act") delegated Congress's authority over the militia to the President and

assigned to the President the United States' duty to protect the states. Section 1 of the Militia Act provided:

That whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion.., it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States, to call forth ... the militia ... to repel such invasion ... ; and in case of an insurrection in any state, against the

government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States, on application of the legislature of such state, or of

to call
the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened)
2 67

forth ...

the militia

. . .

to suppress such insurrection.

This provision united in the President the powers granted in the Militia

and Domestic Violence Clauses and largely tracked the language of the Constitution (with the exception of using the term "insurrection" instead of "do-

mestic violence").
Section 2 of the Militia Act, which authorized the militia to execute the
laws of the United States, would shortly prove more controversial. This sec-

tion provided, in part:
That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or

the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial pro-

ceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals.., the same being
notified to the President of the United States, by an associate justice
or the district judge, it shall be lawful for the President ...to call
forth the militia of such state to suppress such combinations, and to
268
cause the laws to be duly executed.
a federal response. See infra note 270. Compare id. § 2, with Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1
Stat. 424 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1994)).
15.
265 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
266 Id. art. IV, § 4.
267 Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 1, 1 Stat. 264, 264. The current codification provides:
Whenever there is an insurrections [sic] in any State against its government, the
President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature
cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States,
in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he
considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.
10 U.S.C. § 331 (1994).
268 Act of May 2, 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. at 264. The current codification provides:
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the
militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to
enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.
10 U.S.C. § 332.
HeinOnline -- 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 42 1997-1998

1997]

Insuring Domestic Tranquility

This provision went far beyond the language of the Constitution. It
vested serious decisions about the strength of domestic resistance to the enforcement of U.S. law in the President 269 and the judiciary. 270 In contrast to
section 1 of the Militia Act and the Domestic Violence Clause, section 2 of
the Militia Act and the Militia Clause appeared to authorize federal suppression of any resistance to federal law without any act or consent by the states.
Representative William Vans Murray of Maryland hoped "[t]he
bill.., would attempt to mark with precision the objects the Constitution
looked towards, under the words 'execute the laws of the Union, and suppress insurrections."' 27' Furthermore, he suggested an important distinction:
"What was the occasion to warrant force of that species, was the first object:
Who was to judge of its existence, was another."27 2 He worried that the bill
lacked "defined objects and situations" for which the militia would be called
forth.273 To Representative Murray, the Militia Act's broad grant of power
was problematic because the new government "was a Government of definition, and not of trust and discretion."2 74 Other representatives voiced concerns that the bill "suppose[d] that the General Government only possesses
the power to suppress insurrections."2 75 In reality, "the States individually
certainly possess this power; they can suppress insurrections, and will do it;
their interest is involved in supporting the laws, and they are fully competent
light during the Whiskey Rebellion
to do it.' '2 7 6 These issues quickly came to277
in Western Pennsylvania two years later.
c. The Sedition Act of 1798
The liberties Congress took with the Constitution in the early crime and
militia bills were trivial when compared with its actions under the Act of July
14, 1798 (the "Sedition Act"). This Act made criminal the "writing, printing,
uttering or publishing of any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent
to defame."2 78 Through the Sedition Act, Congress codified, in part, the
common law rule of seditious libel, altering it, however, to provide that truth
269 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 554 (1792) (statement of Rep. Murray) (objecting to the Militia
bill's vesting the power to call forth the militia "to the discretion of one man"); 2 id. at 553
(statement of Rep. Mercer) (opposing section 2 of the Militia bill).
270 The Act of 1792 expired in 1794. A new bill was passed in 1795 with one significant
change. Section 2's provision requiring certification from an associate justice or district judge
was omitted. The need to intervene was left entirely to the President's judgment. See Act of
Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424, 424 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 331); see also Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 641-42 (1862) ("[The President's] powers in cases of insurrection or
invasion were clear and undoubted. He had the army, the navy, and the militia of the
States... confided to his command, sub modo.").
271 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 554 (statement of Rep. Murray).
272 2 id. (statement of Rep. Murray).
273 2 id.at 555 (statement of Rep. Murray).
274 2 id. (statement of Rep. Murray); see 2 id. at 574 (statement of Rep. Livermore).
275 2 id. at 574 (statement of Rep. Baldwin).
276 2 id. (statement of Rep. Baldwin).
277 See infra text accompanying notes 312-324.
278 Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596.
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constituted a defense.2 79 Because seditious libel is a lesser offense closely
related to treason, and because treason is expressly defined by the Constitution, one might have expected that no other definition, including lesser offenses, would have been proper.280
The debates over the constitutionality of the Sedition Act centered on
two questions. First, did Congress have an affirmative grant of power to enact such a provision? Second, assuming it did, had the First Amendment
disabled Congress from enacting such provisions? This section focuses on
28 l
the first of these arguments.
The Federalists, seeking a legal basis for silencing criticism of President
John Adams, made several arguments in favor of the Sedition Act. First,
they argued that Congress had power to suppress insurrection and repel invasions, and "[t]he alien and sedition acts ... form ... an essential part in these

precautionary and protective measures, adopted for our security." 282 Alluding to the Militia and Domestic Violence Clauses, as well as the Militia Act,
Massachusetts Representative Harrison Otis argued:
Unlawful combinations to oppose the measures of Government, to
intimidate its officers, and to excite insurrections, are acts which
tend directly to the destruction of the Constitution, and there could
be no doubt that the guardians of that Constitution are bound to
provide against them. And if ...

these were acts of a criminal na-

ture, it follows that all means calculated to produce these effects,
28 3
whether by speaking, writing, or printing, were also criminal.
These arguments lacked textual support, however, because Congress's
only enumerated power to suppress insurrections and repel invasions was the
power to martial the militia. Furthermore, the power of the United States
against invasion and domestic violence is intended to protect the states, not
the national government.
More to the point, the Federalists asserted that the Sweeping Clause empowered Congress to punish seditious libel. "[Clan the powers of a Government be carried into execution, if sedition for opposing its laws, and libels
against its officers, itself, and its proceedings, are to pass unpunished?" 28 4 A
committee report, drafted in response to petitions requesting a repeal of the
alien and sedition laws, reasoned that:
[A] law to punish false, scandalous, and malicious writings against
the Government, with intent to stir up sedition, is a law necessary
279 See 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 142, at 767; 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 235 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT].

280 Congress has, nevertheless, approved legislation that criminalizes lesser offenses of treason. See, e.g., An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Therein Specified, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 613
(1799) (criminalizing correspondence with a foreign government with the intent to influence that
government in matters involving the United States).
281 I have discussed previously the Sedition Act debates in the context of the First Amendment in Bybee, supra note 33, at 1567-71.
282 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2991 (1799) (committee report).

283 5 id. at 2146 (1798) (statement of Rep. Otis).
284 5 id. at 2167 (statement of Rep. Harper).
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for carrying into effect the power vested by the Constitution in the
Government of the United States...; because the direct tendency
of such writings is to obstruct the acts of the Government by excit-

ing opposition to them, to endanger its existence by rendering it
odious and contemptible in the eyes of the people, and to produce
seditious combinations against the laws, the power to punish which
285
has never been questioned ....
The Federalists further defended the distance the Sedition Act had trav-

eled from the Constitution by reciting various sections of the Act of 1790, as
evidence that "Congress has passed many laws for which no express provision can be found in the Constitution, and the constitutionality of which has
never been questioned. ' 28 6 Finally, the Federalists claimed that the federal
government could not hope for punishment of sedition by the states and,
therefore, Congress simply was codifying a common law crime that the federal courts must have power to punish. 28 7
Republicans answered that, the First Amendment aside, Congress had
no power to enact such legislation. Virginia Representative John Nicholas
claimed "it was not within the powers of the House to act upon this subject." 2 He had "looked in vain amongst the enumerated powers given to
Congress in the Constitution, for an authority to pass a law like the present." 28 9 James Madison, in defense of the Virginia Resolutions, 290 argued
that Congress's power to suppress insurrections could not support the Sedi285 5 id. at 2988 (1799) (committee report).
286 5 id. As Representative Otis stated:
[O]ther crimes had been made penal at an early period of the Government, by
express statute, to which no exception had been taken. For example, stealing public records, perjury, obstructing the officers of justice, bribery in a Judge, and even a
contract to give a bribe,... were all punishable, and why? Not because they are
described in the Constitution, but because they are crimes against the United
States-because laws against them are necessary to carry other laws into effect ....
5 id. at 2147 (1798) (statement of Rep. Otis). Otis also pointed to language in the Judiciary Act
of 1789, that "sav[ed] to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy, where the common law was competent to give it." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77; see 5 ANNALS
OF CONG. 2147 (statement of Rep. Otis). Otis assumed that this competency derived from the
Constitution and could not "perceive how this competency applied to civil and not to criminal
cases." 5 id. (statement of Rep. Otis).
27 See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2989 (1799) (committee report); 5 id. at 2147 (1798) (statement
of Rep. Otis) ("[T]he National Government is invested with a power to protect itself against
outrages of this kind, or it must be indebted to and dependent on an individul [sic] state for its
protection, which is absurd."); 5 id. at 2141 (statement of Rep. Harper).
288 5 id. 2139 (statement of Rep. Nicholas).
289 5 id. (statement of Rep. Nicholas).
290 The Virginia Resolutions of 1798 were drafted by James Madison and adopted by the
General Assembly of Virginia to denounce the Alien and Sedition Acts as unconstitutional, as
well as to reaffirm the rights of states as reserved through the Tenth Amendment. See James
Madison, Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprintedin 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 116, at 528,
528-29. Similarly, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolutions to oppose the Acts. See
Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES,
supra note 116, at 540, 540-45. The Virginia Resolutions were transmitted to the executive of
each state, who were asked to communicate the resolutions to each legislature, so that "the other
states, in confidence that they [would] concur with [Virginia] in declaring, as it [did] hereby
declare, that the [Alien and Sedition Acts] [were] unconstitutional." Madison, supra, at 529. A
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tion Act "with the least plausibility."2 91 Further, North Carolina Representative Nathaniel Macon quoted from James Iredell's remarks during the North
Carolina ratifying debates to show that Congress has "'no power to define
any other crime whatever,"' 292 beyond those enumerated in the Constitution.
The Kentucky Resolutions, authored by Thomas Jefferson, made this argument more forcefully:
Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States having delegated to Congress a power to punish treason, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the united States, piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offences against the laws of nations, and no other crimes whatever; and it being true, as a general
principle, and one of the amendments to the Constitution having
also declared "that the powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people,"-therefore, also, the [Sedition Act and the Bank Fraud Act] (and all other their acts which
assume to create, define, or punish crimes other than those enumerated in the Constitution,) are altogether void, and of no force; and
that the power to create, define, and punish, such other crimes is
reserved, and of right appertains, solely and exclusively, to the re293
spective states, each within its own territory.
The Republicans also denied that authority might be found in the
Sweeping Clause. Representative Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, one of
the most vocal critics of the sedition laws, asserted that the Constitution gave
to Congress no specific power to punish seditious libel, and Congress could
only claim it from a "more general authority.

' 294

If "Congress had the

power, generally, to provide for the punishment of any offenses against Government ....

such a power,... would embrace the punishment of any.., act,

which, though not criminal in itself, might be obnoxious to the persons who
happened to have Government in their hands. 2 95 But, he said, the Constitution specified the offenses Congress could punish. He then proceeded to list
piracy and felonies on the high seas, counterfeiting, treason, offenses within
U.S. territories and property, and
offences against the laws or exercise of the Constitutional authority
of any department-which offences Congress had a right to define
and punish, by virtue of the clause of the Constitution which emnumber of states issued resolutions disapproving the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. See 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 116, at 532-39.
291 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, reprintedin 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 116, at 546, 568.
292 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2151 (statement of Rep. Macon). The passage from which Macon
quoted is found in 4 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 116, at 219.
293 Jefferson, supra note 290, at 540.
294 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2158 (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
295 5 id. (statement of Rep. Gallatin); see 5 id. at 3002 (1799) (statement of Rep. Gallatin);
Madison, supra note 291, at 568 (reiterating that the federal government is "possessed of particular and definite powers only, not of general and indefinite powers vested in ordinary
governments").
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powered them to pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying
296
into execution any power vested by the Constitution in them.
He defended Congress's previous crime acts, including provisions punishing theft of the mails and tax evasion, as evidence that it had "heretofore
strictly adhered to the specification of the Constitution. '297 The Sweeping
Clause, he argued, required a basis in some other enumerated power of Congress or the United States.298 The Federalists' argument, on the other hand,

Congress a "general guardianship over the morals of the
would give
29 9
people.

'

The Republicans also asserted that there was no warrant for a claim to
common law authority to punish seditious speech. Representative Gallatin
stated that the Federalists had confounded two very distinct ideas-the principles of the common law, and the jurisdiction over cases arising under it.
"That those principles were recognised in the cases where the courts had jurisdiction, was not denied; but such a recognition could by no means extend
' 300
the jurisdiction beyond the specific cases defined by the Constitution.
Thus, in Gallatin's ;iew,
[t]he question was not whether the Courts of the United States had,
without this law, the power to punish libels, but whether, supposing
they had not the power, Congress had that of giving them this jurisdiction-whether Congress were vested by the Constitution with
30
the authority of passing this bill? '

296 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2158 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
297 5 id.at 2159 (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
298 See 5 id.
299 5 id. at 3005 (1799) (statement of Rep. Gallatin). In a harbinger of the arguments made
in Lopez, Representative Gallatin continued:
[N]othing can have a greater tendency to insure obedience to law, and nothing can
be more likely to check every propensity to resistance to Government, than virtuous and wise education; therefore Congress must have power to subject all the
youth of the United States to a certain system of education. It would be very easy
to connect every sort of authority used by any Government with the well-being of
the General Government ....although the consequence must be the prostration of
the State Governments.
5 id.(statement of Rep. Gallatin).
Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions expressed a similar thought: "Congress have
power to suppress insurrections; yet it would not be allowed to follow, that they might employ all
the means tending to prevent them; of which a system of moral instruction for the ignorant... might be regarded as among the most efficacious." Madison, supra note 291, at 558; cf.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 622-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Discussing the links between crime, education, and commerce, Justice Breyer questioned:
Why then is it not equally obvious, in light of those links, that a widespread, serious, and substantial physical threat to teaching and learning also substantially
threatens the commerce to which that teaching and learning is inextricably
tied?... [G]uns in the hands of six percent of inner-city high school students and
gun-related violence throughout a city's schools must threaten the trade and commerce that those schools support.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
300 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2157 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin); see also Madison, supra
note 291, at 561-64 (rejecting the proposition that Congress can simply codify the common law).
301 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2157-58 (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
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3
Moreover, state sedition laws did not justify Congress's actions. 02
Sedition posed an interesting and unique dilemma for government. In
its most extreme form-overt actions against the government-it constituted
treason. In a lesser form-but constituting action nonetheless-it could be
punished as a crime. But in either form, it was a unique kind of crime because the victim was the institution of government itself. Although any crime
challenges the ability of the government to protect its citizens and to maintain the peace, sedition strikes at the fundamental ability of the government
to protect itself, to maintain its physical legitimacy, and to leave itself in a
position to protect its citizens.
The federal government's power to punish sedition presented a special
issue of its broader power to punish unenumerated crimes. This issue, as
framed by the Sedition Act debates, was profound because it went to the
heart of the government's legitimacy, and it was broad because Congress relied exclusively on the Sweeping Clause for its authority. In these debates, it
is sometimes difficult to separate arguments of political expediency from
more detached thoughts about the Constitution. For example, as the Federalists pointed out, no one in Congress contested the power of Congress to
punish seditious acts, even though the Republicans' arguments about the lack
of an enumerated power authorizing punishment of seditious libel applied
30 3
with equal force to the section of the bill punishing actions.
But even if the Federalists and Republicans agreed on the government's
power to punish seditious acts, the arguments served as a warning that congressionally defined crimes not intended to protect the government itself
must have a clear basis in the text of the Constitution. The Republicans'
arguments revealed a deep suspicion that the enumerated powers principle
was proving to be a sieve and that the Sweeping Clause might justify nearly
all criminal legislation. Although some Republicans continued to maintain
that Congress could only punish the enumerated crimes, most Republicansand almost certainly the Federalists-would have conceded that Congress
could make certain conduct criminal such as was necessary and proper to the
enforcement of laws plainly within Congress's power. In the end, "a crisis
which seems to us to have been concerned with freedom seemed to the
statesmen of 1798 to be a crisis in federalism." 304

d. Other Provisions
The initial impetus to enact laws protecting the interests of the United
States demonstrated that Congress did not believe that its authority was confined to the enumerated crimes and crimes committed on federally owned
property. Congress obviously thought that the Sweeping Clause authorized
302 See 5 id. at 2142 (statement of Rep. Nicholas).
303 See 5 id. 2988 (1799) (committee report).
304 Mark DeWolfe Howe, Book Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 189, 190 (1952) (reviewing
JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION AcTs (1951)); see Dennis v.

United States, 341 U.S. 494, 522 n.4 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting an 1804 letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams: "While we deny that Congress have a right to controul [sic] the freedom of the press, we have ever asserted the right of the states, and their
exclusive right, to do so.").
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further criminal legislation. Prior to the Civil War, Congress enacted a
number of criminal statutes protecting federal interests. These crimes included forgery against the United States or involving U.S. debt or securities,
bribery, fraud against the United States, interference with the mail, and embezzlement.3 0 5 These crimes appear to arise out of enumerated powers

granted to Congress. 30 6 To the extent punishment of these crimes infringed
30 7
state jurisdiction over crime, the incursion was modest.
Following the Civil War, Congress enacted its first laws intended to protect individuals, rather than the government itself.308 These laws included the
Act of March 3, 1865 which, among other things, prohibited the passing of
obscene materials through the mail.30 9 Despite the fact that the mails were
exclusively within federal control, the passage of these laws represented a
substantial step towards the federalization of crime. 310 Regulatory crimes,
311
drawing on Congress's commerce power, followed shortly thereafter.
2.

The Executive and Domestic Violence

The first real test of the United States' new powers against insurrection
and domestic violence came in 1794, shortly after passage of the Militia Act.
In early 1791, Congress enacted an excise tax on whiskey. 312 The whiskey tax
305 See, e.g., Act of Dec. 23, 1857, ch. 1, §§ 12-13, 11 Stat. 257, 259 (punishing forgery or
counterfeiting of treasury notes and fraudulent use of engraving plates); Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch.
81, 10 Stat. 170 (criminalizing various frauds upon the Treasury of the United States); Act of
Aug. 31, 1852, ch. 113, § 4, 10 Stat. 121, 140 (punishing the theft of mailbags and other property
belonging to the Post-Office Department); Act of Aug. 6, 1846, ch. 90, § 16, 9 Stat. 59, 63
(criminalizing embezzlement of public moneys). These laws are described in WHARTON, supra

note 96, at 80-85. See also Sara Sun Beale, FederalCriminalJurisdiction,in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE 775-76 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); Martin Conboy, Federal Criminal
Law, in 1 LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at 295, 308-10 (Alison Reppy ed., 1937).
306 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 7 (mail); id. cl. 2 (U.S. debt); id. cl. 6 (counterfeiting
securities); id. art. II, § 4 (removal of officers of the United States for bribery).
307 See 1 CONG. DEa. 167 (1825) (statement of Rep. Webster) ("The crimes most mischievous were crimes against the property of the Government."); id. at 154-55 (statement of Rep.
Webster). But see id. at 154, 335-36 (statements of Rep. Wickliffe) (criticizing a bill comprising
various federal crimes because "it extends the jurisdiction of the United States to offences committed within the territories of the several States"). Indeed, the Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 65, 4
Stat. 115, contained an assimilated crimes provision, adopting state criminal laws in federal areas
within a state where there was no applicable federal law. Rather than adopt a separate federal
criminal code that covered all possible offenses in these areas, Congress instead chose to rely on
state laws for many of the offenses that could be committed.
308 See Baker, supra note 96, at 513-14; Beale, supra note 305, at 776; Conboy, supra note
305, at 311-24. For discussion of the civil rights acts, see infra Part IV.
309 See An Act Relating to the Postal Laws, ch. 89, § 16, 13 Stat. 504, 507 (1865).
310 See Baker, supra note 96, at 514; see also An Act to Amend Certain Sections of the
Revised Statutes Relating to Lotteries, and for Other Purposes, ch. 908, 26 Stat. 465 (1890); An
Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Statutes Relating to the Post-Office Department, ch.
335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 322 (1872).
311 See, e.g., An Act for the Suppression of Lottery Traffic Through National and Interstate
Commerce and the Postal Service Subject to the Jurisdiction and Laws of the United States, ch.
191, 28 Stat. 963 (1895); An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints
and Monopolies, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1-4 (1994))
(Sherman Antitrust Act); Act to Regulate Commerce, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
312 See An Act Repealing, After the Last Day of June Next, the Duties Heretofore Laid
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was part of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's fiscal plan, under which
the United States would assume state debts, and the tax would cover the
budget shortfall.313 To the farmers of Western Pennsylvania, the tax was odi314
Comous, and as many as 7,000 of them organized against its collection.
315
parisons with Shays' Rebellion were inevitable.
After an attack on a federal tax collector, President Washington met
with Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin in August 1794 and found that
state officials were reluctant to meet the organized rebellion with the state's
militia.316 Governor Mifflin thought that the judiciary should be employed to
punish the rioters before deploying a military force. 317 Soon after Associate
Justice James Wilson certified that U.S. laws were being opposed and that the
resistance was beyond the judiciary's power (a certification required by the
Militia Act), Washington determined to assemble a militia and send it to
Western Pennsylvania. 318 The United States marshalled a militia of nearly
13,000 men from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, and Maryland and, as
3 19
with Shays' Rebellion, the resistance dispersed quickly.
The episode would seem to have vindicated Washington's use of the Militia Clause and the Militia Act. 320 But the precedent came at some cost to
clarity in state-federal relations. After President Washington announced his
intentions to send a militia, Governor Mifflin and Secretary of State Edmund
Randolph exchanged correspondence over the propriety of President Washington's proposed acts. Governor Mifflin protested that "the military power
of the Government ought not to be employed until its judiciary authority,
after a fair experiment, has proved incompetent to enforce obedience or to
punish infractions of the law."' 32' Referring to the Domestic Violence Clause,
Governor Mifflin advised that although the riots were connected with federal
revenue laws, the acts were indistinguishable from other acts of organized
violence:
Had the riot been unconnected with the system of federal policy,
the vindication of our laws would be left to the ordinary course of
justice; and only in the last resort, at the requisition, and as an auxilupon Distilled Spirits Imported from Abroad, and Laying Others in Their Stead; and also upon
Spirits Distilled Within the United States, and for Appropriating the Same, ch. 15, §§ 14-15, 1
Stat. 199, 202-03 (1791).
313 See H.M. BRACKENRIDGE, HISTORY OF THE WESTERN INSURRECTION IN WESTERN
PENNSYLVANIA 17-18 (Pittsburgh, W.S. Haven 1859); THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY
REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

95-97 (1986).

See BENNETr MILTON RICH, The Presidents and Civil Disorder 7 (1941).
315 See id. at 2; SLAUGHTER, supra note 313, at 103.
316 See RICH, supra note 314, at 8.
317 See LELAND D. BALDWIN, WHISKEY REBELS: THE STORY OF A FRONTIER UPRISING
184-85 (1939); RICH, supra note 314, at 8; SLAUGHTER, supra note 313, at 192-93, 196; Richard A.
Ifft, Treason in the Early Republic: The FederalCourts, PopularProtest, and Federalism During
the Whiskey Insurrection, in THE WHISKEY REBELLION: PAST AND PRESENT PERSPECTIVES 165,
170 (Steven R. Boyd ed., 1985).
318 See RICH, supra note 314, at 8-9.
319 See id. at 8-10, 16.
320 See id. at 19-20 (offering effusive praise for Washington's actions during the Whiskey
Rebellion).
321 4 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 2827 (1796) (letter from Governor Mifflin).
314
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iary of the civil authority, would the military force of the State be
322
called forth.
Governor Mifflin's point was a fair one: What was to prevent the United
States from declaring the law enforcement efforts of a state inadequate and
thus a threat to federal laws, requiring displacement of the state's law enforcement role? In response, Secretary Randolph conflated the Republican
Guarantee and Domestic Violence Clauses, suggesting that military force is
sometimes necessary if the citizens of the United States expect to "support
their own authority . . against disorderly and violent combinations" and to
"preserve the character of Republican Government, by evincing that it has
adequate resources for maintaining the public order. ' 323 The latter statement
could not have been reassuring to state officials who were concerned that any
public disturbance might be viewed as a threat to republican government and
provide the occasion for federal intervention. From a state's perspective,
there could be no threat as great to its republican form of government as
324
federal intervention.
Executive practice in the period between the Whiskey Rebellion and
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment was more guarded than President
Washington's initial foray may have suggested. Following President John
Adams's use of the militia to suppress Fries' Insurrection of 1799, an incident
similar to the Whiskey Rebellion, 325 there were relatively few occasions requiring the use of federal troops prior to the Civil War,326 and most of the
interventions involved opposition to federal law. 327 Presidents were very
cautious about intervening in state domestic affairs when no violation of federal law was involved. In fact, on several occasions, the President declined to
respond to requests for assistance on the grounds that the state had not

322

See 4 id. app. at 2827-28 (letter from Governor Mifflin).

4 hi app. at 2832. Professor Wiecek says that the Guarantee Clause was not cited as
authority by Washington or Congress for his efforts "to put down the Rebellion since the domestic violence clause provided authority enough." WIECEK, supra note 131, at 78. But the Domestic Violence Clause clearly was not the source of the government's claim to authority. Because
the Rebellion involved the enforcement of a federal excise on domestic whiskey, it was the
Militia Clause, not the Domestic Violence Clause, that provided the textual basis for the President's use of force under section 2 of the Militia Act of 1792. See Ferguson, supra note 198, at
414 & n.40 (noting that President Washington authorized the use of troops to stop the obstruction of federal law).
324 See BALDWIN, supra note 317, at 184 ("[Pennsylvania] state officials were silent, probably each reminded of the prophecy that the federal government would swallow up the states and
323

interpreting [Washington's] proposal as a step in that direction.").
325

See RICH,supra note 314, at 21 n.1, 22-24.

326 These incidents are catalogued in OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., FEDERAL
AID IN DoMESTIc DIsTURBANcES, 1903-1922, S. Doc. No. 67-263 (1922) (supplementing FREDERICKC T. WILSON, U.S. ARMy,FEDERAL AID IN DomEsTIc DIsTuRBANcES, 1787-1903, S. Doc.
No. 57-209 (1903)). See generally RICH, supra note 314.
327

See S. Doc. No. 67-263, at 45.
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demonstrated the insufficiency of its own resources 328 or that an improper
329
official had made the request.

During this period, Attorney General Caleb Cushing advised that "domestic violence" encompassed more than insurrection or riot, but extended
to "robbery, burglary, arson, rape, and murder. '330 This view of "domestic
violence" was a two-edged sword. It expanded the circumstances in which
the federal government could intervene when requested by the appropriate
state officials, yet simultaneously suggested that it typically was not appropriate for the United States to address such ordinary crimes in the absence of a

state request. If, in cases of insurrection against a state, the federal government could only act upon invitation, a fortiori, there was no authority for
intervention in lesser matters of "domestic violence." Furthermore, the Attorney General affirmed that "each State of the Union has the right to pro-

tect itself against domestic violence, and to invoke to that end the friendly co'331
operation, or at least the neutrality, of the United States."
3.

The Courts and the Federalizationof Crime

Early judicial opinions offer relatively little discussion of congressional
authority to punish crime. The judiciary widely assumed that Congress possessed "necessary and proper" authority to punish acts against the United
States.332 In dicta in McCulloch v. Maryland,333 Chief Justice Marshall in334
ferred from Congress's power "[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads"
the right of the United States "to punish those who steal letters from the
328 See id. at 54-56 (Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island); id. at 75-76 (San Francisco riots); id.
at 174 (labor disturbances in Missouri and Illinois); The Guarantee of Order and Republican
Government in the States, supra note 242, at 86 (elections in Mississippi). The Dorr Rebellion is
discussed in text accompanying infra notes 364-378.
329 See S. Doc. No. 67-263, at 56 (request from a governor denied without evidence that
the legislature could not convene); id. at 76-77 (same); id. at 145 (request from Little Rock
mayor denied); see also id. at 99, 173-74, 311 (examples of the President denying assistance because the state legislature had not made the request); Insurrection in a State, 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 8,
13 (1856) (request from a governor denied without evidence that the legislature could not
convene).
The Department of Justice has specified three prerequisites for the President to send troops:
(1) "That a situation of serious domestic violence exists within the state"; (2) "That such violence
cannot be brought under control by the law-enforcement resources available to the Governor,
including local and State police forces and the National Guard"; and (3) "That the proper request is received from the Legislature or, when the Legislature is not in session, the Governor."
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE UNDER FEDERAL LAW TO DEAL WITH
CIVIL DISORDERS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 3-4 (1980) [hereinafter THE USE OF MILITARY
FORCE UNDER FEDERAL LAW].

Yazoo City Post Office Case, 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 489, 494 (1857).
Id. at 497.
332 See, e.g., James Iredell's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District
of New York (April 6, 1795), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note
279, at 22; James Iredell's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of
Pennsylvania (April 11, 1799), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 279, at 341-44.
333 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
334 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
330
331
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post-office, or rob the mail. '3 35 In his view, "the power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised, whenever' 336
the sovereign has a
right to act, as incidental to his constitutional powers.
The judiciary gave a great deal more attention, however, to the question
of its own powers over crime. Just as Congress and the Executive had struggled with the reach of their new powers, the judiciary grappled with the
bounds of its jurisdiction to punish crimes. On the one hand, its jurisdiction
seemed to be circumscribed by Congress's criminal authority.337 The courts'
immediate concern, however, was not with the breadth of Congress's enumerated power over crime, but with its own powers to try cases based on
common law crimes.338 A "common law jurisdiction to punish was a doctrine
to be feared. Its potential reach threatened the liberties of citizens and the
polity of each and every state. ' 339 Jurisdiction over common law crimes
would have expanded dramatically the power of the United States to define
and punish crime. Had the courts possessed common law jurisdiction over
crime, the Executive's power to prosecute such crimes would have expanded
commensurately. Moreover, it would probably have expanded Congress's
power as well, because Congress has power over federal jurisdiction and has
the power to make laws "necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . . all other Powers . . . vested in the Government of the United

States." 340
The debate over common law crimes was relatively short-lived. In May
1806, the Connecticut Courantreprinted an article charging that the President
and Congress had given $2,000,000 to Napoleon as inducement to make a
treaty with Spain.341 The United States indicted publishers Hudson and
Goodwin for common law criminal libel against President Thomas Jefferson
and Congress. 34 2 The Court's spare opinion in United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin34 3 held that the courts did not possess jurisdiction over such
335

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 417. Alluding to the Crime Act of 1790, Marshall

added that "the punishment of the crimes of stealing or falsifying a record or process of a court
of the United States, or of perjury in such court" was "conducive to the due administration of

justice" though "not indispensably necessary." Id.
336 Id. at 418.

337 See Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdictionto Punish:FederalAuthority, Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 LAW & HisT. REv. 223, 226-28 (1986).
338

See JOHN M.

GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF

AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, IN CoNTRAS

wITH THE DocrRNES OF THE ENGLISH COMMON

LAW ON THE SUBJEcr OF CRIMES AND PuN smNTs 283-314 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Ja-

cobstein eds., photo. reprint 1972) (1819).
339 Preyer, supra note 337, at 263.

340 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 18.
341 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,32 (1812); 2 CRossKEY,
supra note 142, at 771-72; Gary D. Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson
& Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes,
101 YALE L.J. 919, 924 (1992).
342 See 2 CRossKcY, supra note 142, at 772. Ironically, the Jeffersonians, who had vociferously protested the Sedition Act as beyond Congress's enumerated powers and a violation of the
First Amendment, employed a common law variation on the Act's theme against its Federalist

supporters.
343 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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crimes. 344 The Court declined to state whether such jurisdiction could be
conferred by Congress; it was sufficient that Congress had not.345 The Court
acknowledged that the federal government might possess "certain implied

powers," but with respect to defining crimes, "[t]he legislative authority of
the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.

whatever implied powers inhered in the courts,
348
mon law crimes did not.

347

'346

Moreover,

power to adjudicate com-

Hudson & Goodwin provided substantial support for state control of

crime. Just as the Sedition Act debates concerned state control of speech,
press, and religion, Hudson & Goodwin preserved, at least for a time, the
states' power to define crimes. 349 If the Supreme Court had upheld a federal

court common law jurisdiction over crime, Congress's ability to define such
crimes might have followed as well.350 Had the United States then possessed
common law criminal authority, almost any crime could have been viewed as
an act against the government (as the debates over the Civil Rights Act of
1871 demonstrated). 351 If such authority were construed broadly, the national government could have used the Militia Clause to intervene at will to

punish crimes, reducing the Domestic Violence Clause to a nullity. Hudson
& Goodwin confirmed that Congress held, in the first instance, whatever au344 See id. at 34.
345 See id. at 33; see also Madison, supra note 291, at 564 (discussing Article III, Section 2;
concluding that the judiciary's power over "cases in law and equity" excludes jurisdiction over
criminal cases).
346 Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34. The Court's reference to Congress
"declar[ing] the Court that shall have jurisdiction" referred to the practice of authorizing prosecution of federal crimes in state courts. See Kurland, supra note 7, at 61-62. It was not a foregone conclusion that federal crimes, once defined, would be prosecuted in federal court.
347 The Court referred to the courts' inherent powers to "fine for contempt-imprison for
contumacy-[and] inforce the observance of order." Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at
34; see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991) (discussing the basis for, and
examples of, courts' inherent power).
348 See Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34.
349 Had Hudson & Goodwin concerned common law crimes in places under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, the case may have only represented a judgment concerning the
division between Congress and the judiciary. Cf. 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 142, at 782 (quoting
complaints that, following Hudson & Goodwin, crimes not defined by statute could not be punished, even when committed in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States); see
also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 216 (1876) ("If Congress has not declared an act done
within a State to be a crime against the United States, the Courts have no power to treat it as
such.").
350 See Rowe, supra note 341, at 928, 931-35 (discussing Justice Story's efforts to have Congress authorize federal courts to adjudicate common law crimes).
351 See infra Part IV.B.2. In a subsequent case involving prosecution for piracy, Justice
Story, riding circuit, held that federal courts may punish common law or nonstatutory piracy.
Story included as "crimes and offences against the United States ... all offences against the
sovereignty, the public rights, the public justice, the public peace, the public trade and the public
police of the United States." United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 620 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)
(No. 14,857). The Supreme Court reversed. See United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
415 (1816).
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thority the United States possessed to define crimes. 352 The Court deferred
to another day the limitations, if any, on Congress's authority.
The early Court had few opportunities to opine about the extent of Congress's criminal authority. Two years after the Court's dicta on the power of
Congress to define crimes based on the Sweeping Clause, 353 the Court offered more dicta, which now suggested that Congress's authority over crime
was quite limited. In Cohens v. Virginia,354 Virginia prosecuted the Cohens
for selling lottery tickets, which was prohibited in Virginia.3 55 The Cohens
argued in defense that the tickets were issued by a District of Columbia corporation
organized under a congressional statute authorizing it to conduct a
356
lottery.

The Court upheld its jurisdiction over the Cohens' appeal from the Virginia courts. 357 Virginia had argued that when Congress legislated for the
district, its powers were no greater than "a local legislature. 3 58 The Court
disagreed that Congress's power was so limited, but in the course of its discussion, admitted that Congress had "no general right to punish murder committed within any of the States" and that "Congress cannot punish felonies
generally. '359 On the merits, the Court held that Congress had not authorized the sale of tickets outside the District of Columbia and affirmed the
convictions.

360

Cohens provided a fascinating twist on Hudson & Goodwin. Although
the Hudson & Goodwin Court gave up its ability to exercise jurisdiction over
substantive common law crimes, it reserved Congress's power to define common law crimes.361 In Cohens, the Court (at least in dicta) rejected any claim
that Congress might have had to define crime within the states, 362 but it asserted the Court's jurisdiction to hear appeals from state common law
352

See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,424 (1985) ("The definition of the elements

of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes,
which are solely creatures of statute."); cf Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the
FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L. Rzv. 49, 73 (1923) (suggesting that the legislative

history of the Judiciary Act shows that "Congress did not intend to limit criminal jurisdiction to
crimes specifically defined by it").
353
354
355
356
357

See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819).
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
See id. at 375.
See id. at 375, 423.
Cohens raised the question whether the Supreme Court could hear a constitutional chal-

lenge to a criminal conviction under state law. The question of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to civil matters in state courts had been resolved
previously in Martin v. Hunter'sLessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351 (1816). For background on

Cohens, see W.

RAY LucE, COI-ENs V. VIRGINIA

(1821): THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE
1-24 (1990); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE

RIGHTS, A REEVALUATION OF INFLUENCES AND IMPACTS

1815-1835, at 504-10 (abr. ed. 1991).
Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 427; see id. at 292-93 (argument of Philip Barbour on
behalf of Virginia) (arguing that the D.C. lottery corporation was not created under a law of the
United States and thus the appeal was not within the Court's jurisdiction).
359 Id. at 426, 428.
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE,
358

360

See id. at 447.

361 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33-34 (1812).
362

See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 426-28.
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cases.3 63 Following Hudson & Goodwin and Cohens, it appeared that the
federal judiciary had disclaimed any authority to adjudicate common law
crimes and that Congress lacked any general power to punish felonies within
the states.
The Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to shed light on
the Domestic Violence Clause's role in federalism in Luther v. Borden.3 64 In
1842, a group of citizens in Rhode Island sought to replace the original Charter of Charles II, issued in 1663, with a new constitution.3 65 Thomas Dorr was
elected governor at the first election under the putative constitution, and his
election set him in opposition to Governor Samuel King, who had been
elected previously under the Charter.3 66 Governor King repeatedly requested federal assistance to quell what he considered an insurrection, yet his
requests were denied on the ground that the disturbances were not beyond
Rhode Island's capacity and that the legislature (not the Governor) had to
request assistance. 367 The Dorr Rebellion ended with the Charter govern368
ment still in place and without federal intervention.
The suit by Martin Luther, a Dorr sympathizer, alleged that Luther Borden unlawfully entered Luther's home during the Dorr Rebellion.3 69 Borden
claimed that he had entered lawfully on the authority of martial law declared
by the Charter government.370 According to the Court, if the Charter government was legitimate, Borden had lawfully entered Luther's home; but, if
the Dorr government was legitimate, Borden had trespassed. 371 For purposes
of the Guarantee Clause, the Supreme Court held that the power to determine which government was legitimate did not belong to the courts, but to
Congress. The Court concluded that the same reasoning applied to the de372
termination of when to intervene under the Domestic Violence Clause.
Referring to the Militia Act, the Court found that Congress had delegated
the power of the United States in "cases of domestic violence" to the President.373 "If there is an armed conflict,... it is a case of domestic violence,
363

See id. at 415.

48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). The Domestic Violence Clause had been invoked earlier by
counsel in Groves v. Slaughter,40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, app. at lxviii (1841) (argument of Groves's
counsel Mr. Walker). Walker argued that state powers include
a power to guard the state, "against domestic violence," which not only was reserved to the state, but to the state exclusively, unless upon its "application" for aid
to the government of the United States .... In the state then alone resides the
power to pass all laws, designed to protect its people against domestic violence.
Id. The Court, however, did not mention the Domestic Violence Clause in its opinion.
365 See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 35-36.
366 See OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES, 1903-1922, S.Doc. No. 67-263, at 54-55 (1922) (supplementing FREDERICK T. WILSON,
U.S. ARMY, FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES, 1787-1903, S.Doc. No. 57-209 (1903));
see also Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 9, 37 (plaintiff's pleadings to the Circuit Court).
367 See S. Doc. No. 67-263, at 54-56.
364

368

See id. at 57.

See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 34.
370 See id.
371 See id. at 38-39.
372 See id. at 42-43.
373 Id. at 43.
369
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and one of the parties must be in insurrection against the lawful government.
And the President must, of necessity, decide which is the government .... "374
Luther v. Borden was the Court's first-and, effectively, its last-pronouncement on the Domestic Violence Clause. Ironically, the Court avoided
stating what the Domestic Violence Clause meant or might mean in another
context. For the Court, it was sufficient that the power to decide the proce-

dural question of whether the precondition for the exercise of federal authority in state domestic affairs had been met was committed by statute to the
President. 75 The Court treated the Domestic Violence Clause as a procedural requirement for which there was no statutory role for the Court. 376 In
the context of Luther, the Court properly identified its role, but Luther was
read later for the broader proposition that the Republican Guarantee
Clause-and with it the Domestic
Violence Clause-raised questions for the
377
political branches exclusively.

[I]f the question of what was the rightful government within the intendment of § 4 of Article IV was a judicial one, the duty to afford
protection from invasion and to suppress domestic violence would
be also judicial, since those duties were inseparably related to the
378
determination of whether there was a rightful government.
Luther implied that the Court had nothing to say about the Domestic Violence Clause.

Id.; see Letter from President John Tyler to Governor Samuel King (Apr. 11, 1842), in
POTTER, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF A CONSITrUTION, AND ExTENsIoN OF SUFFRAGE IN RHODE ISLAND 52,54 (Boston, Thomas H. Webb & Co.
1842) (reprinting correspondence of President Tyler declining to respond to Governor King's
request to intervene in the Dorr Rebellion, but acknowledging his responsibility to recognize the
proper government); see also The Guaranteeof Orderand Republican Government in the States,
supra note 242, at 65 (explaining that the President could only intervene against "unlawful violence" and that to respond to a demand from a particular side would have been to recognize that
government as lawful).
375 See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 43.
376 See id. ("[Congress] might, if they had deemed it most advisable to do so, have placed it
in the power of a Court to decide when the contingency had happened which required the federal government to interfere. But Congress thought otherwise, and no doubt wisely ....
).
377 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 455 (1939); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon,
223 U.S. 118,141-50 (1912); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548,578-79 (1900); cf. Monarch Ins. Co.
v. District of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-55 (D.D.C. 1973) (denying claims against the
United States based on the Domestic Violence Clause for the failure to prevent 1968 riots because "the decision to use troops or the militia (National Guard) in quelling a civil disorder is
exclusively within the province of the President"), affd mem., 497 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Beale, 282 F. 934, 936 (S.D. Ohio 1922) (declining to issue a
certificate that an insurrection exists because that determination belongs to the President). In
the context of immigration policy and implementation, several courts recently have held that
claims arising out of the Invasion and Guarantee Clauses are nonjusticiable. See Texas v. United
States, 106 F.3d 661, 666-67 (5th Cir. 1997); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1090-91
(9th Cir. 1997); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 468-70 (3d Cir. 1996); Padavan v.
United States, 82 F.3d 23, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1996); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094, 1097 (11th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1674 (1996).
378 Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 148.
374

ELISHA

R.
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The Domestic Violence Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment worked real change in state-federal relationships. This section reviews the development of federal criminal law in
light of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. As this section demonstrates, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were well aware that the
Amendment would alter the authority of the United States over domestic
violence. They were not of one mind, however, as to how the Fourteenth
Amendment would alter it and could not have predicted the course the Court
would chart.
A. Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
In early 1866, shortly after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment,
Congress began work on three important pieces of reconstruction legislation:
the Freedmen's Bureau Bill,379 the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (the "Civil Rights

Act"), 3 0 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress took up the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill first. Two sections of that bill are of interest here. Section 7
directed the President to provide military protection and military jurisdiction
over cases involving persons denied civil rights on the basis of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.38 1 Section 8 made it a misdemeanor to deprive persons of their rights, as provided in section 7.382 The Bill passed Congress but was vetoed by President Andrew Johnson, who questioned its
constitutionality, 3 3 and the veto was sustained in late February 1866.
Congress then took up a proposal to amend the Constitution. Republican Congressman John Bingham of Ohio proposed:
Article _. The Congress shall have power to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to
all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
384
liberty, and property.
Despite Bingham's assurance that the proposed amendment did not
"take away from any State any right that belongs to it,' ' 385 he candidly admit-

ted that under his proposal Congress would have the power to make laws
equal.38 6 Senator William Stewart of Nevada argued that the only way to
make the laws equal was to "afford the same protection in all the States,"
which would require Congress "to legislate fully upon all subjects affecting
life, liberty, and property, and in this way secure uniformity and equal protecS. 60, 39th Cong. (1866).
Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 19871992 (1994)).
381 See S. 60 § 7; HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT 13-14 (1965).
382 See S. 60 § 8; FLACK, supra note 381, at 13-14.
379
380

383

See

CONG. GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 915-17 (1866) (President Johnson's veto

statement).
384 Id. at 1034 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
385 Id. at 1088 (statement of Rep. Bingham)
386 See id. at 1093-94 (statements of Reps. Hale and Bingham).
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tion to all persons in the several States. '3 Some members of Congress believed that Bingham's proposal gave Congress the power to prescribe
uniform criminal codes, which they regarded as an "utter departure" from
the original constitutional scheme.388 It was soon apparent that there was
formidable opposition to Bingham's proposed amendment, and the amend3 89
ment was tabled while Congress considered the Civil Rights bill.
The Civil Rights Act contained provisions similar to sections 7 and 8 of
the Freedmen's Bureau bill. Section 1 granted all citizens "the same
right.., as is enjoyed by white citizens" to make contracts, sue, inherit, own
property, as well as the right "to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property. '390 Section 1 further provided that all citizens shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties. '391 Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act made it a misdemeanor for a
person, under color of law, to deprive an inhabitant of any State or Territory
of civil rights secured by section 1 by reason of color, race, or previous condition of servitude. 3g9 Congress enacted the bill in March 1866, only to have
President Andrew Johnson veto it, in part, because the bill would preempt
state criminal law.3 93 He feared that in the "vast domain of criminal jurisprudence, provided by each State for the protection of its own citizens, and for
the punishment of all persons who violate its criminal laws, Federal law,

387 Id. at 1082 (statement of Sen. Stewart); see also id. at 1263 (statement of Rep. Broomall)
(suggesting the Government already had the power "to protect its citizens within as well as

without its jurisdiction").
388 See id. at 1063 (statement of Rep. Hale); see also id. at 1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss) ("I understand the amendment as now proposed ... authorize[s] Congress to establish
uniform laws throughout the United States upon the subject named, the protection of life, lib-

erty, and property."); id. at 1087 (statement of Rep. Davis) (stating that the proposed amendment was "a grant for original legislation by Congress.... []t is itself the judge of the measure
of equal protection"). Senator Stewart remarked:
Congress shall have power by law to make all the laws in all the States affecting the

protection of either life, liberty, or property, precisely similar; ... Congress must
examine and modify all these laws, so that they shall afford the same protection in
all the States that they do in any. The only way this could be accomplished, would
be for Congress to legislature fully upon all subjects affecting life, liberty, and prop-

erty, and in this way secure uniformity and equal protection to all persons in the
several States. When this was done, there would not be much left for the State
Legislatures.

Id. at 1082 (statement of Sen. Stewart).
389 See id. at 1095 (postponing discussion on the amendment for about a month and a half);
see also FL~cK, supra note 381, at 59.
390 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1982, 1987-1992 (1994)).
391

Id.

392 See id. § 2. Section 2 reached only acts under color of law. Representative Wilson explained that, by this limitation, the drafters were attempting to avoid creation of "a general

criminal code for the States." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1120 (1866) (statement of
Rep. Wilson); see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-26 & n.33 (1968).
393 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679-81 (1866) (President Johnson's veto
statement).
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law. ' 394 This time, howwherever it can be made to apply, displaces State
395
ever, Congress overrode the President's veto.

Members of Congress, as well as the President, had lingering doubts
about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act.396 In response to these
concerns, Congress renewed its efforts to propose an amendment to the Constitution that would make the Civil Rights Act constitutional. 397 In May

1866, Thaddeus Stevens, the Republican leader in the House, introduced a
redrafted proposal very similar to our present Fourteenth Amendment. 398

The Amendment passed Congress in June 1866 and was ratified in July
1868.

B.

3 99

Congress, the Domestic Violence Clause, and the Civil Rights
Enforcement Debates
The challenge of enacting enabling legislation under the Fourteenth

Amendment fell to subsequent Congresses, which struggled with the Amendment's meaning.400 In 1871, Congress began consideration of the so-called
Ku Klux Klan Act, or the Civil Rights Act of 1871.401 Enacted pursuant to
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Ku Klux Klan Act provided a
civil remedy in tort for anyone deprived of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States" by a person acting
under the color of law. 40 2 The Ku Klux Klan Act also made it a criminal
offense for two or more persons to conspire to deprive "any person or any
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws. ' 40 3 The Act further authorized the President to employ the militia to suppress any "insurrection,
Id. at 1680.
See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, 14 Stat. at 29-30.
396 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:. FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 104 (1988).
397 See id. From the beginning of the Thirty-ninth Congress, some members of Congress
felt the need for an amendment to place the rights secured by the Freedmen's Bureau bill and
the Civil Rights Act "beyond the power of shifting congressional majorities." JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 184 (1951).
398 See FLACK, supra note 381, at 65-66, 116. For a detailed account of the drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see generally id. at 55-139.
399 See 15 Stat. app. at 708-11 (1868). Throughout the drafting and ratification process, the
most extensive debates in Congress were the debates over Bingham's proposed amendment in
February 1866.
400 Following the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, Congress enacted various enforcement acts that contained criminal sanctions, in addition to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, discussed
infra. The Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1981, 1987-1991 (1994)), made it a misdemeanor to interfere with the right to vote. The Act of
Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, made it a misdemeanor to deny equal enjoyment of public
accommodations. The latter Act was held unconstitutional in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
25 (1883).
401 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
(West Supp. 1997)). Congress had voted to adjourn in March 1871 when it received a message
from President Ulysses Grant, requesting legislation to protect life, liberty, and property. Five
days later, Representative Shellabarger reported a bill to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
See FLACK, supra note 381, at 226-27.
402 Act of Apr. 20, 1871 § 1.
403 Id. § 2 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
394
395
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domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies" hindering the execution of the laws, when state officials are unable or unwilling to protect the
state's citizens. 40 4 It thus extended dramatically the President's authority
under the Militia Act, which had been enacted pursuant to Article IV, Sec405
tion 4.
The Ku Klux Klan Act tested the limits of Congress's power under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike the Act of May 31, 1870, there was no requirement that a conspiracy have any connection with or approval by state
officials, aside from the simple failure to prevent it.4°6 Rather, as in the
Freedmen's Bureau bill and the Civil Rights Act, Congress intended to punish individuals, not states or state officials. 4°7 But unlike those prior bills,
which claimed power from the Thirteenth Amendment, 40 8 the Ku Klux Klan

Act's references to equal protection tied it securely to the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4°9 Front and center in the extensive debates were questions

about Congress's power to punish crime and the role of the Domestic Violence Clause.
The opponents of the Ku Klux Klan Act made three general arguments
against Congress's power to enact such legislation. They first made the familiar argument that Congress had limited authority to pass criminal legislation,
a claim that received little response from the Act's proponents. Second, they
argued that Congress had not acquired new power to punish crime under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a claim that was carefully contested by Radical
Republicans and questioned even by cautious opponents of the bill. Finally,
Id. § 3. The current codification provides:
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other
means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State,
any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States
within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right,
privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by
law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to
protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or
impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied
the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.
10 U.S.C. § 333 (1994); see Ferguson, supra note 198, at 414-19 (discussing the constitutionality
of section 333).
405 Compare 10 U.S.C. § 331 (corresponds to the Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264)
(requiring a state request for federal assistance with domestic violence), with 10 U.S.C. § 333
(authorizing intervention without a state's request). See Comment, FederalIntervention in the
States for the Suppression of Domestic Violence: Constitutionality, Statutory Power, and Policy,
1966 DuKE L.J. 415, 418 n.16 [hereinafter FederalIntervention in the States] (indicating that the
Ku Klux Klan Act was independent of Article IV, Section 4).
406 See Act of Apr. 20, 1871 § 3.
407 See Federal Intervention in the States, supra note 405, at 428.
404

408

See FLACK, supra note 381, at 19-27.

409 See FederalIntervention in the States, supra note 405, at 419-20; see also District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973) ("Unlike the 1866 [Civil Rights] Act, which was
passed as a means to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, the primary purpose of the 1871 Act
was 'to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" (quoting full title of the Act of
April 20, 1871)).
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the Act's opponents argued that the Domestic Violence Clause reserved the
states' rights over crime and that it had not been repealed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Act's supporters responded that the Domestic Violence
Clause either was not encroached or, more boldly, actually supported Congress's power. This section examines each of these arguments in context.
1. Enumerated Crimes and Necessary and Proper Crimes
The first person to speak after the Ku Klux Klan Bill was introduced was
Democratic Representative Michael Kerr of Indiana. Representative Kerr
argued that the bill constituted a "shabby evasion of an express limitation
upon the power of Congress. 410 He quoted Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in Cohens v. Virginia411 to support the proposition that Congress's "criminal
jurisdiction is rigidly confined to the punishment of crimes committed within
places subject to its exclusive jurisdiction ... and to crimes against the reve412
nue, or other clearly granted powers of general control and regulation.
Representative John B. Storm of Pennsylvania put the question in a more
sophisticated light. He first asked whether the Fourteenth Amendment denied to the states the right to punish crimes. 413 Concluding that it did not, he
argued that the Piracy Clause and the principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius demonstrated that Congress could not deprive the states of the right
to punish crimes other than piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas.414 He then referred to the District of Columbia Clause and the Act of
own authority as limited; a
1790 as evidence that the first Congress viewed its
415
view which, he said, was confirmed by Cohens.
Echoing Representatives Kerr and Storm, Representative Charles W.
Willard of Vermont referred to the Counterfeiting and Treason Clauses as
evidence of the states' reserved powers.
Certain specified crimes.

. .

the General Government has jurisdic-

tion of and can punish; but it can no more punish offenses against
life and property . . . than it can regulate the distribution of the

the matters
property of estates, the enforcement of civil contracts, 416
of taxation, or the proceedings in courts, in the States.
Representative James G. Blair of Missouri added that although Congress
could punish what he referred to as "incidental" crimes-those "[o]ffenses
arising from the violation of the specific powers granted," such as the power
to establish post roads-Congress did not receive a constitutional grant to
punish "substantive crime," such as murder or larceny. 417 Representative
42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 50 (1871) (statement of Rep. Kerr).
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 428 (1821) ("It is clear, that Congress cannot punish felonies
); see supra text accompanying notes 354-360.
generally ....
412 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 50 (1871) (statement of Rep. Kerr).
413 See id. app. at 86 (statement of Rep. Storm).
410

CONG. GLOBE,

411

414

See id. app. at 86-87 (statement of Rep. Storm).

415

See id. app. at 87 (statement of Rep. Storm).

416

Id. app. at 187 (statement of Rep. Willard).

417

Id. app. at 207 (statement of Rep. J. Blair).
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Horatio C. Burchard of Illinois worried that if Congress could punish conspiracy to commit a crime, it could punish the underlying offense as well.418
The supporters of the Ku Klux Klan Act offered little rebuttal to these
claims. They likely believed that it was too late to argue that Congress did
not have the power to punish crimes other than those enumerated, and that
the Ku Klux Klan Act was an "incidental" crime as Representative James
Blair had defined it. As the bill's sponsor, Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio pointed out, the question was not one of Congress's exclusive control of crime, but of its concurrent power under the dual sovereignty
doctrine.

419

Surprisingly, few supporters of the legislation referred to Congress's
prior criminal legislation, including the recent Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
1870, both of which contained criminal provisions. 420 If Congress really was
limited to punishing only enumerated crimes, or even crimes "incidental" to
its express powers, the prior acts should have been unconstitutional. Undoubtedly, there were important distinctions to be made between the earlier
acts and the 1871 proposal, but neither side seemed willing to articulate a
comprehensive theory of Congress's criminal authority.
2. CriminalAuthority Under the FourteenthAmendment
However limited Congress's power to define and punish crimes had
been under the original Constitution, the opponents of the Ku Klux Klan Act
had to show that Congress had not acquired any new criminal authority
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 421 The Act's proponents could find
two textual bases for arguing that Congress had new congressional power
over crime. First, the Equal Protection Clause was nominally about "protection of the laws. '422 This clause at least guaranteed equality in the administration of state-laws. Although it may not have constituted a license to courts to
ensure that the laws were equal, it at least assured that "protection of the
laws" was administered fairly.423 Second, the Privileges and Immunities
418 See id. app. at 313 (statement of Rep. Burchard). If Congress indeed had such a power,
he added, "a revolution in the whole theory of our Government has been effected unknown to
the people." Id. (statement of Rep. Burchard).
419 See id. app. at 70 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger) ("[Tihe [Fourteenth] amendment
have brought within the benign protection of the Constitution... these 'fundamental' rights of

American citizenship, and Congress can protect them and so can the States so far as they are
identical.").
420 But see id. app. at 153 (statement of Rep. Garfield) (referring to the Civil Rights Acts of

1866 and 1870); id at 506 (statement of Sen. Pratt) (same).
421 Representatives Bingham and Shellabarger asserted that the Ku Klux Klan Act's constitutionality rested on the Fourteenth Amendment's grant of power to enforce its provisions. See
id. app. at 83 (statement of Rep. Bingham); id. app. at 69 (statement of Rep. Shelabarger).
Shellabarger loosely quoted Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 230 (1847) for the propo-

sition that Congress may "'enforc[e] by legislation every constitutional provision'
[sic] .... Congress is bound to execute, by legislation .... even those provisions not specially
named as to be so enforced." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 69 (1871) (statement of
Rep. Shelabarger).
422 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.

423 See Harrison, supranote 129, at 1433-37, 1447-51 (arguing that the "equal protection of
the laws" is different from the protection of "equal laws"; "the Equal Protection Clause is mainly
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Clause forbids the states from abridging the "privileges or immunities of citizens," 424 which, following Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,
included "[p]rotection by the Government." 425
Opponents of the Ku Klux Klan Act responded with two arguments.
First, they claimed that because Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was
a negative provision akin to the state disabilities found in Article I, Section
10 ("No state shall"), it was judicially, but not legislatively, enforceable; thus,
Congress had acquired no additional power to define and punish crime. 426 In
making this assertion, they did not ignore Section 5,427 but rather they argued
that Section 1 was a congressionally unenforceable prohibition.
[B]y a negative provision States are prohibited from making and
enforcing laws which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States .... [N]egative provisions confer no
power to enact positive laws. There is simply a denial of power to
428
States, and not a conferring of power on Congress to pass laws.
Representative William S. Holman of Indiana added to the argument:
[I]t seems impossible that [the Equal Protection Clause] should be
tortured into an affirmative power in Congress to legislate on that
subject. Where power is conferred on Congress by the Constitution
it is done in express terms, or as a necessary incident to a power of
legislation expressly conferred; but here there is no power conferred, but simply a denial of power.
[I]f any State does violate .. .these provisions [in section
1] ... [t]he Federal courts [will] . . . declare[ ] the statute null and
429
void.
430
On this ground, the opponents had made an important point.
Although the Equal Protection Clause undoubtedly was about protection,
and southern states had shown an appalling lack of respect for the rights of
their new citizens, the structure of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
was decidedly-indeed, deliberately-that of Article I, Section 10.431 The
about protection, even though it is about equality too"); Heyman, supra note 128, at 563-66; see
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063-64 (1866) (colloquy between Reps. Stevens and
Hale) (illustrating the two sides of congressional debate on the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause).
424 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
425 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
426 On the comparison between Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I,
Section 10, see CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 260 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Holman); id. app. at 221 (statement of Sen. Thurman).
427 See id. app. at 160 (statement of Rep. Golladay) (arguing that Section 5 "applies to the
other sections of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and not to the first section").
428 Id.
429 Id. app. at 259 (statement of Rep. Holman); see id. app. at 242 (statement of Sen. Bayard) (stating that there is no "affirmative grant of power" in Section 1); id. at 572 (statement of
Sen. Stockton) (disparaging the claim that "because no State can, Congress may; or, in other
words, the denial of power to a State confers it on Congress").
430 See Bybee, supra note 33, at 1592-96 (discussing these arguments in the context of congressional power to enact legislation respecting the First Amendment).
431 Representative Bingham stated that he "imitate[d] the framers of the original Constitu-

HeinOnline -- 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 64 1997-1998

1997]

InsuringDomestic Tranquility

later sections were self-executing and complete without congressional enactment. 432 Moreover, the argument did not overlook Section 5, but limited its
application to those sections of the Fourteenth Amendment that clearly con-

templated congressional action, Sections 2 and 3.433

Representative Shellabarger responded to these arguments by pointing

out that the Fugitive Slave Clause 434 was also a negative clause, granting no
express power to Congress. 435 Nevertheless, Congress had legislated the Fu437
gitive Slave Act 436 in 1793 and prescribed criminal violations in 1850.
Moreover, the Supreme Court had upheld the 1793 Act in Prigg v. Penn-

sylvania.438 He concluded that the Court's decision confirmed that "upon
that mere negation upon the power of the States it was the right of Congress
to enforce its provisions by affirmative law, both civil and criminal, in its
remedies." 439 Building upon the theme of Congress's duty to protect its citizens, Representative Bingham added that the Reconstruction Amendments
"vest in Congress a power to protect the rights of citizens against States, and
individuals in States, never before granted." 440
A second, more moderate, approach to opposing the Ku Klux Klan Act
was taken by Ohio Republican James Garfield and other Congressmen. Garfield suggested that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment could be enforced through Section 5 and, therefore, might justify congressional action,
including criminal sanctions. 441 What troubled Garfield, however, was that
the Fourteenth Amendment seemed to limit Congress's enforcement of Section" in his use of the phrase "[N]o State shall." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84
(1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
432 Representative Shellabarger countered this argument by distinguishing the legal relationship between the states and the national government from the relationship between states
and the people. See id. app. at 69-70 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger). Although the former are
"prohibitions upon the political powers of the States" and are "of such nature that they can be,
and even have been, when the occasion arose, enforced by the courts," the latter, including the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, are enforceable by Congress. Id. app.
at 69 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger). Likewise, because the provisions of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment were intended to protect personal rights from invasion by the states, he
argued that they were enforceable by Congress through affirmative legislation. See id. (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); infra text accompanying notes 434-439.
433 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 259 (1871) (statement of Rep. Holman).
434 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. This clause provides that
[n]o Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
ld.
435 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 70 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Shellabarger).
436 Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
437 See Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, § 7, 9 Stat. 462, 464; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. app. at 70 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
438 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622 (1842); see CONo. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 70
(1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
439 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 70 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
440 Id. app. at 83 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
441 See id. app. at 153 (statement of Rep. Garfield).
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tion 1 to circumstances when the "laws of the State are unequal" or there is
"a systematic maladministration of [the laws], or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions."'442 If this state of affairs was "clearly made out," Garfield believed that the Fourteenth Amendment authorized congressional
response.443 The problem was that the Ku Klux Klan Act "propose[d] to
punish citizens of the United States for violating State laws ....

[W]hen we

provide by congressional enactment to punish a mere violation of a State law,
we pass the line of constitutional authority. "' 4

Garfield argued that Con-

gress was simply assuming that violations of state criminal laws, without
more, constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws. 445 Were that the

case, Congress's authority would be nearly unlimited, as long as crimes were
committed in the states.446 In essence, Garfield and his colleagues regarded
this view as improperly imputing the acts of a state's citizens on the state

itself. As Illinois Representative John F. Farnsworth remarked, the bill "as447
sumes that an unlawful act of some of its citizens is the act of the State."
For Representatives Garfield, Farnsworth, and others, the proposed bill

fell well within power that Representatives Bingham and Shellabarger had
once advocated for Congress 44--but not within what Congress and the states
had actually agreed to in the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Garfield recognized that the power Congress claimed in 1871 was an exercise of
Representative Bingham's failed constitutional amendment, a charge Representative Bingham did not deny.449 Representative Bingham's "proposed

amendment," said Representative Garfield, "was a plain, unambiguous proposition to empower Congress to legislate directly upon the citizens of all the
States in regard to their rights of life, liberty, and property." 450 The Fourteenth Amendment instead "exerts its force directly upon the States .... The
other, the rejected proposition, would have brought the power of Congress to
'451
bear directly upon the citizens."
442 Id. (statement of Rep. Garfield); see also id. at 506 (statement of Sen. Pratt) ("So long
as the States do their duty in affording protection, there is no pretext for intervention by Congress."); id. at 501-02 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen) ("I hold it to be always constitutional to
prevent the Government and the administration of its laws from being destroyed or seriously
impaired.").
443 See id. app. at 153 (statement of Rep. Garfield).
444 Id. app. at 154 (statement of Rep. Garfield).
445 See id. (statement of Rep. Garfield).

446

See id.

Id. app. at 116 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth).
See supra notes 434-440 and accompanying text.
449 As Representative Bingham stated:
[The Fourteenth Amendment] is full and complete. The gentlemen says that
amendment differs from the amendment reported by me in February [1866]; differs
from the provision introduced and written by me, now in the fourteenth article of
amendments. It differs in this: that it is, as it now stands in the Constitution, more
comprehensive than as it was first proposed and reported in February, 1866. It
embraces all and more than did the February proposition.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 83 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
450 Id. app. at 151 (statement of Rep. Garfield).
451 Id.; see id. app. at 115-16 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth); see also EARL M. MALTZ,
447
448

CIVIL RIGHTS, THE

CoNsTrrlrION, AND CONGRESS,

1863-1869, at 92 (1990) (explaining that the

original proposal was defeated primarily because it was too broad); Alexander M. Bickel, The
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Representative Garfield's position was eminently reasonable. He did
not deny that Congress had acquired new authority in the Fourteenth
Amendment, including authority to prescribe and address crime. The authority Congress acquired was not plenary, however, but limited to crimes
committed by state officials who, while acting under color of state law, had
failed to respect citizens' rights to privileges or immunities, equal protection,
and due process.452 The Fourteenth Amendment did not extend Congress's
power to punish domestic crime committed by citizens, even if the crime
453
might be motivated by race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Rather, it granted Congress the power to address state refusals to protect its
citizens equally. 454

3. The Domestic Violence Clause as a Reserved Power
Finally, both sides looked to the Domestic Violence Clause to support
their positions. The proponents of the Ku Klux Klan Act argued that the
United States derived power from the Domestic Violence Clause. Indiana
Senator Daniel D. Pratt reasoned that the Guarantee Clause and the Domestic Violence Clause implied power in the United States. 455 In Michigan Representative Austin Blair's opinion, the requirement of a state request for
'
federal assistance was a "mere[ ] technical difficulty. "456
[Article IV, Section 4] is mandatory: "The United States shall protect each of them against domestic violence on application." But,
now a case arises in which the domestic violence exists, and large
numbers of the people who suffer apply to Congress for its suppression; but the State authorities, in plain violation of their duty, will
not make the application. May not the Government, under this section, waive the application and move at once to the performance of
457
its duty in this respect?
According to Representative Blair, drawing support from the Militia Act
and President Washington's actions in the Whiskey Rebellion, a state request
is not a condition precedent to federal action to suppress domestic violence
pursuant to Article IV, Section 4:
The Constitution forbids nothing in this section. It lays a duty upon
the United States in a certain event, but it does not prohibit the
performance of that duty in case the event does not occur. The
Constitution is open to reasonable construction upon that subject,
and the construction ought to be such as to promote the manifest
Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 60 n.115 (1955) (reviewing the Bingham-Garfield debate over Congress's power to legislate under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
452 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 151 (1871) (statement of Rep. Garfield).
453 See id. app. at 154 (statement of Rep. Garfield).
454 See id. app. at 153 (statement of Rep. Garfield).
455 See id. at 504 (statement of Sen. Pratt) ("It cannot be that the United States, charged
with guarantying to every State a republican form of government and protecting it against domestic violence, shall not possess the power adequate to fulfill its trust.").
456 Id. app. at 72 (statement of Rep. A. Blair).
457 Id. (statement of Rep. A. Blair).
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object of the provision, which was
to protect the people of the
458
States against domestic violence.
To Representative Blair, the Domestic Violence Clause constituted a
continuing obligation on the part of the United States and required no authorizing request from a state. Rather, a state could compel the United
States to aid the state when the United States had not come to the state's
assistance on its own volition. 459 Representative Blair's argument was a
bootstrap. Crime became evidence of a state's inability (or inattention to the
need) to call for assistance under Article IV, Section 4. The failure to call for
federal assistance denied protection of the laws to the state's citizens. Therefore, the argument went, Congress could intervene without a state request by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Other members of Congress thought that the Fourteenth Amendment
eliminated outright the Domestic Violence Clause's requirement that a state
request assistance before the United States intervened. Although New
Jersey Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen denied that it was "expedient for the
General Government to assume a general municipal jurisdiction over crimes
in the States,' 460 he thought, nevertheless, that the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Ku Klux Klan Act granted new powers to the President:
When the President, in the exercise of his official judgment, is satisfied that, by reason of combinations, insurrections, or domestic violence in any State, the State fails to give protection to the citizen of
the United States in his privileges and immunities, it should be the
President's duty to suppress such domestic violence or combination
by the use of the military force or other means ....
...

[I]f you give the President of the United States authority to

employ the military force and other means, such as police or constabulary force, to suppress domestic violence ... there will not be
461
much disorder in [the South].

He concluded that the federal government can
act[ ], nationally, in its supervision over the peace and order of the
States. This would be giving the President the same power that the
fourth article of the Constitution gives him, only it is to be exercised
at his discretion instead of at the discretion and request of a Governor of a State. 462
458 Id. app. at 72-73 (statement of Rep. A. Blair); see id. app. at 79 (statement of Rep.
Perry) (suggesting that the language regarding a state request means "that when applied to in
that way [the United States] shall assist. It does not expressly forbid assistance when not applied
for in that way"); see also id. at 604 (statement of Sen. Pool) ("When any State denies the protection of the laws to persons within its jurisdiction, it is competent for the Government of the
United States to intervene and to afford to its citizens that protection.").
459 See id. app. at 79 (statement of Rep. Perry); id. app. at 72-73 (statement of Rep. A.
Blair).
460 Id. at 501 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen).
461 Id. at 501-02 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen).
462 Id. at 502 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen). Vermont Senator George Edmunds reinforced this view of the President-as-Governor. Under the Ku Klux Klan Act, the President and
the military "act... just as police officers .... [They are in] precisely the position that a body of
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Although Senator Frelinghuysen did not think the Domestic Violence
Clause constrained the United States' ability to suppress domestic violence in
the states, he seemed to believe that the Ku Klux Klan Act did not work a
serious deprivation of state control over crime. He did not explain, however,
what limits, if any, were placed on Congress.
The United States interferes only to guaranty rights and protection
when the State fails, and acts in its national character, and not municipally. It does not interfere with the State government, excepting
to strengthen and sustain it. The United States neither makes nor
executes a criminal code. The framework of our Government, reserving municipal government to the States and463national jurisdiction
to the General Government, is not disturbed.
Representative Shellabarger and others appeared to agree that the United
464
States could suppress domestic violence if a state denied equal protection.
Opponents of the Ku Klux Klan Act made two essential arguments.
They first warned that the Ku Klux Klan Act plainly violated the Domestic
Violence Clause, which they characterized as a reservation of state authority
over crime. According to Representative George W. Morgan of Ohio, "so
jealous is the Constitution of the rights and liberties of the people, that it
does not allow the President to interfere, even on the application of the Governor of a State, except when the Legislature cannot be convened. '465 Citing
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, New Jersey Senator John P.
Stockton argued that Article IV, Section 4 provided "a full, ample, and complete remedy" to domestic violence and "absolutely forbid[s] any other interference by other means or under other circumstances. ' 466 Other
Congressmen agreed that the Domestic Violence Clause left complete power
" Id. at 567-68 (statement of Sen.
police would occupy in seeing a riot in the streets of a city ....
Edmunds).
463 Id. at 502 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen).

464 See, e.g., id. app. at 71 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
Two things are provided-equal laws and protection for all; and whenever a State
denies that protection Congress may by law enforce protection. The amendment
does not say that in such case the laws of Congress must be made so that the protection cannot be furnished to the people until it is invited by the Legislature or
Executive of the very State which is denying it.

Id. (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); see FederalIntervention in the States, supra note 405, at 42627.
465 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 331 (1871) (statement of Rep. Morgan).

466 Id. at 574 (statement of Sen. Stockton). During the course of the Senate debates, Senator Lyman Trumbull objected to a proposal that would give the President power to intervene "in
all cases where domestic violence in any State shall obstruct the impartial course of justice." Id.
at 580 (statement of Sen. Trumbull). He reminded the Senate that the Act of 1792 had authorized the President to act only when the judiciary required assistance. The proposed language of
this bill went too far in his view. According to Trumbull, the United States could intervene when
a conspiracy obstructed constitutional rights, "but as the bill is altered, it provides for giving this
assistance to put down domestic violence in any locality in a State whenever the impartial admin-

istration of justice is interfered with." Id. at 581 (statement of Sen. Trumbull). Senator Trumbull
referred incorrectly to the Act of 1795, which eliminated the 1792 Act's requirement of judicial

certification. See supra note 270.
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over the question of domestic violence to the states. 467 Some quoted Justice

Story's Commentaries for the proposition (belonging to St. George Tucker)
that "'every pretext for intermeddling with the domestic concerns of any
State, under color of protecting it against domestic violence, is taken
away' ,,4 68 by the Domestic Violence Clause.
The Ku Klux Klan Act's opponents also argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment had not altered the relationship between the federal government and the states vis-a-vis the Domestic Violence Clause. In their opinion,
469
the clause "is not repealed or modified by the fourteenth amendment.
Moreover, they argued that the Fourteenth Amendment could not have re-

pealed the Domestic Violence Clause. Representative James Blair drew an
analogy between the Domestic Violence Clause and "specific jurisdiction,"
which he asserted was "fatal to the position assumed by the advocates of the

bill, that general jurisdiction over life, liberty, property, and the rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizen is conferred upon Congress[.] Is it not
fatal to any jurisdiction other than that specifically named... ?"470 For Representative Blair, the Fourteenth Amendment, as a broad prohibition, could

not have repealed, sub silentio, a reservation of power as specific as the Domestic Violence Clause.471
Congress, eventually enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act. 472 Section 333 of
Title 10 now provides that the President

shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a
State ....domestic violence... [when it] ... so hinders the execution of the laws of that State ...and the constituted authorities of
467 See, e.g., id. app. at 221 (statement of Sen. Thurman); id. app. at 207 (statement of Rep.
J. Blair); id. app. at 160 (statement of Rep. Golladay); id. app. at 117 (statement of Sen. F. Blair);
id. app. at 49 (statement of Rep. Kerr).
468 Id. app. at 49 (statement of Rep. Kerr) (quoting 1 STORY, supra note 242, at 633); see id.
app. at 117 (statement of Sen. F. Blair).
469 Id. app. at 49 (statement of Rep. Kerr); see id. app. at 117 (statement of Sen. F. Blair);
cf EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 259 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The Tenth Amendment was not, after all, repealed when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified .... The question then becomes whether the Fourteenth Amendment operates to transfer from the states to
the Federal Government the essentially local governmental function of deciding who will protect
citizens from lawbreakers.").
470 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 207 (1871) (statement of Rep. J. Blair).
471 I have not located further discussions of the Domestic Violence Clause in Congress. In
recent years, at least those years that can be researched through computer, the Domestic Violence Clause rarely has been invoked, and when it has, it has been asserted as a source of congressional authority. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REc. 32,959-61 (1987) (statement of Rep. Conyers)
(arguing, in support of the Fraud Amendments Act of 1987, that Article IV, Section 4 grants
Congress "the power to act to protect state and local governments, not only from foreign intrigue or domestic violence, but also corruption"); see also Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee
Clause as a Basis for FederalProsecutionsof State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL- L. REv. 367,
445 (1989) ("After its experience with the Reconstruction Acts, Congress has rarely exercised its
power under the guarantee clause to pass legislation or to otherwise justify congressional
action.").
472 See Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
(West Supp. 1997)).
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that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect [a right, privilege,
immunity, or protection named in the Constitution]. 473

C.

The Executive and Domestic Violence After the Adoption of the
FourteenthAmendment

Following the divergent and divisive congressional debates over the relationship between the Domestic Violence Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Executive Branch has taken a remarkably passive view of its
powers. The President has been careful to distinguish between responses to
opposition of federal law (for which the Militia Clause supplies the constitutional authority) 474 and formal state requests (for which the Domestic Vio-

lence Clause supplies the authority). 47 Even as the Executive has provided
assistance, it has affirmed the primary role of the states as guarantors of the
physical safety of the people. The Office of Legal Counsel stated in 1981 that
"[t]he statutory and constitutional scheme of our government leaves the protection of life and property and the maintenance of public order largely to
state and local governments. Only when civil disorder grows beyond a state's
ability to control or threatens federal rights does the federal government gen'476
erally intervene.
Even during the period of civil unrest following Brown v. Board of Education,477 when federal troops were used to enforce federal court decrees issued under the Fourteenth Amendment, 478 the Executive expressed its
473

10 U.S.C. § 333 (1994).

See, e.g., Proclamation No. 6023, 3 C.F.R. 113 (1990) (regarding domestic disturbances
in the Virgin Islands that obstructed execution of federal laws); Exec. Order No. 12,690, 3 C.F.R.
236 (same); Proclamation No. 5748, 3 C.F.R. 178 (1988) (regarding disturbances at a federal
penitentiary in Atlanta that made impractical the enforcement of certain federal laws); Exec.
Order No. 12,616, 3 C.F.R. 260 (same). But see EDWARD S. CoRwiN, THm PRSIDENT-r: OFCE
AND PoWERS, 1787-1957, at 133-36 (4th rev. ed. 1957) (arguing that the use of federal troops to
quash labor disputes blurred the line between federal and state control of the domestic peace).
475 See Proclamation No. 6427, 3 C.F.R. 44 (1992) (regarding the Los Angeles riots); John
Lancaster & Barton Gellman, 4,000 FederalTroops Concentratein StagingArea for L.A. Deployment, WASH. PosT, May 2, 1992, at A17 (referring to the request from California Governor
Wilson and Los Angeles Mayor Bradley for federal assistance); see also Governorship of Arkansas-Case of Baxter and Brooks, 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 391, 391 (1874) (application by the legislature, as well as two persons, each claiming to be governor, to prevent domestic violence
following a contested election for governor).
476 Use of Potatoes to Block the Maine-Canada Border, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 422, 423
(1981).
The present posture of criminal law in the United States is consistent with that
intended by the Founding Fathers: the States retain jurisdiction over crimes committed within the State which are local in nature; the Federal Government has jurisdiction over certain crimes that involve interstate commerce, taxes, assaults on
Federal and foreign officials, and the like.
1972 Arr'y GEN. ANN. REp. 26; see id. at 313 ("The Constitution ... provide[s] for Federal
assistance to States to help them to 'suppress Insurrections' and to insure 'against domestic
Violence."').
477 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
478 See President's Power to Use Federal Troops to Suppress Resistance to Enforcement of
Federal Court Orders-Little Rock, Arkansas, 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 329 (1957) (invoking the
authority of 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-333); Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: ConstitutionalFalse Conscious474
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reluctance to assume responsibility except when necessary. For example,
during the integration of Little Rock's schools, the U.S. Attorney General
reaffirmed that:
Whenever interference and obstruction to enforcement of law exists, and domestic violence is interposed to frustrate the judicial process, it is the primary and mandatory duty of the authorities of the
State to suppress the violence and to remove any obstruction to the
orderly enforcement of law. This same duty fully exists where the
domestic violence is interposed in opposition to the enforcement of
Federal law rather than to the local law of the State.479
Although the Executive has been reluctant to intervene physically in
specific instances, the President has not expressed the same reluctance to enforce the general criminal legislation of the United States, even when that
480
legislation may displace the "primary and mandatory duty" of the states.
D.

The Courts and the Federalizationof Crime After the Adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment

The federal judiciary showed an even more unreceptive disposition than
the Executive towards the expansion of federal control over crime. After
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to reconsider the extent of federal authority in light of that amendment.481 The initial signals were favorable to those who favored centralized
authority. In Ex parte Siebold,482 a case brought under the Civil Rights Act
of 1870,483 the Court declared that the United States may
by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that
belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that
extent.
This power to enforce its laws.., does not derogate from the

power of the State

....

484

ness and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 70 n.46 (1995) (discussing
presidential enforcement of court decrees in Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi pursuant to 10
U.S.C. §§ 331-333); see also FederalIntervention in the States, supra note 405, at 418 n.16 (noting
Governor Wallace's objections to the use of U.S. troops in Alabama during the civil rights era
because the state legislature had not requested federal assistance).
479 41 Op. Att'y Gen. at 322-23.
480 The United States has sought to enforce new federal legislation, even when the legislation touches matters traditionally within the states' purview. See, e.g., United States v. McHenry,
97 F.3d 125 (6th Cir. 1996) (enforcing the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994));
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995) (same). For
examples of federal legislation in the domestic relations area, see supra note 57.
481 See Bonfield, supra note 198, at 557 ("[A]s the Court discarded the guarantee clause as
judicially unenforceible [sic], it adopted and expanded the fourteenth amendment as a vehicle
for achieving many of the same ends.").
482 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
483 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1981, 1987-1991 (1994)).
484 Siebold, 100 U.S. at 395; see also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895) ("The entire
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This statement might simply have been a tautological declaration that the
United States would exercise such power as it possessed, but to the Congress
that recently had enacted various civil rights enforcement acts, it must have
been inspiring.
Whatever hope the Republican Congresses had for the recognition of a
broad criminal authority was dashed, however, in the early civil rights enforcement cases. 48 5 The Supreme Court did not deny that the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress some new authority to punish crime, but it maintained that the amendment had not given Congress expansive powers over
crime. In United States v. Cruikshank,486 the United States charged the defendants with violating section 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 487 by "banding" and conspiring to injure a citizen with the intent of hindering the
exercise of constitutional rights. 48

8

In particular, the defendants were

charged with, among other violations, conspiring to deprive citizens of their
lives and liberty without due process of law. This allegation, the Court said,
amounted to a charge of "conspiracy to falsely imprison or murder" and was
"no more... within the power of the United States... than it would be to
'489
punish for false imprisonment or murder itself.
Cruikshank was followed by United States v. Harris,490 in which the
Court struck down the criminal conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan
Act.4 91 The Ku Klux Klan Act punished conspiracies to deprive persons of
their privileges or immunities or their rights to equal protection and due
course of justice. 492 The statute did not apply only to the acts of a state or
state officials, but to the acts of private persons "no matter how well the State
'4 93
may have performed its duty.
First, the Court affirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment reached only
state actions and thus found the Act's criminal conspiracy provisions unconstitutional. 494 The Court then concluded that the Thirteenth Amendment did
not justify the law.495 It reasoned that if Congress could punish conspiracy to
do an unlawful act, it could punish the underlying criminal act as well, and
"[t]he only way.., in which one private person can deprive another of the
equal protection of the laws is by commission of some offense against the
laws which protect the rights of persons, as by theft, burglary, arson, libel,
strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of
all national powers and the security of all rights intrusted by the constitution to its care.").

485 See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicH. L.
REv. 1323, 1336-39 (1952).
486 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
487 Act of May 30, 1870 § 6.

488. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548-49.
489 Id

at 553-54.

490 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
491 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (originally codified at Rev. Stat. § 5519); see
Harris, 106 U.S. at 644.
492 See Act of Apr. 20, 1871 § 2.
493 Harris, 106 U.S. at 639.
494 See id. at 638-39 (citing Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554).
495 See id. at 639.
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If the Court upheld the criminal provisions of the Ku

Klux Klan Act, it would "accord to Congress the power to punish every
crime by which the right of any person to life, property, or reputation is invaded. '497 Moreover, approval of the Act's criminal sanctions under the
Thirteenth Amendment would "invest Congress with power over the whole
catalogue of crimes," a result that was "clearly unsound. '498 The Court sub-

sequently has given much broader construction to the civil rights enforcement provisions that impose civil rather than criminal sanctions, 499 and even
to those provisions that enforce criminal sanctions against state officials or
private persons who obtain cooperation from state officials.500
Finally, in the Civil Rights Cases,5 01 the Court struck down the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, which made it a misdemeanor to discriminate in public
accommodations on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.502 Holding that the Fourteenth Amendment reached only state action,
the Court warned that without a state action requirement, Congress could
not "enact a code of laws for the enforcement and vindication of all rights of
life, liberty, and property." 5°3
The Court had turned back Congress's aggressive use of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As the Court closed out the nineteenth century, however, it
expressly affirmed that Congress's power over crime was not limited to the
enumerated crimes:
Although the Constitution contains no grant, general or specific, to
Congress of the power to provide for the punishment of crimes, except piracies and felonies on the high seas, offences against the law
of nations, treason, and counterfeiting the securities and current
coin of the United States, no one doubts the power of Congress to
496

Id. at 643.

497

Id.

Id. The Court also cited with approval part of Justice Bradley's opinion as Circuit Justice in Cruikshank:
[The Fourteenth Amendment] is a guaranty of protection against the acts of the
state government itself. It is a guaranty against the exertion of arbitrary and tyrannical power on the part of the government and legislature of the state, not a guaranty against the commission of individual offenses; and the power of congress,
whether implied or expressed, to legislate for the enforcement of such a guaranty,
does not extend to the passage of laws for the suppression of ordinary crime within
the states. This would be to clothe congress with power to pass laws for the general
preservation of social order in every state.
United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 710 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897), affd, 92 U.S.
542 (1876); see Harris,106 U.S. at 638.
499 See, e.g., Griffin v. Beckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968); see also John Valery White, Vindicating Rights in a FederalSystem:
Rediscovering 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)'s Equality Right, 69 TEMp. L. REv. 145, 153-57 (1996) (discussing the evolution of the Court's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994), which provides the
civil remedy originally enacted as section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act).
500 See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-57 (1966); Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945).
501 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
502 See id. at 9-10, 26.
503 Id. at 14; see also id. at 11 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "does not authorize
Congress to create a code of municipal law").
498
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provide for the punishment of all crimes and offences against the
United States, whether committed within one of the States of the
over which Congress has plenary and exUnion, or within territory
5 04
clusive jurisdiction.
In the various civil rights enforcement cases, the Court confirmed that
the Fourteenth Amendment only modestly expanded Congress's criminal authority; any future expansions of federal criminal law would have to rely on
authority that took place soon after,
the growth of existing congressional
50 5
through the Commerce Clause.
V.

The Future of the Domestic Violence Clause

Congress's debates and enactments, the President's deployment of
troops, and the Supreme Court's opinions demonstrate a wide spectrum of
views on the power of the United States under the Domestic Violence
Clause. It is at least clear that the clause was of great importance to the
Framers, that it remained important to the early Congresses, and that it reacquired significance in the civil rights enforcement debates.5 °6 The Domestic
Violence Clause has been regarded variously as a purely procedural requirement, as evidence of federal power, as a clause repealed sub silentio by the
Fourteenth Amendment, and as evidence of state insulation from federal authority. This section explores the legitimacy of the explanations of the Domestic Violence Clause's role in federalism and congressional authority.
A.

The Domestic Violence Clause as a ProceduralRequirement

At its most basic level, the Domestic Violence Clause provides a procedure by which a state can request assistance from the federal government.
This reading of the clause is a natural reading of the text and satisfies the
concerns of the Framers that a state (such as Massachusetts during Shays'
507
Rebellion) has a means of obligating the United States to come to its aid.
The elements of the Domestic Violence Clause's procedural effect are
significant. First, the Domestic Violence Clause recognizes the right of state
governments to request assistance and, within state governments, the pre504 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263,283 (1892); see also In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134

(1892) ("It is not necessary that Congress should have the power to deal with crime or immorality within the States in order to maintain that it possesses the power to forbid the use of the mails
in aid of the perpetration of crime or immorality.").
505 The Commerce Clause, as has been well documented, has been the principal source of

Congress's broad criminal power. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
For a time, Section 2 of the Eighteenth Amendment also served as a basis for federal criminal authority over "intoxicating liquors." U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2 ("The Congress and
the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."), repealed by U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXI. For a discussion of the role the Prohibition
Amendment played in the development of federal criminal law, see generally KENNETH M.
MURCHIsoN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DocrnINEs: THE FORGOTTEN INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL
PROHIBITION (1994).
506

Since Luther v. Borden, it has not played a significant role in court decisions. See supra

notes 375-378 and accompanying text.
507

See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
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ferred position of state legislatures over governors. For those states
threatened with federal military intervention, the clause provides a brightline process for inviting a federal presence. The state legislature's power to
request federal troops is the closest thing the Constitution allows to a state
declaration of war; it is the state's means to combat violence beyond its
resources.
Second, the Domestic Violence Clause conscientiously distinguishes between state legislatures and state governors, but it conspicuously fails to assign within the national government responsibility for responding to a state's
'50
request for assistance. The power is granted to "[t]he United States.
Although Congress has assigned to the President the responsibility of responding to state requests, there is no textual reason (as the Court itself acknowledged in Luther v. Borden)50 9 that the judiciary could not assume some
responsibility for its enforcement. The power to respond to domestic violence naturally devolved to the political and war-making branches. Since Luther, the Court has disclaimed any statutory responsibility for the process of
responding to the states.
Following the passage of the Militia Act, presidents have most frequently and quite naturally viewed the Domestic Violence Clause as a procedural requirement. 51 0 From the President's perspective, the power he
possesses under the Domestic Violence Clause and the early militia acts is
simply an extension of his authority as commander in chief. 511 This statement
should not suggest that the President bears only a ministerial duty. Because
the Constitution distinguishes between invasion (of the United States or a
state), insurrection (against the United States), and domestic violence
(against a state), the President must discern between domestic violence in the
states (for which he needs a request before intervening), and insurrection
against the United States or invasion of a state or the United States (for
512
which he needs no further authorization).
As previously discussed, presidents have been cautious in the exercise of
their authority against domestic violence.51 3 They have distinguished between domestic violence at federal facilities and in federal territories and domestic violence in the states, and have been careful to ensure that state
requests for assistance have come from the legislature. Furthermore, when a
governor has assumed the responsibility for making the request, presidents
have exercised their own judgment as to whether the Constitution has been
5 14
satisfied because the legislature was unable to convene.
§ 4.
See 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 43 (1849).
It rested with Congress ...to determine upon the means proper.., to fulfil [the
guarantee of the Domestic Violence Clause]. They might, if they had deemed it
most advisable to do so, have placed it in the power of a court to decide when the
contingency had happened which required the federal government to interfere.

508 U.S. CoisT. art. IV,
509

Id.
510 See, e.g., THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE UNDER FEDERAL LAW, supra note 329, at 3-4.
511 See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
512 See id. art. IV, § 4; 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333 (1994).
513 See supra Part III.C.2 and Part IV.C.
514 See, e.g., JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., FEDERAL AID iN DoMESTIc DIsTuRBANCEs, 1903HeinOnline -- 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 76 1997-1998
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The Domestic Violence Clause as a Substantive Provision

If the Domestic Violence Clause only fulfilled the procedural role described in the preceding section, it would satisfy the intentions of many of the
Framers and would serve a useful, if limited, function. But the Domestic
Violence Clause has long had a secondary meaning, one that the Supreme
Court has never had the opportunity to recognize and one only infrequently
acknowledged by the Executive. To many of the Framers, early constitutional commentators, and drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Domestic Violence Clause never was simply a process for requesting federal
assistance, but was a substantive provision as well.
1.

The Domestic Violence Clause as a Grantof FederalPower

With lingering concerns over Shays' Rebellion, some of the Framers regarded the Domestic Violence Clause as a grant of power to the federal government to address extraordinary incidents of violence.5 15 They emphasized
the Domestic Violence Clause as a grant of power, a recognition that no government incapable of offering protection to its citizens was worthy of the
devotion of those citizens.5 16 Nearly a century later, Radical Republicans,
deeply disturbed by racially motivated mobs, riots, and other violence in the
South, again viewed the Domestic Violence Clause as a grant of national
power, albeit a flawed grant.5 17 To some of them, the Domestic Violence
Clause is itself plenary authorization to suppress domestic violence. They
conceived of the Domestic Violence Clause as a continuing obligation on the
part of the United States, which it might choose to fulfill at its own discretion. 518 The phrase "on Application of the Legislature" provides a means for
states to compel the United States to intervene when the United States had
not already done SO. 5 19 Under this construction, the United States insures
domestic tranquility even when, in the view of the governor or the state legislature, no assistance is necessary.
To other drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Domestic Violence
Clause did not go so far. In their view, the Domestic Violence Clause requires a state to consent to federal intervention, a constitutional flaw that the
Equal Protection Clause remedied.5 20 Under this view, the Fourteenth
Amendment superseded the Domestic Violence Clause and authorized federal intervention whenever required to protect U.S. citizens. Still others believed the Fourteenth Amendment simply added to, but did not supersede,
521
the powers of the United States under the Domestic Violence Clause.
Rather they thought that the two provisions were linked through a mirror1922, S. Doc. No. 67-263 (1922) (supplementing FREDERCK T. WILSON, U.S. ARMY, FEDERAL
AiD iN DoMESTIC DISTURBANCES, 1787-1903, S. Doc. No. 57-209 (1903))..
515 See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
516 See supra notes 128-131, 198 and accompanying text.
517 See supra notes 455-459 and accompanying text.
518 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 79 (1871) (statement of Rep. Perry); id.
app. at 72-73 (statement of Rep. A. Blair).
519 See id. app. at 72-73, 79.
520 See supra notes 459462 and accompanying text.
521 See supra notes 460-462 and accompanying text.
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image symmetry: the Domestic Violence Clause protects state governments
from groups of their citizens; the Fourteenth Amendment protects groups of
citizens from their state governments.
In one sense, the Domestic Violence Clause clearly empowers the
United States to respond to domestic violence. No other constitutionally
granted power authorizes the United States to suppress domestic violence.
law and protection
The Militia Clause only authorizes enforcement of federal
522
from insurrection or invasion of the United States.
Treating the Domestic Violence Clause purely as a power, however, is
troublesome. The clause surely authorizes federal intervention to suppress
domestic violence, but the aggressive interpretations outlined above would
moot the Invasion Clause and vastly expand the Militia Clause. An expansive reading also is less consistent with the context in which the Domestic
Violence Clause was drafted. There was little sense among the Framers that
the United States required a general power to address violence in the
states. 5z3 Although the memory of Shays' Rebellion was a powerful reminder of the vulnerability of the states and the need for union, the Framers
were acutely aware of the states' role as the first response to crime and violence. 524 A broad reading of the clause-as-power offers such huge potential
for federal intervention into state domestic affairs that it is inconceivable that
such an aggressive Federalist view would have prevailed.
It also is doubtful that the Fourteenth Amendment is a sufficient vehicle
for the repeal, sub silentio, of the Domestic Violence Clause. The Fourteenth
Amendment plainly is about protection (as are numerous other provisions of
the Constitution), but by its terms, it is about a special case of protectionequal protection.52 5 The Fourteenth Amendment might justify federal remedies against a state that systematically fails to offer the protection of its laws
to an individual or group. 526 It might justify criminal penalties against offending state officials. 527 But it is too great a leap to suggest that domestic
violence is, without more, evidence of a state's failure to protect its citizens
and sufficient justification for federal intervention. Such an approach, as the
Supreme Court recognized in the early civil rights cases, would make the
528
national government the peacekeeper of first resort.
A group among the Radical Republicans would have been happy to see
the federal government assume responsibility for national enforcement of
criminal law. Because they counted among their numbers the drafters and
spokesmen for the Fourteenth Amendment and the enforcement acts, the
Radical Republicans' views carry some weight. Their votes alone were not
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; supra note 224.
Rather, the Framers primarily seemed concerned with preventing organized insurrection. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. The Anti-Federalists envisioned an even
more limited role for the federal government. See, e.g., supra note 204.
524 See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 128, at 525 (describing in general terms the division of
responsibility for crime between the federal and state governments).
525 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. For a discussion of the Amendment's framers' debates,
see supra notes 384-388 and accompanying text.
526 See, e.g., supra notes 401-404 and accompanying text.
527 See supra notes 391-395 and accompanying text.
528 See supra notes 501-503 and accompanying text.
522
523
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sufficient, however, to carry the Amendment and the enforcement acts, and
more moderate Republicans and Democrats explained why the Fourteenth
Amendment, as written, did not go so far.529 The precise line between Congress's power to provide remedies for state violations of equal protection of
the laws and the general power of states as the primary agent for defining
and punishing crime may not always be clear (and is beyond my present purposes), 530 but drive-by shootings, "animal enterprise terrorism" against a zoo,
aquarium, circus, or rodeo, and carjackings 531 do not fall on Congress's side
of the line.
2.

The Domestic Violence Clause as a Reservation of State Authority

The Domestic Violence Clause was also viewed as a disability on the
federal government and a reservation of state authority, a kind of Tenth
Amendment for crime. Through the Militia Clause, the Framers authorized
to Congress the use of the militia to execute the laws of the United States,
repel invasions, and suppress insurrections. The Domestic Violence Clause,
on the other hand, was seen as a bill of rights for the states, ensuring that the
United States would not abuse its authority over the militia to displace state
power over domestic disturbances. The Domestic Violence Clause dispelled
any thought that the United States had a general authority to address crime.
This view of the Domestic Violence Clause confirms the enumerated
power doctrine. Domestic violence is by its nature local; it refers to the internal affairs of a state. Although a state might believe itself overwhelmed by
insurrection, riots, or even more ordinary crime, the decision whether assistance is needed, like decisions about defining and punishing crime itself, belongs to the state. Such a reading of the clause is confirmed by the
requirement that state legislatures, rather than the state executive, make the
request, which gives the states an additional measure of security by avoiding
5 32
a precipitous request by the governor.
It is not a contradiction to suggest that the Domestic Violence Clause is
both a power and a disability. More precisely, the Domestic Violence Clause
is a conditional grant of power and a disability. In form, the clause is similar
to the disabilities imposed upon the states in Article I, Section 10. Consider,
for example, the Compacts Clause: 533 the states are forbidden to enter into
compacts with other states, except where Congress specifically authorizes it.
The Compacts Clause is a conditional disability.
529 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 260 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Holman); supra notes 428-433 and accompanying text.
530 See OFFICE oF =H JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCEs, 1903-1922, S. Doc. No. 67-263 (1922) (supplementing FREDERICK T. WILSON, U.S.
ARMY, FEDERAL AnD IN DoMEsTIc DISTURBANCES, 1787-1903, S. Doc. No. 57-209 (1903)); Fed-

eral Intervention in the States, supra note 405, at 460-62.
531

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 36, 43, 2119 (1994).

532 See, e.g., 2

FARRAND,

supra note 162, at 317 (rejecting a motion to strike "on application

of the legislature," but also agreeing that the request should not simply come from the legislature or executive).
533

gress ....

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Conenter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power
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Because of the structure of the Constitution, a conditional power in
Congress and a conditional disability in the states are roughly symmetrical.
Congress may exercise only those powers specifically granted it; the states
are denied only such powers expressly or implicitly denied them. The states
expressly are denied the power to enter into interstate compacts, subject to a
condition permitting them to do so. Likewise, the United States is denied the
power to intervene in state domestic violence, subject to a condition permitting it to do so. The result under both clauses is the same, as the states may
not enter into interstate compacts, nor may the United States intervene to
suppress a state's domestic violence, except as each is invited by the other.
This interpretation of the Domestic Violence Clause does not disparage
the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment. If a state denies to its citizens the
equal protection of the state's criminal laws, for example, Congress has
power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause through, among other things,
criminal sanctions against state officials. 534 But the Fourteenth Amendment
did not repeal the Domestic Violence Clause, nor did it (as revealed by its
text and history) displace the states as the level of government entrusted with
535
providing for domestic tranquility.
C. The Domestic Violence Clause and the Federalizationof Crime after

Lopez
What implications does this analysis have for the Domestic Violence
Clause and state-federal relations? There are two consequences: the clause
supplies both a rule and presumption. First, the Domestic Violence Clause
provides, at a minimum, a rule regarding the process by which the United
States may physically intervene to protect states from domestic (as opposed
to external) threats. At one time, the Domestic Violence Clause also might
have reinforced the enumerated powers doctrine, providing a rule that Congress had no power over crime except the three enumerated crimes and, perhaps, crimes committed in federal territory. Thus, it would have given the
states exclusive power over all other crime. This narrow view would not diminish Congress's power over commerce, but it would limit Congress's power
to define crimes based on the Commerce Clause.53 6 Although this is a plausible reading of the Domestic Violence Clause, in light of the practices of the
earliest Congresses and the Supreme Court's reading of the Necessary and
534 See, e.g., FederalIntervention in the States, supra note 405, at 438-39 (discussing Congress's ability to "punish the culpable failure of the state official to do his duty"); supra note 500
and accompanying text.
535 See supra text accompanying notes 525-528.
536 See Van Alstyne, supra note 100, at 1747. Throughout this analysis, I assume that there
are no independent grounds for federal intervention such as enforcing federal law, protecting the
state against invasion, or displacing the state's law enforcement functions because the state is
violating the Equal Protection Clause.
Ultimately, the Domestic Violence Clause largely may be symbolic, more a punctuation
mark emphasizing the importance of federalism principles that are woven throughout the enumerated powers doctrine. Nevertheless, the importance of such a function should not be overlooked. The Tenth Amendment bears such a burden. See Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 773
n.15. Lopez may also serve such a purpose. See Brickey, Life After Lopez, supra note 7, at 839
("[T]he real significance of Lopez may be its symbolic value.").
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Proper Clause, it is too late in the day to maintain it. The procedural function of the Domestic Violence Clause, however, is well established and
5 37
respected today.
Second, and most important, this analysis suggests that the Domestic Violence Clause provides a presumption against federal preemption, co-option,
and even duplication of state efforts to control domestic violence. This secondary meaning of the Clause suggests that if the United States undertakes
to address domestic violence on the basis of its own independent authority, it
must demonstrate clear constitutional support for its actions. The Domestic
Violence Clause does not deprive the federal government of criminal jurisdiction that properly belongs to it, nor does it suggest that the division of
criminal jurisdiction between federal and state governments is unique and
exclusive. Rather, it emphasizes the different spheres in which the federal
government and the state governments operate and the fact that encroachment by the federal government into domestic violence undermines the
states in their first duty: protection of their citizens.
As its origins in Shays' Rebellion demonstrate, the Domestic Violence
Clause relates, in the first instance, to insurrections: those actions that
(although falling short of overt revolution) threaten the legitimacy of the
government itself.5 38 Violent acts against the government are regarded as
more serious than violent acts against individuals because the former
5 39
threaten our common ability to maintain our supporting institutions.
Hence, the promise of federal support to suppress domestic violence was significant because it ensured that state governments could rely on the resources
of other states, brought together by the United States, to guarantee the physical integrity of the state as a governmental institution and to secure the people in the state as a political body.
When Congress seeks to punish ordinary crime, however, it suggests that
Congress can, a fortiori, intervene to preserve the institution of a state unable
to control domestic violence even in the absence of a request by the state
legislature. But that implication is contrary to the accepted understanding of
the clause. When Congress invokes the Commerce Clause, for example, in a
way that affects a state's power over ordinary crime within the state, Congress eviscerates the Domestic Violence Clause. Congress threatens to assume, on its own authority, all responsibility for domestic violence, nullifying
the clause entirely.
The Domestic Violence Clause supplies an independent justification for
demanding that Congress demonstrate that it has not displaced the criminal
authority of the states when it legislates against crime in the states. In this
respect, the Domestic Violence Clause provides a better explanation for the
state as the primary authority against crime than does the Court's flawed
Tenth Amendment analysis in Lopez.540 Furthermore, the Domestic Vio537 See supra Part V.A.
538 See, e.g., WICEK, supra note 131, at 33; supra note 123 and accompanying text.
539 See supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text.
540 For similar reasons, the Domestic Violence Clause also supports the Court's recent decision in Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997), in which it held unconstitutional the Brady
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lence Clause supports the Court's insistence in Lopez that activities that Congress makes criminal under the Commerce Clause must "substantially affect"
commerce. 541 After Lopez, Congress bears the burden of demonstrating that
legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause substantially, and not inci542
dentally, affects commerce.
Indeed, the Domestic Violence Clause may demand an even more
scrupulous review of federal criminal legislation than would Lopez.
Although Lopez applies to all legislation under the Commerce Clause,
5 43
whether criminal or civil, it has no application to noncommerce legislation.
The Domestic Violence Clause, on the other hand, is an external constraint
on federal criminal law enforcement, whether Congress derives its authority
from the Commerce Clause or some other provision. Thus, the "substantially
affects" standard may not translate effectively should the Court be called
upon to review federal criminal legislation that claims provenance from other
constitutional provisions. This analysis of the Domestic Violence Clause
does not prevent Congress from passing laws that define and punish crime,
nor does it prevent Congress from passing laws that overlap with state domestic violence provisions (and in their enforcement even displace state enforcement). But the Domestic Violence Clause requires that if Congress
undertakes to define and punish crime, it must have some firm constitutionally enumerated basis for doing so.
Finally, implicit in this analysis is the idea that it is appropriate for the
judiciary to sit in judgment of congressional legislation. Whatever the merits
of judicial review in other contexts, the Domestic Violence Clause imposes a
duty on the "United States," and not on Congress alone. 544 The Court may
have few tools for judging the legitimacy of competing governments (as in
Luther), but it surely is able to distinguish between legislation legitimately
serving an end within the express powers of the United States and the creation of a general, federal criminal code.
VI.

Conclusion

The Domestic Violence Clause demands that one respect the notion of a
dual criminal system. It is a powerful reminder of the primacy of the states as
the caretakers of the public peace and the lesser role of the United States as
the insurer of that peace when the state admits that the matter is beyond its
resources. Although the Court in Lopez took a step towards refocusing our
eral principles of federalism, the Court concluded that "[tihe power of the Federal Government
would be augmented immeasurably if it were to impress into service-and at no cost to itselfthe police officers of the 50 states." Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
If, as I have argued, the Domestic Violence Clause prevents the federal government from
displacing indirectly the states' law enforcement responsibilities through a duplicative federal
criminal code, a fortiori, the federal government cannot displace the states directly by conscripting into service state law enforcement officials.
541 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
542 See id.

543 See id. at 552 (indicating that the issue before the Court was limited to Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause).
544 See U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 4.
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attention on federalisi, the courts should either confess the end of the enumerated powers doctrine and finish the charade or put some teeth back into
the doctrine. The Domestic Violence Clause provides one means for ensuring that the states provide for domestic tranquility, without interfering with
the United States' duty to insure it.
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